Howard Fineman picks up on something I've been mulling, but not quite in the same context as me:
The most powerful IED on the road ahead is timed to explode some time this spring. Last February, Congress raised the ceiling on the national debt from $12.4 trillion to $14.2 trillion. Since then, the debt has risen to $13.7 trillion -- which means Congress will have to raise it yet again within a few months.
A failure to approve one would, technically, bar the government from borrowing more money. In other words, we would not have the cash to pay our bills.
And yet Tea Party candidates and their fellow travelers in the GOP have vowed to oppose further increases in the legal debt ceiling.
Are they going to stick to that idea when faced with the reality of default?
Fineman's article approached this, and a number of other challenges in governance looming on the horizon, in terms of "booby traps" the Democrats may "leave behind" for incoming Republicans, most particularly (I presume) in the House.
But I'm thinking in terms of the Senate. And why wouldn't I? The Senate puts itself first in most things, anyway, constantly demanding the House bend to it's will, and leaning on the antiquated cloture rules to do it, insisting the House pretty much has to accept whatever the Senate hands it, since nothing else could possibly clear the 60-vote threshhold. And in the Senate, the odds are still against a Republican takeover.
Still, all signs point to the Senate Democratic caucus shrinking in the 112th Congress. And things being as they are, that's got to mean that it'll be harder than ever to get cloture on bills and nominations of all kinds. Including the always-controversial (though ordinarily non-partisan, believe it or not) bill to raise the federal debt limit.
As Fineman notes, the consequences of a failure to pass such a bill would be dire. A government shutdown. Possibly default on federal debt instruments. And hey, maybe a little global financial meltdown. You never know.
Now, consider that the debt ceiling bill, unlike the budget resolution or reconciliation bills, enjoys no statutory protection from the filibuster. Add rampant teabaggery to the mix, and you're looking at a serious situation. Fineman's thinking "booby trap," but that's only the case if Republicans take over, as may be the case in the House. In the Senate, raising the debt ceiling might still be the Democrats' responsibility. And it'll still be the prerogative of the tea-infused Republicans to make that difficult, and try to put the Senate and the administration over a barrel.
That by itself could be enough to force the leadership to attempt to pass the debt ceiling bill during the lame duck session, when there are more Democrats on hand to help out. But Republicans have been dead-set against allowing Democrats to use the lame duck session to move anything of substance, and their ability to block critical bills might even be enhanced during the lame duck -- not just because there'll be an argument to be made that significant legislation ought to be left to the newly elected Congress, but also because there could actually be more Republicans in the Senate. Don't forget: the elections in West Virginia, New York, Delaware and Illinois are technically special elections, to replace Senators Byrd, Clinton, Biden and Obama. Neither the New York or Delaware situations are likely to make a difference in this respect, though. But West Virginia and Illinois are in play, and that could mean two more Republican Senators-elect with claims on the right to be seated immediately.
For whatever reason, the Colorado Senate seat vacated by Ken Salazar and currently occupied by Michael Bennet is not being filled by a special election, though the situation is similar -- except that Beenet is seeking reelection, while Roland Burris of Illinois is not.
Anyway, waht that means for the prospects of a debt ceiling hike during the lame duck session is that there could possibly be two fewer votes over which the administration has significant sway. If Teapublicans opt to filibuster such a bill, the leadership could be left scrambling for 60 votes.
So far, at least one Republican has said he'd oppose a government shutdown, on the grounds that itd' endanger troops deployed overseas. That'd perhaps do the trick if there were 59 other votes for cloture on a debt ceiling bill, but there may not be. And it's unclear whether Isakson would feel the same way about a shutdown over the debt ceiling as he might about a shutdown stemming from the failure to pass necessary appropriations bills.
Remember, too, that although debt ceiling bills are traditionally a non-partisan affair, passed nearly unanimously, the last such increase was marked by holdouts from both sides of the aisle -- Republicans who oppose everything in general, and Democratic "budget hawks," who used the leverage created by the unusual need for cloture on a debt ceiling bill to extract President Obama's agreement to the convening of the cat food commission.
So it's by no means clear that seeking to take care of the business of the debt ceiling in the lame duck session is going to be more doable -- at least in terms of clearing the 60-vote mark -- than it's likely to be after January.
But that brings me back to the title of the post. Although it's likely that there will be even fewer Democratic Senators on hand next year than there would be in the lame duck, there's at least the possibility that the procedural rules under which the Senate would deal with a must-pass bill like the debt limit hike could be different. That's all within the power of just 51 Democrats.
And that may well be the choice facing the Senate Democratic caucus in the months leading up to January. Find the will to reform the filibuster, or face the music when it comes time to deal with the debt bill. Opinion both inside and outside the Senate is shifting rapidly toward the first option as it is. I don't think you want to walk past that opportunity, especially at the risk of finding yourself staring at option two.
