"Acknowledging and working with existing realities must not, however, mean accepting them as permanent. The existing situation is not only short on security and justice; it is also unstable. Things can—and might well—get worse unless the United States and other outside actors couple a realistic view of the present with a serious effort to push for a more promising future. But for the present, they should stop banging their heads against the obstacles to an immediate and comprehensive solution of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Instead, it is time for Plan B." - Professor Nathan Brown 2/09
At the end of February, Nathan Brown, a Professor of Politcal Science and International Affairs at George Washington University and a Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment For International Peace, issued a policy brief titled "Palestine and Israel: Time For Plan B". Professor Brown believes that negotiations over a two-state solution to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict have reached a dead end, and international diplomacy will need to change in order to resolve the conflict.
According to his biography,Nathan Brown is a distinguished scholar and author of four books on Arab politics. He has expertise on Palestinian reform and Arab constitutionalism. His research interests include Egyptian and Palestinian politics, legal reform in the modern Middle East, as well as democratization. Brown’s most recent book, Resuming Arab Palestine, presents research on Palestinian society and governance after the establishment of the Palestinian Authority. Brown was previously a scholar in residence at the Middle East Institute. He has recently been a member of the international advisory committee on drafting the Palestinian constitution and consultant to the UNDP's program on governance in the Arab world.
Introduction
The two-state solution has come to a dead end, at least for the present, due to ineffective leaders, deep mutual distrust, political disarray on both sides, deliberate actions seeking to block a negotiated solution, and feckless U.S. diplomatic efforts. Although President Obama has inherited a nearly spent diplomatic process, there are some positive signs that can be used for future diplomacy. Israel and Hamas do negotiate, albeit indirectly, over short-term agreements. Both groups have interest in some kind of cease-fire, since Israel seeks to prevent rocket fire on a widening area of the country and Hamas seeks to resume the construction of its party-state in Gaza. The U.S. and other actors should stop working on an immediate and comprehensive solution to the conflict, and focus on a new plan, "Plan B".
Step One:Properly Negotiate A Cease-Fire
The first step in a new diplomatic approach must be to establish a 1 to 2 year cease-fire that builds on the common interest of both Israel and Hamas to avoid fighting in the short term. The cease-fire that lasted from June-December, 2008 failed because it was indirectly negotiated and unwritten, which allowed for different interpretations of essential and incidental elements. Hamas wanted it to hold for a defined period, include the West Bank, and lead to an open border with Egypt. Israel rejected the first two ideas and gave unwritten hints on opening the border. The cease-fire that ended the recent War in January is actually two unilateral cease-fires, which are more skeletal and undefined than the previous one. A new cease-fire should aim to correct the mistakes of these previous agreements. It should be clearly defined and written. Also, mediators, whether European or Arab, must be willing to make it more attractive to both sides. Hamas can be enticed by increasing the border opening with Egypt, and Israel can be persuaded by improving the halting of arms supply to Hamas.
Step Two:Broaden The Cease-Fire To An Armistice
Even if diplomatic efforts address the shortcomings of previous cease-fires, leaders of both groups would still view another clash as inevitable. It is critical that this short-term cease fire be accompanied by intensive efforts to develop a 5 to 10 year armistice, or hudna. This armistice would acknowledge that the conflict is not resolved, and would build a series of arrangements acceptable to both sides for an interim period. For Israel, this would ensure quiet, as well as a limit on open arms to Hamas. For the Palestinians, it would allow open borders, a settlement freeze, and an opportunity to rebuild shattered institutions. This hudna would need Israel to stop acting unilaterally, and Hamas would need to control the various armed factions operating in the Gaza Strip. It would, also, need the involvement of the international community to actively monitor and enforce such issues as borders, settlement activity, arms smuggling, and inspection of goods.
Step Three:Use The Respite
Since the effects of an armistice would be unsustainable in the long term, the U.S., Europe, and Middle East Nations must use the time to create a long-term accord. There are two general guidelines in this part of the process: Rebuilding the Palestinian Authority, and Forcing All Parties to Begin Making Choices.
No long term solution is possible without a rebuilt and viable Palestinian leadership able to make authoritative decisions for all Palestinians. The first step would be to have a true Hamas-Fatah reconciliation. To improve on the failed attempts at unity between 2006 and 2009, the international community, most importantly the U.S., must show generosity and a heavy hand (i.e.-carrots and sticks). These nations can influence the Palestinian groups since the PA depends on international support to pay salaries and stay solvent, Egypt and Israel control all entry and exit for goods and people, and both Hamas and Fatah use international assistance to show Palestinians that they can govern more effectively than the other. Once reconciliation is accomplished, the goal shoud be a revival of Palestinian democracy with Constitutional rule and free elections. The international community will need to support Palestinian political institutions and pledge not to overturn the results of fair elections.
In addition, diplomacy should force the parties to make choices rather than avoid them. Efforts to exclude Hamas or force it to immediately capitulate to the demands of the international community have been unrealistic, ineffective, and unsuccessful. It is wiser to provide sustained and steady pressure in order to attain intermediate benchmarks, which would strive to emphasize Hamas's actions rather than its ideology. This diplomatic pressure should be used to make sure Israel honors its agreements and does not undermine the efforts of the international community.
Conclusion: Is This A Realistic Proposal?
The "Plan B" idea is a reversal of traditional American diplomatic efforts, which have centered on a two-state solution in the near future. Not only does this new option deal with short, medium, and long-term agreements, but it endorses Palestinian reconciliation. It attempts to work with Hamas, as opposed to breaking it. The Obama Administration can move in this direction, but it will be a slow and difficult process, which may encounter several obstacles. First, the parties involved may not be interested in these ideas, even though they may have been in the past. Second, the policies proposed may involve legal challenges, since a 2006 law bars using funds for diplomatic contact with Hamas and ends all assistance to any ministry controlled by Hamas. Lastly, the leaders of the two sides may feel that these policies are traps to force them to challenge their preferences and goals. Neither Palestinian or Israeli leaders are likely to stand still while they are maneuvered into positions they seek to avoid. It is not certain that this plan can deliver peace. However, the present path is not working, and new ideas need to be attempted that allow the Israelis, the Palestinians, and the international community the opportunity to evolve the conflict into more manageable forms.
Professor Brown presented this paper at a March 5th event at the Carnegie Endowment For International Peace. Gaith Al-Omari of the American Task Force On Palestine and Robert Malley of the International Crisis Group commented on the Professor's proposals. A future diary will describe this discussion.
