Ukraine continues to advance in Luhansk and in Kherson, such as assaulting Kreminna.
2/ First, what we are seeing is an excellent Ukrainian operational design playing out across the south and east of the country. While geographically separate, they are campaigns that are part of an integrated design, and part of an overall military
#strategy.
3/ Second, the two campaigns are mutually supporting. The south is the most decisive region because of its economic contribution to Ukraine’s economy. The Russians know this and it is here they have deployed their most capable units.
4/ But the east is also important. It is a region proximate to Russia, and therefore gains here has a significant psychological effect on the Russians. And, the north east is a key logistic route for supporting operations in the Donbas.
5/ Third, because the Ukrainian operational deign for these campaigns has sequenced them well. Large Russian forces were drawn to the south and at trite during by Ukrainian artillery and HIMARS. This provided an opportunity for the next part of their design, the
#Kharkiv thrust.
6/ It has been a classic ‘horns of a dilemma’ for the Russians, who have to decide where to weight their forces and reinforcements between the south and north east. And at the same time, they have persisted with their pointless attacks in the Donbas.
7/ Fourth, because the Ukrainians are operating on interior lines, they are better placed to move forces between the campaigns (although it is still a good distance). The Russians, on exterior lines, have big challenges in this regard.
8/ Fifth, the Ukrainian campaigns have continued to implement the ‘strategy of corrosion’ which focusses on destruction of Russian fire support, logistics, C2 nodes and concentrations of troops that might be reinforcements or reserves.
9/ This corrodes the Russians from within. It physically reduces their fighting power and also has a profound psychological impact. But there is also something else going on while this corrosion occurs. This is the ‘recon battle’ - a fight for tactical information.
10/ This reveals weak points which the Ukrainian combined arms teams can break into and penetrate. And then conduct rapid exploitation, as we saw (and continue to see) in the
#Kharkiv area. And now MIGHT be seeing in
#Kherson.
11/Ultimately the result of the physical and psychological pressure of all these integrated elements of the Ukrainian campaign design can lead to cascading tactical (and potentially operational) failures by the Russians.
12/ Such failure by the Russians in the two different regions can force additional errors. For example, they might speed up the deployment of mobilized troops, competing with transport required to provide other logistical support to front line troops.
13/ It can also force the Russians into taking greater risk with assets such as their EW, fires, and Air Force (they still have one, right?). All of which provides additional opportunity for the Ukrainians to exploit, destroy more of the Russian Army and recapture more ground.
14/ This is less an operational update than an explanation of how the theory of operational design works in practice. But what we have seen recently from the Ukrainian Armed Forces is more evidence that they have a better understanding of modern multi-domain war than all of us.
15/ Their mastery of modern war - including strategic influence operations - has also induced profound psychological shock in the Russians at the political, strategic, operational & tactical levels. Russia must now respond to Ukrainian initiatives at levels.
16/ We will see over the next few hours and days how the Kharkiv and Kherson campaigns play out. And, because of pressure in these two areas, there may be opportunities elsewhere that open up for the Ukrainians to exploit. End.
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I recommend
@DefMon3's thread about what is and isn't known. He's right to point out Ru defenses are more fortified in Kherson and they have more elite units, but when this many Russian channels are sounding the alarm, it usually means they're in trouble.
This Russian account is begging for air support and asking over Telegram if anyone has a connection to Russian military command to put them in contact, which is a pretty bad sign for Russian forces.
7/
The Russian Voenny Osvedomitel channel asks what should be done with officers who "openly sabotage the situation at the front with their inaction and stupidity" based on a report that units on the front line were warning about the Ukrainian buildup.
10/
t.me/milinfolive/91…
• • •
As for the current situation, in principle both goals are unattainable for Russia. Firstly, because there are no such groups or clusters of Ukrainian troops that could justify the expediency of using nuclear weapons. And given the political risks that follow, the use of nuclear weapons becomes inexpedient.
As for the demonstration strike, there is a clear position that Russia should understand that a demonstration strike will not work. The fact is that Ukraine has already passed the painful threshold when such a strike could force, firstly, the political leadership of the country to surrender, and secondly, intimidate our international partners so that they would limit support for Ukraine or rush to convince official Kyiv that it’s necessary to accept any Russian conditions.
Given this, the goals that Russia would try to achieve with such a nuclear strike are almost unattainable.
english.nv.ua/...