Unfortunately given the amount of destruction, the war will not be over for quite a while longer. A delay is likely between the arrival of new equipment in Ukraine’s ability to use it in a counteroffensive.
High-ranking Russian officials continue a campaign begun in December 2022 to set domestic conditions for a protracted war both in private and in public. The Guardian, citing anonymous internal sources, reported on March 28 that Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov told a group of Russian political and cultural elite that “things will get much harder” and that the current situation (in reference to the war) “will take a very, very, long time” during a private dinner in December 2022.[17] Peskov’s reported warning supports ISW’s assessment that Russian authorities have been preparing multiple aspects of Russian society for a protracted war through careful setting of information conditions and engagement of the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) since the end of 2022.[18] Russian Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu relatedly visited artillery shell production facilities in Chelyabinsk and Kirov oblasts on March 28 and claimed that Russian ammunition production has increased significantly over the past year, promising that production will increase a further seven to eight times for certain unspecified artillery products by the end of the year.[19] Shoigu’s visit to artillery factories is the latest in a slew of choreographed visits to DIB facilities by various Russian officials and is part of a concerted effort to present the Russian DIB as effective in advance of a protracted war effort.[20]
www.understandingwar.org/...
The Russian budget continues to reflect the overall costs of Russia’s war in Ukraine. Bloomberg reported on March 28 that Russia has classified an unprecedented one-third of its entire budget expenditures and noted that classified spending as of March 24 is twice as high as it was during the same period in 2022.[21] Bloomberg also found that Russian defense and security spending is the second largest budget category after spending on social programs.[22] Bloomberg concluded that the classified share of the Russian budget will account for nearly a quarter of all expenditures for the whole of 2023 and will be due to an increase in expenses classed as “other expenses in the field of national defense.”[23] Russian outlet RBC relatedly reported on March 28 that the Russian Ministry of Finance plans to submit a proposal to reduce the number of federal state institutions subordinate to federal authorities in order to increase the efficiency of budget expenditure management.[24] Such expenditure manipulations suggest that Russia is trying to cut spending in a variety of spheres to support increased defense spending, further responding to costs associated with the war and setting conditions for a long war.
www.understandingwar.org/…
Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov stated on March 27 that Ukrainian forces may be planning to launch a counteroffensive in April or May depending on weather conditions. In an interview with Estonian news outlet ERR, Reznikov stated that the Ukrainian General Staff might decide to use recently received Leopard 2 tanks in a possible spring counterattack.[19] Leopard 2 and Challenger 2 tanks arrived in Ukraine on March 27, and US officials announced the acceleration of the deployment of Abrams tanks and Patriot missile systems to Ukraine on March 21.[20] The arrival of equipment in Ukraine likely sets conditions for a Ukrainian counteroffensive, although a delay is likely between the arrival of new equipment in Ukraine’s ability to use it in a counteroffensive.
- Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian met with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov in Moscow on March 29 to review strategic and long-term cooperation agreements that will likely intensify Russia and Iran’s bilateral security relationship.
- Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin seized on the recent story of the sentencing of a Tula Oblast father for his 12-year-old daughter’s antiwar drawing to promote the Wagner Group’s reputation and ameliorate his own personal image.
- Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov’s demonstrative response to an attack on a police station in Chechnya suggests that he may be concerned about the stability of his authoritarian rule.
- Russian authorities arrested Russian National Guard (Rosgvardia) naval department head Colonel Sergey Volkov for corruption-related charges.
- Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line.
- Russian forces continued offensive operations in and around Bakhmut and along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City front.
- International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Grossi visited the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) for the second time.
- Russian occupation authorities continue to implement measures to integrate occupied territories into the Russian administrative and legal system.
- The Belarusian Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported that planned activities are ongoing to call up those liable for military service for military training and to retrain reserve servicemen in military registration specialties.
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1— Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and continue offensive operations into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on March 29. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful ground attacks near Krokhmalne (20km northwest of Svatove), Novoselivske (14km northwest of Svatove), Stelmakhivka (12km northwest of Svatove), Bilohorivka (10km south of Kreminna), Verkhnokamianske (18km south of Kreminna), Vymika (27km southwest of Kreminna), and Berestove (30km south of Kreminna).[21] Geolocated footage published on March 26 shows elements of the Russian 6th Combined Arms Army (Western Military District) striking Ukrainian positions northeast of Kupyansk.[22] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty stated on March 28 that Russian forces continue to use ”classic army tactics” with a considerable number of armored vehicles in the Kupyansk-Lyman direction.[23] A Russian milblogger posted footage on March 28 purportedly showing the 3rd Guards Spetsnaz Brigade operating near the Siverskyi Donets River south of Kreminna.[24] Another milblogger claimed that Russian forces continue to advance in the forests around Kreminna.[25] Ukrainian Luhansk Oblast Military Administration reported on March 29 that Russian forces are concentrating their main efforts on offensive operations in the Lyman direction and that Russian forces attempted to storm Bilohorivka.[26] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces regained lost positions and made unspecified advances near Bilohorivka.[27] The milblogger also claimed that Russian forces pushed through Ukrainian defenses near Torske (14km west of Kreminna) and unsuccessfully attacked Ukrainian positions near Terny, Nevske, and Makiivka, all 17 to 21km northwest of Kreminna. ISW has not observed visual confirmation that supports a Ukrainian advance near Bilohorivka or a Russian advance near Torske.
www.understandingwar.org/...
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2—Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in and around Bakhmut on March 29. Geolocated footage published on March 28 and 29 indicates that Russian forces advanced in southern and southwestern Bakhmut.[29] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces conducted offensive operations near Khromove (2km west of Bakhmut) and advanced in northern parts of Bakhmut.[30] Russian milbloggers claimed on March 28 and 29 that Wagner Group fighters advanced further in the southern part of Bakhmut.[31] A Russian milblogger claimed on March 28 that Wagner fighters are intensifying their offensives within Bakhmut itself because conventional Russian forces strengthened Russian positions north and south of the city to defend against potential Ukrainian counterattacks, supporting ISW‘s assessment that conventional Russian elements are likely increasingly supporting Wagner operations in this area.[32] The United Kingdom Ministry of Defense (UK MoD) reported that Russian forces are continuing to conduct assaults on Bakhmut at a reduced tempo in comparison to recent weeks.[33] Russian milbloggers claimed that Wagner fighters advanced near Ivanivske (6km west of Bakhmut) on March 29 and that Ukrainian forces continued attempts to push Russian forces back from the T0504 highway as of March 28.[34] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations within 11km northwest of Bakhmut near Orikhovo-Vasylivka and Bohdanivka and within 16km southwest of Bakhmut near Ivanivske, Predtechyne, and Ozarianivka.[35] The Ukrainian General Staff acknowledged that Russian forces conducted partially successful assaults on Bakhmut but did not specify the details of those assaults.[36] ISW assessed that Wagner Group forces likely occupied the AZOM industrial complex in northern Bakhmut and made additional gains in the city on March 28.[37]
www.understandingwar.org/...
Supporting Effort—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)
Ukrainian forces continued striking Russian positions and concentration areas in southern Ukraine on March 29. Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted a HIMARS strike against an electrical substation at a railway depot in occupied Melitopol, Zaporizhia Oblast.[44] Geolocated footage posted on March 29 shows smoke rising near the railway depot in Melitopol following the strike.[45] Geolocated footage posted on March 28 additionally shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian positions near Oleshky, east (left) bank of Kherson Oblast.[46] Russian sources reported that Russian air defense shot down a Ukrainian drone over Simferopol, occupied Crimea on March 29.[47]
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Grossi visited the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) for the second time on March 29.[48] Grossi reportedly spent several hours at the ZNPP and to observe how the situation at the plant has changed since his first visit, talk to nuclear engineers at the plant, and act as a guarantor for IAEA personnel rotation.[49] Grossi told reporters that ”it is obvious that military activity is increasing in this whole region” and called for the observance of every possible measure to safeguard the ZNPP.[50]
Russian forces continue efforts to fortify positions in occupied Crimea. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on March 29 that Russian troops are building trenches and fortifications in the Armiansk and Dzhankoi regions of Crimea and that Russian forces are using civilians to build some of the defenses.[51]
Russian forces otherwise conducted routine shelling in Kherson, Mykolaiv, and Zaporizhia oblasts on March 29.[52] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command noted that Russian forces dropped guided aerial bombs on Beryslav, Kherson Oblast, from a Su-35 aircraft.[53]
www.understandingwar.org/...
"in the autumn of 2021 Russian agents in Ukraine began to go on brief holidays at short notice to resorts in Turkey, Cyprus and Egypt where, coincidentally, they would meet with their handlers." static.rusi.org/202303-SR-Unco…
"the Russian Orthodox Church...Beyond its efforts to support Russian information operations, its priests were widely recruited and run by the Russian special services and their monasteries and churches used as safe houses for equipment and personnel."
static.rusi.org/202303-SR-Unco…
"Russia’s belief that it understood Ukrainian politics may have been bolstered by the number of senior former Ukrainian officials resident in Moscow who had a clear motive in telling the Kremlin to proceed."
static.rusi.org/202303-SR-Unco…
Agent network fragility: "the full-scale invasion fundamentally altered the context within which their unwitting agents or agents recruited under false flags who lacked any ideological commitment...were judging the harms of operating under Russian control"
static.rusi.org/202303-SR-Unco…
"A large portion of the middle echelon of [Ukrainian] officials that were Russian agents simply stopped responding to [Russian] messages early in the invasion or else abandoned their posts, severing chains of command"
static.rusi.org/202303-SR-Unco…
Clever info ops. "the Russians started messages on Ukrainian social media calling for citizens to report suspicious markings on buildings. The result was a deluge of false positives swamping the capacity of Ukrainian law enforcement."
static.rusi.org/202303-SR-Unco…
"One of the foremost causes of inaccuracy in pre-war military assessments of the likely trajectory of the fighting – both in NATO countries & in the Ukrainian mil.– stems from the assumption that the Ru forces would conduct a deliberate military offensive"
static.rusi.org/202303-SR-Unco…
"relatively small level of infiltration & sabotage against military sites attempted in the opening phase [per] Russian doctrine...Instead most Spetsnaz deployed in conventional reconnaissance roles ahead of the [BTGs] while special forces were largely intended to sweep in behind"
"The Russians were so confident that they would succeed in hours that their support apparatus had rented apartments around the key sites from which their special forces were supposed to operate in Kyiv"
static.rusi.org/202303-SR-Unco…
"The population was divided into five core categories". Number one was "Those deemed leaders of Ukrainian nationalism who were specified for physical liquidation on a high-priority target list, or for capture to enable show trials."
static.rusi.org/202303-SR-Unco…
"fact that layout of these facilities is consistent throughout the country & the equipment used in torture chambers incl specialised electrocution machines were same across multiple oblasts demonstrates this was a systematic plan & not improvised sadism."
static.rusi.org/202303-SR-Unco…
"Of the 800 Russian agents identified in the occupied parts of Kharkiv oblast...majority were junior officials in local government including in departments such as the forestry commission. Fewer than 100 local law enforcement officers collaborated."
static.rusi.org/202303-SR-Unco…
"Based on its experiences in Chechnya, [Rus] planning assumption was that 8% of the population needed to collaborate, whether proactively or under coercion, to enable the counterintelligence regime to be effective". Ukr assessed "FSB was broadly correct"
static.rusi.org/202303-SR-Unco…
The digitised gulag archipelago. "By the time these datasets reached the TOG at the oblast level, there is evidence that data was ingested into ‘Spectrum’. Spectrum is the FSB’s digital architecture for its security and counterintelligence work..."
static.rusi.org/202303-SR-Unco…
This could certainly make the work of war crimes investigators much easier.
Collective punishment. "Even in...areas [w/] no strikes...acts of resistance wd often lead to apparently random people being lifted for interrogation in numbers. In some communities this essentially led many residents not to go out except for essentials"
static.rusi.org/202303-SR-Unco…
SF cannibalising regular infantry. "the expansion of Spetsnaz units had contributed to a shortage of competent contract infantry for the wider Russian military – as most competent infantry had been pushed toward Spetsnaz and airborne units."
static.rusi.org/202303-SR-Unco…
Prigozhin: GRU's conduit to Putin. "the GRU has often routed political recommendations to Putin through Prigozhyn rather than its own official chain of command. Instead, it would be fairer to say that the GRU and Wagner are strongly intertwined."
static.rusi.org/202303-SR-Unco…
"Despite transcending the GRU’s chain of command, the supply of weapons and military equipment to Wagner is carried out by the structures of the [Russian MoD] through the 78th Special Reconnaissance Centre and the 22nd Special Forces Brigade of the GRU"
static.rusi.org/202303-SR-Unco…
"the persistent [HUMINT] network held together by the resistance movement has been critical to the accurate targeting of Russian command & control and logistics infrastructure using long-range precision fires"
static.rusi.org/202303-SR-Unco… [though Ukr has incentive to mislead here]
"details of how the resistance movement is run is clearly operationally sensitive...skills...are primarily those of [HUMINT] handling & covert communications and...personnel best suited to this activity are mainly drawn from the special services"
static.rusi.org/202303-SR-Unco…
Goodbye Salisbury, hello Kherson. "some officers of [GRU's] Unit 29155, who were exposed and can no longer be used undercover, are now involved in remote recruitment and management of agent networks on the territory of Ukraine"
static.rusi.org/202303-SR-Unco…
"fact that [GRU] have consistently found targets and have the means to strike them means that how to identify & break up these human reconnaissance networks is a key question for the rear area security of NATO conventional forces in the event of conflict."
static.rusi.org/202303-SR-Unco…
"Although crude and violent – having a terrible effect on the economy and quality of life in targeted areas – [Ru repression] does appear to be an effective method of constraining resistance activities to a manageable level and maintaining control."
static.rusi.org/202303-SR-Unco…
"For NATO forces ... partnered resistance operations need to be calibrated towards reconnaissance rather than direct action...Those interfacing with these networks need to prioritise skills in handling human agents and in covert communications"
static.rusi.org/202303-SR-Unco…
"there appears to be a systemic problem [in Russian intel services] of overreporting one’s successes and concealing weaknesses to superiors." static.rusi.org/202303-SR-Unco… See my piece from October on this:
Deterring the deluded: "this lack of self-awareness in the Russian services...is far from comforting as it leads to a situation in which the Russians are difficult to deter because they have an unrealistic estimation of the likelihood of their success."
static.rusi.org/202303-SR-Unco…
"once a particular [Russian] form or method is exposed it tends to have been widely replicated allowing for the rapid detection of a wide range of unconnected activities. The Russian system does not appear to encourage treating each operation as bespoke."
static.rusi.org/202303-SR-Unco…
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