Russian forces conducted a mid-sized Shahed-136/131 drone strike against Ukraine on the night of September 31 to October 1.
The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched 32 Shaheds from Kursk Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea, 29 of which Ukrainian forces destroyed over Cherkasy, Kirovohrad, Mykolaiv, Kherson, Poltava, Sumy, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts.[78] The remaining three Shaheds reportedly did not reach their targets due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference.[79] Ukrainian Ground Forces Commander Lieutenant General Oleksandr Pavlyuk noted on September 30 that Ukrainian forces have shot down a total of 143 Shahed drones over the past week (September 23 to 30).[80]
Russian forces struck civilian infrastructure in Zaporizhzhia City with guided aerial bombs on October 1.[81] Zaporizhia Oblast Head Ivan Fedorov stated that the strikes damaged high-rise buildings and homes in Komunarskyi Raion, killing one and injuring nine.[82] Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Vladyslav Voloshyn noted that Russian forces recently began using guided aerial bombs to strike Zaporizhzhia City after Russian forces recently made tactical and technical adaptations to the bombs that allowed them to travel longer distances.[83]
- Russian forces likely seized Vuhledar as of October 1 following a reported Ukrainian withdrawal from the settlement, though it is unclear if Russian forces will make rapid gains beyond Vuhledar in the immediate future.
- Some Russian sources expressed doubts that Russian forces would be able to rapidly advance and achieve operationally-significant breakthroughs immediately after seizing Vuhledar.
- Ukrainian officials continue to highlight how Ukraine is reducing Russia's battlefield artillery ammunition advantage, likely in part due to recent Ukrainian strikes on Russian ammunition depots.
- The United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UN OHCHR) issued its June-August 2024 report detailing Ukrainian civilian casualties, systemic Russian mistreatment of Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs), and limited Ukrainian mistreatment of Russian POWs. The UN OHCHR report highlighted the difference between official Russian and Ukrainian reactions to the mistreatment of POWs, and Russian state media largely misrepresented the report by ignoring assessments about Russia's systemic mistreatment of Ukrainian POWs.
- The Russian federal budget for 2025-2027 has carved out funding to support online platforms belonging to a prominent Kremlin propagandist and a former opposition outlet, further highlighting the Kremlin's efforts to adapt its propaganda machine to Russians’ growing reliance on social media for information.
- Russian forces recently advanced near Vovchansk, Kreminna, Toretsk, Pokrovsk, and Vuhledar.
- Russian authorities are reportedly planning to increase recruitment within Russian pre-trial detention centers.
https://t.co/cxHUoQzK29
Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations west of the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast in Glushkovsky Raion on September 30 and October 1, but did not advance.[26] Russian sources, including the Russian MoD, claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian offensive operations near Novy Put and Veseloye (both southwest of Glushkovo) and that Ukrainian strikes on Krasnooktyabrsky (southeast of Veseloye) suggest that Russian forces still control the settlement.[27] Elements of the Russian 56th Airborne (VDV) Regiment (7th VDV Division) continue to operate in Glushkovsky Raion.[28]
Russian sources claimed that Russian forces recently advanced southeast of Sudzha within the Ukrainian salient in Kursk Oblast. Russian sources claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Plekhovo and advanced near Borki (both southeast of Sudzha), although ISW has not observed visual evidence of Russian advances near Borki.[29] Russian sources also claimed that Russian forces made unconfirmed advances between the forest areas of Kucherov and the Brodina gully (on the international border southeast of Sudzha) and that Ukrainian forces continued attacking near Kremyanoye (east of Korenevo).[30] Chechen Akhmat Spetsnaz Commander Apty Alaudinov claimed on October 1 that Russian forces seized two unspecified settlements in Kursk Oblast.[31] Drone elements of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet [BSF], Southern Military District [SMD]), artillery elements of the 83rd Separate VDV Brigade, and the ”Smuglyanka” Detachment are reportedly operating in Kursk Oblast.[32]
www.understandingwar.org/...
www.understandingwar.org/...
www.understandingwar.org/...
www.understandingwar.org/...
Russian forces likely seized Vuhledar as of October 1 following a reported Ukrainian withdrawal from the settlement, though it is unclear if Russian forces will make rapid gains beyond Vuhledar in the immediate future.
Russian forces likely seized Vuhledar as of October 1 following a reported Ukrainian withdrawal from the settlement, though it is unclear if Russian forces will make rapid gains beyond Vuhledar in the immediate future. Geolocated footage published on September 30 and October 1 shows Russian forces planting Russian flags and freely operating in various parts of Vuhledar, and Russian milbloggers claimed on October 1 that Russian forces seized the settlement.[1] A Ukrainian servicemember reported on October 1 that a part of the Ukrainian force grouping conducted a planned withdrawal from Vuhledar to avoid encirclement, and Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces began to withdraw from Vuhledar as of the end of September 30.[2] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces did not completely interdict Ukrainian egress routes before Ukrainian forces withdrew but that Russian artillery and drones inflicted unspecified losses on withdrawing Ukrainian personnel.[3] The scale of Ukrainian casualties is unknown at this time, however, but the widespread reports of Ukrainian withdrawal suggest that the larger Ukrainian contingent likely avoided a Russian encirclement that would have generated greater casualties. Russian sources credited elements of the Russian 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet, Eastern Military District [EMD]), 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade (29th Combined Arms Army [CAA], EMD), 5th Tank Brigade and 37th Motorized Rifle Brigade (both part of 36th CAA, EMD), 430th Motorized Rifle Regiment (likely a mobilized unit of the 29th CAA), and 14th Spetsnaz Brigade (Special Forces of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces [GRU]) for directly seizing or assisting in the seizure of Vuhledar.[4] Russian sources also claimed that Russian forces continued to advance west of Vodyane (northeast of Vuhledar).[5]
www.understandingwar.org/...
