For those who may be interested on where the anti-AIPAC, pro-real peace, real two-state solution American Jewish center-left stands I am posting below recent declarations from J-Street and Israel Policy Forum.
- J-Street:
For those who don't know
J Street is the political arm of the pro-Israel, pro-peace movement. J Street was founded to promote meaningful American leadership to end the Arab-Israeli and Palestinian-Israel conflicts peacefully and diplomatically. We support a new direction for American policy in the Middle East and a broad public and policy debate about the U.S. role in the region. J Street represents Americans, primarily but not exclusively Jewish, who support Israel and its desire for security as the Jewish homeland, as well as the right of the Palestinians to a sovereign state of their own - two states living side-by-side in peace and security.
In other words, it is the anti-AIPAC. Not just educational like IPF, or local consciousness raising like Brit Tzedek v'Shalom, it is meant to act as a full fledged monied lobbying group.
We believe ending the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is in the best interests of Israel, the United States, the Palestinians, and the region as a whole. J Street supports diplomatic solutions over military ones, including in Iran; multilateral over unilateral approaches to conflict resolution; and dialogue over confrontation with a wide range of countries and actors when conflicts do arise. J Street will advocate forcefully in the policy process, in Congress, in the media, and in the Jewish community to make sure public officials and community leaders clearly see the depth and breadth of support for our views on Middle East policy among voters and supporters in their states and districts. We seek to complement the work of existing organizations and individuals that share our agenda. In our lobbying and advocacy efforts, we will enlist individual supporters of other efforts as partners.
J-Street has a "Ceasefire Now!" petition to demand that the United States intervene to bring about an immediate resumption of the ceasefire between Israel and Hamas. They are already using the petition numbers in conversations with President-elect Obama's transition team and Congressional leaders. Click here to sign their petition right now.
Here was J-Street's initial reaction via their statement of FAQs on Gaza:
Was Israel justified in attacking Hamas?
Israel has the right and obligation to defend its citizens from short and long-term threats, such as rocket attacks – including taking military action designed to address the specific threat.
The more relevant question is whether Israel’s attack on Hamas will accomplish its security goals. Retaliation is inevitable, though we don’t know how far the violence will spread or how many more Israelis and Palestinians will die and suffer in the days and weeks to come. We think escalating the conflict will prove counter-productive and only deepen the cycle of violence in the region. This attack will deepen animosity between the Palestinian and Israeli people. It will further damage the international standing of both Israel and the United States. It will ignite further anger across the Middle East, further challenging the governments of allied Arab regimes. All of this damages long-term prospects for peace and stability for Israel and the region.
Are Israel’s goals in attacking Hamas militarily achievable?
The most clearly articulated Israeli goal is to stop the rocket attacks on southern Israel. Other goals likely include weakening Palestinian support for Hamas, restoring Israel’s deterrent power and destroying Hamas altogether. While a measured military response was always an option, the degree of escalation currently being pursued will almost inevitably prove counterproductive in achieving these goals.
Ending all rocket attacks. Israel would probably have to impose a prolonged and overwhelming military presence throughout the Gaza Strip, something which is unpopular in Israel, including among its leadership, in order to halt all attacks. Even under such circumstances, which would likely lead to massive casualties, well beyond the current figures and almost certainly including significant IDF losses, one can expect to see other forms of Palestinian armed resistance emerge. These could include guerilla urban warfare, shooting incidents or even suicide bombs from the West Bank and even East Jerusalem, with an increased prospect also of a second front (most likely from Lebanon) developing. The densely populated nature of the Gaza Strip and the difficulty of distinguishing between Hamas-militants and innocent civilians make this a particularly risky move – one almost guaranteed to bog down the IDF, further de-stabilize the region, and trigger intense international pressure on Israel – placing the U.S. in a particularly uncomfortable position. An aerial and partial ground assault may weaken Hamas in the short-run and remove some of its rocket launching capacity, but it is unlikely to stop rocket attacks altogether as some can be produced in fairly basic local workshops.
Israel too recognizes that in the end, the only way to truly halt rocket fire into southern Israel is a diplomatic solution. Throughout the 6-month ceasefire between Hamas and Israel that began on June 19, 2008, there was not a single Israeli casualty. J Street supports an Israeli goal of ensuring a more robust ceasefire the next time around – but prolonging the fighting is likely to make that goal less, not more attainable. The reduced Hamas capacity will be substituted by increased public anger and desire for revenge. Hamas maintains the ability to replenish weapons caches over time and will likely also pursue alternate violent options. Therefore, the US and the Quartet should immediately work to help Israel and Hamas end the violence and reach another ceasefire.
Weakening support among Gaza residents for Hamas. History teaches us that Israel’s attack is likely to have the opposite effect. The civilian casualty rate is very disturbing, and, as we’ve seen in Iraq, Afghanistan and the Afghan-Pakistan border region, once civilians are hit, they rally around their own community, including groups like Hamas, rather than around the foreign government conducting the attacks or around those failing to prevent them (the Abbas-led PA for instance). The Arab street, including Palestinians, is not distinguishing between Hamas and non-Hamas and sees the assault as a general attack on Palestinians. While Hamas is currently controlling the Gaza Strip, their institutions are former and future Palestinian Authority buildings and destroying them damages the infrastructure necessary in the long-run run to bring order to the area.
Restoring deterrent power. Israel likely also aims at restoring its deterrent power in the region following a problematic 2006 war with Hezbollah in Lebanon, by proving its military metal against Hamas aggression. Israel succeeded in establishing its might as a military power through victories in traditional warfare rooted in the 1948 and 1967 wars. However, that is not the reality in Gaza. Israel already has bitter experience of setting an unrealistic bar in unconventional warfare and of being sucked into ground operations against militia forces rooted in the local population. That is what became of Israel’s 18 year presence in Southern Lebanon – ending in a problematic unilateral withdrawal in 2000 and then in the 2006 Second Lebanon War, when Israel’s deterrent image was severely damaged. There, the enemy, Hezbollah, was an amorphous non-state actor. The Second Lebanon War’s unconventional nature posed a major challenge to Israel’s assumption that military power alone could protect its civilians. The same challenge exists today and the longer the violence lasts and Hamas remains able to fire rockets, the more likely Israel will again damage its power of deterrence.
Lebanon and Gaza are not the same. Their terrain is different, their access to outside supplies is different and Hamas is not Hezbollah – not in religious orientation, military capacity or social setting – but many of the same basic rules of unconventional warfare against militant non-state actors are the same. The trend of Hezbollah’s support increasing following the Second Lebanon War is all too likely to be replicated this time. Just as Hezbollah is stronger now than they were before the summer 2006 war, so too does Israel risk bolstering Hamas’s support through this campaign.
On "destroying" Hamas. This goal seems particularly unrealistic. Who would be in control of Gaza once this conflagration is over? Hamas has been the government, law and order, and service provider since it won the elections in January 2006 and especially since June 2007 when it took complete control. Not only does Hamas have deep roots in Palestinian society, it is far from clear that something better will take its place in Gaza. If Fatah rule is re-imposed by the barrel of an IDF tank, then one can expect this outcome to be decisively lacking in public legitimacy or acceptability. The other alternative, anarchy and chaos, may be the worst of all for Israel and the region providing the perfect breeding ground for Al-Qaeda style salafist jihadi groups, which were the only ones able to gain a foothold in Iraq once anarchy ensued.
The stated goal of Israel has not been regime change. Hamas will remain in control and be expected to still impose order, which requires a degree of capacity to do so. Too much Israeli "success" and we are stuck with a Gaza with no central government with whom to make a new ceasefire. This military operation requires a fine degree of calibration and he current missions are making that look ever more difficult to achieve. This is why most Israeli leaders talk today of eventually resuming a ceasefire with Hamas – a known quantity that has proved itself capable of maintaining ceasefires in the past.
What could Israel have done instead?
Israel could have spent the 4-5 months of calm under the June ceasefire [the ceasefire was 6 months but began to unravel in November, even so throughout the six months there were no Israeli casualties] working, with international support, to deepen the ceasefire. Of course Israel had to plan to defend itself and build its military and was rightly concerned that Hamas was strengthening its own capacity. One important component of the June deal was that Israel would ease the blockade on Gaza. This, however, never happened, and the humanitarian situation in Gaza was allowed to deteriorate. Had Israel eased the blockade, it would have created deeper incentives for Hamas and the Palestinian people to renew the ceasefire, giving civilians in Gaza a tangible sense that they had more to lose in a military confrontation.
Israel would have benefited from encouraging more effective mediation channels to Hamas through others, like Turkey and Qatar, instead of relying exclusively on Egypt. Similarly, Israel could have sought greater external pressure from Egypt and the United States to stop weapons from entering Gaza, particularly through the tunnels, while simultaneously improving defense systems and shelters in the south. More regularly opening crossings into and out of the Strip would have decreased the tunnel phenomenon, which currently benefits and strengthens Hamas and hurts civilians the most.
At the same time, Israel could have been working to improve conditions on the ground in the West Bank, including halting settlement expansion and easing check point restrictions on Palestinian freedom of movement. These steps would have shown the Palestinian people the benefits of working for peaceful change through diplomacy.
What should the United States do now?
Eight years of Bush administration neglect and ineffective diplomatic gestures have helped lead Israel and the Palestinians to the tragic situation that exists today. Indeed, Bush’s failed Middle East policy bears a tremendous deal of responsibility for the escalation we see today and the deteriorating prospects of a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict which hang in the balance, and with them, the prospects for Israel’s long-term survival as a Jewish, democratic state.
J Street is calling for immediate, strong diplomatic intervention by the United States, the Quartet and allies in the region to negotiate a resumption of the ceasefire which dramatically reduced violence and preserved quiet. The United States should encourage allies with diplomatic channels to Hamas, like Turkey, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and some European governments, to negotiate an immediate ceasefire.
The United States, the Quartet, and the world community must not wait – as they did in the Israel-Lebanon crisis of 2006 – for weeks to pass and hundreds or thousands more to die before intervening. There needs to be an urgent end to the new hostilities that brings a complete cessation to the rocket fire out of Gaza and that allows food, fuel and other civilian necessities into Gaza.
The need for diplomatic engagement goes beyond a short-term ceasefire. When the June 19, 2008 6-month Hamas-Israel ceasefire expired, no one, including the United States, stepped in to ensure its extension. We cannot make the same mistake twice.
We urge President Bush and Secretary Rice to enlist the help of our allies abroad, particularly in the Arab world, in brokering a new cease-fire. We also urge the incoming Obama administration to lead an early and serious effort to achieve a comprehensive diplomatic resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian and Arab-Israeli conflicts.
This is a fundamental American interest as we too stand to suffer. As the situation spirals, rage in the region is directed at the United States and our regional allies are further undermined. Our goals must be a Middle East that moves beyond bloody conflicts, an Israel that is secure and accepted in the region and an America secured by reducing extremism and enhancing stability. None of these goals are achieved by further escalation.
What are you asking Congress to do?
J Street is encouraging Congress to go on record not simply supporting Israel in its right to defend itself but to clarify that the United States has a compelling national interest in working to end the violence as quickly as possible. Congress should call on the current and incoming President and Secretary of State to work with its allies and the international community to immediately re-establish a ceasefire. We also urge the 111th Congress to communicate their support of President-elect Obama’s expressed interest in reorienting American foreign policy around diplomacy, in taking leadership on resolving the Israeli-Palestinian and Arab-Israeli conflicts and in dealing with Iran diplomatically, while respecting Israel’s’ right to defend its citizens against rocket attacks from Gaza.
Does J Street’s position on this crisis reflect the sentiment of the broader Jewish community?
There is a diversity of opinion in the Jewish community when it comes to Israel, the Middle East and what it means to be "pro-Israel." This spectrum is not always accurately represented in the statements by some large communal organizations – especially in a time of crisis like this. There is no reliable polling data, as of yet, on the attitudes of the American Jewish community to the events of the past week. However, the tens of thousands of pro-Israel American Jews who are joining with statements made by J Street, Americans for Peace Now, Brit Tzedek v’Shalom and others calling for a ceasefire, are a testament to broad support for our positions.
J Street reflects the concern of the majority of the Jewish community about Israel’s security and survival. And J Street represents a majority view in the Jewish community that active American leadership in bringing peace to the region is in both Israel’s short and long-term interests. In fact, 87 percent of American Jews believe that the US should play an active role in helping the parties resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The majority of American Jews believe that a peace agreement with a strong military would provide better security for Israel than military superiority alone. J Street represents its internet subscriber-ship of nearly 100,000 people and stands united with other organizations in the pro-Israel, pro-peace community including Americans for Peace Now, Brit Tzedek v’Shalom, the Israel Policy Forum and B’Tselem.
Did J Street speak out publicly when Hamas was firing rockets?
J Street has condemned Hamas rocket attacks on southern Israel and shares Israel's overriding goal of ending the rocket fire reigning down on Israeli civilians – and we expressed our public support for the June 2008 ceasefire when few pro-Israel organizations did so.
- The Israel Policy Forum is essentially a Washington-based think tank that does the usual policy piece (and peace) writing, beltway networking and advocacy work, short of official lobbying and political donating (which J-Street does). It's most known general blogospheric presence is their policy director MJ Rosenberg, in his incarnation as a regular over at TPM Cafe.
Here is what IPF says about themselves institutionally:
OUR MISSION
Israel Policy Forum (IPF) advocates for active and sustained American diplomatic efforts, which are essential to achieving a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.
Israel Policy Forum believes that through a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Israel and its Arab neighbors, as well as the region as a whole, will become more secure, prosperous and stable. IPF also sees such a resolution as critical to garnering the international support necessary to effectively wage war on terror and to increase global security. To achieve this goal - and strengthen its interests in the region - the United States must remain a consistent and fully engaged partner in the Middle East peace process. IPF is doing everything possible to encourage and support America in this effort.
OUR HISTORY
Founded in 1993 in the wake of the Oslo Accords, Israel Policy Forum (IPF) has grown to become the most important independent, mainstream organization dedicated to mobilizing American Jews in support of sustained U.S. diplomatic efforts in the Middle East. IPF is increasingly recognized as a central clearinghouse for policymakers seeking to more effectively engage the United States in the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
OUR WORK
POLICY: IPF produces insightful news analyses as well as recommendations for pragmatic US approaches to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and associated issues. In consultation with domestic and international policy analysts, and with American Jewish leaders, IPF helps shape the public discussion of critical issues related to Israel and U.S. Mideast policy.
ADVOCACY: IPF mobilizes its leadership and network of advocates – including prominent members of the philanthropic, academic, political and Jewish organizational communities – to deliver vital policy messages to legislators in Washington DC and throughout the country.
LEADERSHIP DEVELOPMENT: IPF sponsors exceptional educational programs and publications, which produce a unique cadre of effective advocates for a two state solution.
PUBLIC DIPLOMACY: In order to complement official diplomatic efforts, IPF facilitates enhanced communication and stronger ties between influential American Jews and key political leaders in the U.S., Israel, and Israel’s neighboring states.
and here is their
Proposal to the President-Elect for the First 100 Days:
On the Arab-Israeli Dispute and the Crisis in Gaza
An Israel Policy Forum Policy Paper (PDF)
President-elect Obama faces daunting problems at home and abroad, prime among them the deepening economic recession. But, whether or not the new administration sought to confront the Arab-Israeli conflict, the war in Gaza arrived on the new President’s desk even before he assumes office.
There are many other reasons for the President-elect to address the Arab-Israeli conflict from his first weeks in office. Simply put, the festering Arab-Israeli conflict threatens major American interests – among them the security of Israel and our other regional allies – while working to end it will advance American interests throughout the Middle East and beyond. Additionally, regional leaders will wish to test the new President's mettle. They will not shrink from providing the new President with the opportunity to show his hand, if only to determine if the President's pledge of change applies to the Middle East or if, in this volatile region, continuity will be the order of the day—continuity few in the region would welcome.
During the past eight years, the United States has appeared to have no sense of urgency about ending the Arab-Israeli conflict. President Clinton left office with an Israeli-Palestinian deal almost within reach. The Bush administration did not pick up where Clinton left off, giving the impression that the United States was indifferent to the worsening conditions (the second Intifada) on the ground in Israel and the Occupied Territories. This seeming indifference helped turn public opinion against the United States throughout the Muslim world to the disadvantage of a myriad of U.S. interests. The Obama administration can turn the situation around, but only if it acts swiftly and with determination. We must leave no doubt that the United States intends to turn the page in its dealings with the Middle East. The era of neglect – benign and not so benign – must be seen as over.
THE CRISIS IN GAZA
We, of course, do not know now what precise circumstances President-elect Obama will confront on January 20. We do know that economic, political, and security conditions in Gaza are such a dire, festering sore that it would take a miracle to have them resolved by then.
In this light, the Obama administration should lead an international effort to arrange a two-phase process: an immediate ceasefire, followed by a longer term armistice. Thus, if a ceasefire has not been established by the time Obama takes office, his team should work assiduously, through intermediaries, to establish a viable ceasefire. This effort should include moderate Arab states pressing Hamas to stop firing missiles and mortars at Israel.
More important, we urge the new administration to arrange, also through intermediaries, a long-term armistice (at least ten years) in which there will be absolutely no attacks on Israel of any kind and the end to the smuggling of weapons by Hamas, in exchange for the lifting of the blockade by Israel in a way that will not recognize Hamas as the legitimate authority in Gaza. This would be an important early achievement.
THE FIRST 100 DAYS: A GAME PLAN FOR THE PRESIDENT-ELECT ON THE MIDDLE EAST
The following is a list of steps President-elect Obama should take in his first 100 days, in addition to the ones listed above concerning the Gaza crisis. They were derived from discussions in Israel Policy Forum's Washington Roundtable, which consists of former U.S. diplomats, other former officials, and academic experts on the Middle East (see endnote).
- The President should state, in his inaugural address or State of the Union message, that it is his determination to immediately begin building on efforts of previous Democratic and Republican administrations to achieve a comprehensive peace between Israel and its neighbors.
He should make specific reference to the Arab League Initiative which can serve as an umbrella for negotiations—along with reference to all relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions. He should state his support and encouragement for both the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian negotiations and the indirect negotiations between Israel and Syria. He needs to convey that it is a new day and that America will seize any realistic proposal to play an active role to advance negotiations.
- As early in his term as possible, after the February 10 Israeli elections, the President should send a trusted emissary on a listening trip to the capitals of the Arab states and Israel, including Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Morocco, Qatar, Lebanon, Palestine, and Israel. This trip would provide the opportunity for the emissary to report to the President on his/her assessment of the potential for early action on specific issues and tracks. The emissary's findings, when added to the insights gained from inevitable early Washington visits by foreign leaders, will lay the groundwork for the Obama administration's more detailed approach to the Middle East during its first months in office. They will inform the President's decisions as to what is feasible and what is not.
- The President should give a speech in late February or March to lay out a vision of overall peace for Arabs and Israelis, together with future policy directions for Iraq and for U.S.-Iran relations. Prospects for early movement toward peace between Syria and Israel and the Palestinians and Israel, and U.S. readiness to do whatever is needed to enhance those prospects, should figure prominently. The President should also signal that he views developments in the Middle East broadly and intends to pursue a policy that addresses the complexity of the security dilemmas facing the region in a comprehensive manner. The speech should focus on not only obtaining a durable and just peace between Israel and its immediate neighbors, but also stability and development throughout the rest of the region. This speech could be delivered here or from a Middle East capital, as has already been suggested by the President-elect.
- The President should announce that we will return an Ambassador to Damascus to facilitate a more productive Syrian-American relationship. In making such an announcement the President should make it clear that Syrian actions with respect to Lebanon, Iraq, and Israeli-Palestinian peace talks will profoundly affect the nature of our bilateral relationship. He should declare at the same time that the United States fully supports Israeli-Syrian negotiations toward a peace agreement, and hopes to be able to play an active role to help advance them.
- The President should continue and even intensify the efforts which have involved Generals Dayton, Jones, and Fraser to improve and unify the Palestinian security and police force, thereby creating for the first time a rational and viable Palestinian security structure. The new efforts in Jenin, Nablus, and Hebron, where the Dayton-trained forces are being deployed, should be backed as well as the economic efforts of former Prime Minister Tony Blair. It is critical for the U.S. to encourage efforts that will result in the release of Gilad Shalit, kidnapped by Hamas in June 2006, as quickly as possible. The President should and can call on Israel to a) dismantle outposts b) freeze settlement construction c) crack down on all settler violence and incitement. But he should also send a clear message to Hamas that so long as it engages in violence against Israel, it can expect no change in American attitudes toward it. A genuine end to violence, however, would be recognized by the United States and reciprocal moves would be considered.
- The President should announce his intention to re-establish formal diplomatic relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran on a reciprocal basis as soon as the Iranian government is ready to do so. He should announce his support for broad negotiations with Iran, without prior conditions, on all outstanding issues including those involving Iran's nuclear program, its activities vis-à-vis Iraq and Afghanistan, and its overall stance toward Israel (with specific reference to Iran's support for Hezbollah and Hamas).
CONCLUSION
There is no need to choose between "Israel-Palestine First" and "Syria First." At one time, the Palestinians would view any emphasis on Syria as indicating a lack of interest in their plight. No more. Mahmoud Abbas, and Fatah in general, understands that an Israeli-Syrian agreement would result in at least some disruption of ties between Damascus and Hamas-controlled Gaza. This could only benefit Abbas and enhance chances for Palestinian national unity and a final status agreement with Israel. Middle East diplomacy is not a zero sum activity. Movement on one front not only does not hinder progress on another: it advances it.
The Arab League Initiative recognizes this fact, which is why it addresses virtually all aspects of the Arab-Israeli conflict simultaneously. Even issues relating to Iran – the nuclear question and its relations with the United States and Israel – are inextricably connected to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and can be addressed as such.
These initial steps during the President's first 100 days would lay the groundwork for a new era in U.S. Middle East policy.
CONTRIBUTORS
Marshall J. Breger Lenore G. Martin
Ambassador Wendy J. Chamberlin Ambassador Robert H. Pelletreau, Jr.
Stephen P. Cohen Jeremy Pressman
Thomas A. Dine MJ Rosenberg
Frederic C. Hof Steven L. Spiegel
Scott Lasensky Ambassador Edward S. Walker, Jr.
Ambassador Samuel W. Lewis
Those listed as contributors have assisted in the preparation of this document, but each participant in the project whose name appears above may not agree with the text in its entirety.
CONTRIBUTORS
Marshall J. Breger: Professor, Columbus School of Law, Catholic University of America
Ambassador Wendy J. Chamberlin: former United States Ambassador to Pakistan; former Director of Global Affairs and Counter-Terrorism at the National Security Council; and former Assistant Administrator in the Asia-Near East Bureau for the US Agency for International Development
Stephen P. Cohen: President, Institute for Middle East Peace and Development; Author of the forthcoming book "Beyond America’s Grasp: a Century of Failed Diplomacy in the Middle East," Farrar, Strauss, and Giroux, 2009
Thomas A. Dine: Senior Policy Advisor, Israel Policy Forum; former President of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty; former Executive Director of AIPAC
Frederic C. Hof: lead drafter of the Mitchell Report (Sharm el-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee); former U.S. Army Attaché in Lebanon; former Director for Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and Palestinian Affairs in the Office of the Secretary of Defense
Scott Lasensky: Senior Research Associate, United States Institute of Peace
Ambassador Samuel W. Lewis: former U.S. Ambassador to Israel; former Director of Policy Planning at the State Department
Lenore G. Martin: Professor of Political Science at Emmanuel College; Associate of the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs and Associate of the Center for Middle Eastern Studies both at Harvard University; co-chair of the WCFIA/CMES Middle East Seminar and the Seminar on Turkey in the Modern World at Harvard University
Ambassador Robert H. Pelletreau, Jr.: former Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, former U.S. Ambassador to Egypt, Tunisia, and Bahrain, member of the U.S. delegation to the 1991 Madrid Middle East Peace Conference
Jeremy Pressman: Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Connecticut
MJ Rosenberg: Director of Policy Analysis, Israel Policy Forum
Steven L. Spiegel: Director of the Center for Middle East Development and Professor of Political Science at UCLA; National Scholar, Israel Policy Forum
Ambassador Edward S. Walker, Jr.: former Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs; former United States Ambassador to Israel, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates
Notes:
Those listed as contributors have assisted in the preparation of this document, but each participant in the project whose name appears above may not agree with the text in its entirety. Titles are listed for identification purposes only.
Israel Policy Forum (IPF) is an independent, non-partisan American organization that promotes active U.S. engagement to achieve a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and peace and security between Israel and its Arab neighbors.
