Israel's recent election was widely expected to yield another triumph for the Israeli right. In the event, what impressed commentators most was the resurgence of the centre. After more than a decade of right-wing dominance, did the vote mark a fundamental realignment of Israeli politics? I spoke to Shir Hever, economist with Israel's Alternative Information Center and author of The Political Economy of Israel's Occupation.
Nothing happened in the elections. The platforms of Yair Lapid (Yesh Atid), Avigdor Lieberman (Yisrael Beitenu), Naftali Bennett (HaBayit HaYehudi) and Binyamin Netanyahu (Likud) are pretty much the same. All the Zionist parties in Israel agree on the principles: Israel shouldn't have anything to do with the Gaza Strip except continue the siege; Palestinian refugees' right to return to Israel should not be discussed; Israel should continue to grant extra rights to Jews at the expense of its non-Jewish citizens; and while there should be some kind of division of land in the West Bank, there is no rush to end the occupation. They are prepared to engage in discussions with the Palestinian Authority, which might even eventually produce a Palestinian semi-state, but none are willing to consider the Green Line [i.e. Israel's internationally-recognised legal border] as a basis for negotiations. The Meretz party—the 'Zionist left'—differs on only one point, in that it agrees with the rest of the world that Israel should withdraw from occupied East Jerusalem.
But even as people voted for the same ideology, they voted for different people: nearly half of the Knesset's members were voted out. One of Lapid's main advantages, besides being good looking and well-known, is that he was not a politician before the election campaign. People were sick of politicians, but had no alternative in mind to the consensus ideology they represent. It's a dysfunctional political system, in which elections are becoming an empty ritual.
The elections were fought mainly on socioeconomic issues rather than the occupation and the Palestinians, a significant fact in itself. On the economy, what is the new government's agenda?
There was greater difference between the parties on economic issues than on the Palestinians. All members of the new governing coalition shared pretty much the same view, that of the Likud. 'Centrist' Lapid didn't differentiate himself at all from Netanyahu's economic platform, and unsurprisingly, in his new role as Finance Minister is saying the same things that every other Israeli Finance Minister says on their first week in the job.
The Labour party dared to do something a little different, advocating a soft-Keynesian approach of slightly increasing the deficit and public spending to partially restore Israel's welfare state. It was attacked by most other parties for being unrealistic. That's interesting because we saw massive economic protests in Israel over the last couple of summers, driven by growing inequality and declining standards of living. Almost all the parties tried to ride that wave into the election. Lapid was probably the most successful, even though he was not part of the demonstrations and made no suggestions for solving the housing problem.
It's interesting to consider why the elections were held in January in the first place. Prime Minster Netanyahu pushed to hold them as early as possible, so that they would precede the presentation of the annual budget—and, with it, the publication of government data on the state's finances to parliament and the press. In the end he was unable to do this, because of laws requiring that new parties be given a notice period before holding elections, to give them time to prepare. So just over a week before the elections, the budget information was made public, and it became clear why Netanyahu had wanted to keep it private until after the elections. Netanyahu, so-called 'Mr. Economy' who prides himself on sound economics and responsible belt-tightening, had run up a huge deficit of NIS 39bn [approximately £7bn]. This was mainly because he hadn't wanted to cut certain government programmes before the elections, there were too many important projects that the government wanted to promote, and the government had refused to acknowledge that people's standard of living—and tax revenues—had declined. What I find fascinating is that despite this information being published just over a week before the election, political and media discussion continued to focus on such empty topics as what the election might mean for a renewed 'peace process' with the Palestinians. So Netanyahu succeeded in getting the budget bombshell out of the way.
The unprecedented J14 movement in Israel was driven by opposition to growing economic inequality. It seems as though, with the election of Lapid, this has been transferred onto the issue of inequality of 'service' (i.e. state subsidies to and army exemption for religious Jewish communities).
All social movements and protests in Israel prior to J14 were crushed in the same way: by pitting one minority against the other, and shifting the discussion to security and external threats.
J14 tried hard to overcome these obstacles, which is probably why it was the most successful movement to date. It insisted, 'everybody's invited', 'everybody's welcome, 'we're a movement of everyone'. So when some activists tried to raise the issue of Israel's occupation of Palestinian territory, others said, 'no, this is a movement of everyone, so we won't bring up any divisive topics: the occupation is off the table'. Then extreme right activists entered the movement and began saying, 'well you know, there's a housing shortage in Israel, why not come and move to the colonies?', 'there's a housing shortage in Israel, so why not kick out the Sudanese and Eritrean refugees so we have more room?' The presence of that kind of extreme right argument was accepted, even though many activists found it abhorrent, because of the idea that 'everyone is welcome'. Of course, inclusive slogans aside, such deep political rifts cannot be papered over for long, and they were eventually exploited by the political parties.
Lapid realised that Israel's ultra-Orthodox community didn't really participate in the protests, despite being the second poorest social group in Israel, after Palestinians. By claiming that 'we all share the benefits and the burdens of the economy, but the ultra-Orthodox only reap economic benefits without sharing the burden of army service', he was able to divert widespread popular frustration and dissatisfaction into hatred. He wasn't the first to do this. His father, Tommy Lapid, created a political party in the 1990s with pretty much the same message (Shinui) and he won a lot of seats. Shinui deteriorated over time and became sort of a joke. In the 2006 election, some of its campaign videos portrayed the ultra-Orthodox so hatefully that they were disqualified by the High Court for being antisemitic.
More interesting is what happened with Bennett and the ultra-Orthodox. Bennett represents national-religious Jews—who combine religious Orthodoxy (but not ultra-Orthodoxy) with Zionism—and many Jewish settlers. The Zionist leadership's initial plans for the political structure of the State of Israel involved allowing non-Zionist ultra-Orthodox Jews a degree of autonomy in exchange for their support for the Zionist project. But national-religious Jews took a much more active role in Zionism, and since 1967 have become increasingly dominant in the Zionist movement, the army and the settlements. Bennett's position in this election reflected that: he effectively advocated that national-religious Jews work with secular Zionists in an alliance that marginalises the ultra-Orthodox. In my opinion this was a strategic error. The ultra-Orthodox are hurt and insulted, and if they decide to turn their back on the Zionist movement because they no longer receive the benefits and autonomy they've received so far, it would create a very strong upheaval in Israeli society, one which Israel cannot really afford.
The big news in Israel last week was President Obama's visit. The extent of the media coverage in Israel illustrated how important the U.S. connection is, on a popular as well as political level. Israeli liberals were in ecstasy over Obama's speech—relieved, I suppose, to receive external support for their embattled position within Israeli politics. What was your take on his visit?
Obama is very good at giving speeches. He managed to win a Nobel Prize for giving one. His speech was well-written, but as with most of Obama's policies, the gap between rhetoric and action was vast. Descending from on high as representative of the international power of the United States to help resolve a local dispute between two squabbling neighbours, Obama didn't address the fact that his country is somewhat involved in this conflict. For the past forty years Palestinians have been killed by American-made weapons that were given to Israel for free by the United States. I think that confers some responsibility.
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