This article is part of a series on World War I. To read other posts in the series, please go here.
July 24th-July 26th 1914, London, Berlin, and St. Petersburg
“We are within measurable, or imaginable, distance of a real Armageddon. Happily there seems to be no reason why we should be anything more than spectators.”
– H.H. Asquith, British Prime Minister, 1908-1916
War was on the mind of the British cabinet on July 24th. However, it was not world war that consumed them, but civil war. Ireland was on the verge of a full-on conflict. Since William Gladstone, Liberal prime minister, had argued for home rule a generation earlier, the topic had been a political hand grenade. It shattered the Liberal Party and horrified the Irish Protestants, who would become a minority in an autonomous Ireland. These unionists formed paramilitary organizations, promising to fight to maintain Irish union with Britain. When a new home rule bill was introduced, the unionist paramilitaries dug in and began to arm themselves. Worryingly in March 1914, at the Curragh barracks in Ireland, dozens of British army officers resigned out of sympathy with the unionist Ulster Volunteers. It appeared increasingly likely that Ireland would need to be partitioned, which would outrage the unionists and their republican opponents.
Suddenly, Foreign Secretary Edward Grey entered the room. He began reading the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum to Serbia. The words shocked many, as the cabinet had not even discussed the Balkans in weeks. Almost at once, the cabinet recognized the grave implications of Austria-Hungary’s note. To quote Winston Churchill, then First Lord of the Admiralty: “the parishes of Fermanagh and Tyrone faded back into the mists and squalls of Ireland, and a strange light began immediately, but by perceptible gradations, to fall and grow upon the map of Europe.”
Britannia the Mediator
While appreciating the danger, much of the British Government saw no need for Britain to get involved. Britain was struggling not only with the Irish crisis but with significant domestic upheaval as well. Keir Hardie’s Independent Labour Party gave industrial workers and miners a voice in parliament. Suffragettes like Emeline Pankhurst and Charlotte Despard led rallies and acts of civil disobedience. Radical ideas like socialism were gaining popular support and threatening to upend both imperial policy and old aristocratic privilege.
Given its domestic situation, Britain had little interest in European entanglements. However, Britain could not ignore the latest developments. Her imperial economy was built on free trade and a European war threatened open markets. Although the past decade had brought closer ties with France and Russia, Britain’s geographic isolation and commercial interests made her a potential mediator in Continental conflicts.
Edward Grey and the British Foreign office saw how an Austro-Hungarian invasion of Serbia could lead to a Russian response. A Russian attack would bring in Germany, leading to the involvement of Russia’s ally France. He warned his friend, Prince Lichnowsky, of this dangerous cascade, fearing Austro-Hungarian belligerence would lead to a European War. Lichnowsky was the liberal German ambassador to London and a proud Anglophile. At the time, Grey viewed Germany as a willing partner in preventing escalation. Grey asked Lichnowsky to pass along a proposal for a conference led by Britain, France, Germany, and Italy to mediate the dispute. Lichnowsky was enthusiastic and dutifully wired Berlin. However, the decision-makers in Germany had quite different ideas.
Germany Schemes
Kaiser Wilhelm immediately rejected Grey’s suggestion, considering it British “condescension.” Foreign Secretary Jagow also dismissed any role for Germany in restraining its ally, arguing that Germany had no business intervening in “an internal Austro-Hungarian affair.” Jagow then ordered Lichnowsky and his other ambassadors to lie about German knowledge of the ultimatum, a shoddy ruse that only made increased British distrust of Germany. Finally, Jagow sabotaged Grey’s plan by not sharing it with Vienna until after the ultimatum expired.
Lichnowsky begged Germany’s leaders to reconsider, warning: “if we do not join the mediation, all faith here [Britain] in us and in our love of peace will be shattered.” German intransigence is shocking given how much value Germany placed on British neutrality in a potential conflict. A few days earlier, Kaiser Wilhelm’s mild-mannered brother Heinrich had visited King George V in Britain. The cousins lamented the growing European conflict, and George off-handedly remarked that Britain would “try all we can to keep out of this and shall remain neutral.” The Kaiser seized on this as an official declaration of neutrality, which as a constitutional monarch, George had no authority to make. When Naval Secretary Alfred von Tirpitz questioned this interpretation, the Kaiser pompously responded “I have the word of a King and that is enough for me.” Additionally, Edward Grey had that Britain had a “free hand” in Europe and was not bound by any formal alliances. However, such aloofness was wishful thinking by Grey, as Britain was already holding joint military talks with France. While the King and Grey may have given unintentionally confusing signals about British intentions, the Kaiser again showed his penchant for self-delusion. There was no possibility that Britain would view an Austro-German war of aggression with disinterest.
One man who never counted on British neutrality was Army Chief Helmuth von Moltke. He considered a two-front war inevitable and expected Britain to cast her lot with France and Russia. Moltke and the Kaiser had scant regard for Britain’s “contemptible little army,” which in 1914, consisted of fewer than 100,000 men. Even if Moltke disregarded Britain, his detailed battle plans required Germanic efficiency to succeed. Having modified the Schlieffen Plan, Moltke would strike first at France through Belgium, hoping to score a knockout blow in the West before Russia could fully mobilize her full might. The narrow passage through Belgium would squeeze the German army through some of the strongest fortifications in Europe, starting at Liège. The Belgian forts had to be taken in quick succession to keep to Moltke’s strict timetables. The longer discussions continued, the less Germany could count on the element of surprise. Moltke was spoiling for a fight. He wanted the army marching right away, diplomats be damned.
Russia’s Rage
“You are setting Europe on fire!” Russian Foreign Minister Sazonov shouted at Austro-Hungarian ambassador, Count Szapary. Invoking the “monarchical principle,” Szapary protested, surely autocratic Russia couldn’t side with terrorists and regicides. “The monarchical idea has nothing to do with this,” Sazonov growled. The foreign minister’s meeting with the German ambassador, Count Portalès, was similarly heated. Portalès was taken aback by Sazonov’s incendiary tone, urging the foreign minister not to be “blinded by hate.” Sazonov declared that he didn’t “hate Austria” rather he “despised her.” Sazonov was convinced, correctly, that Austria-Hungary planned to dismember Serbia. He was also right that Germany was behind Austria-Hungary’s aggressive stance. He warned Portalès in no uncertain terms that Austro-Hungarian attempts to destroy Serbia would result in an Austro-Russian war. Shocked, Portalès left the Sazonov’s office.
Sazonov’s views were not altogether surprising for the man who, upon hearing of the ultimatum, declared “this means European war.” However, was Sazonov’s wrath the consequence of genuine indignation at the Central Powers, or an ostentatious bluff to dissuade them from attacking Serbia? Regardless, Russia’s actions would speak louder than Sazonov’s words.
The Council on Ministers had decided to put the army on alert and begin a partial mobilization of over one million troops in European Russia. These forces would be moved into position along the Austro-Hungarian and German borders. Despite this momentous nature of this action, they did not notify their French allies or Britain. In fact, the British ambassador, George Buchanan, was totally oblivious, for days reporting to London that the Russians had taken no actions along their Western frontier. However, the more astute German attachés began issuing alarming reports detailing the actions within the Western Russian military districts.
Russia would not announce its partial mobilization until July 28th, the same day that Austria-Hungary attacked Serbia. Russia denied that her army had taken these preparatory steps. Thus, these military maneuvers provided little deterrent to Austria-Hungary. The Russian actions beg the question: did Russia believe that European war was inevitable after the delivery of the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum? Certainly, some elements in the Russian government (including Sazonov) believed that Germany and Austria-Hungary were using the archduke’s assassination as a pretext to attack Slavdom. Given the militaristic climate in Berlin, Russian actions increased the pressure on the Kaiser and Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg and made it harder for them to ignore Moltke’s calls for mobilization. That pressure would only grow in the days to come.
Read More
The British interest for peace was genuine, but their ability to remain impartial would be severely tested in the coming two weeks. Some British ministers feared that Russia was dragging Britain headlong into the European crisis, while others blamed Germany for Austro-Hungarian intransigence. Both groups were correct. The Origins of World War I by Richard Hamilton and Holger Herwig helps explain the British move from observer to combatant. Once again, Fritz Fischer’s seminal work Germany’s Aims in the First World War condemns the German leadership as duplicitous and dishonest in the face of British peace proposals. Sean McMeekin offers a far different perspective in The Russian Origins of the First World War, arguing that Russian policies directly led to escalation. He notes that Russia began war preparations well before Germany and made a deliberate choice to intervene in a conflict that did not threaten Russian territory.