Russian forces conducted a large-scale Shahed-136/131 drone strike against Ukraine on the night of September 13 to 14.
The Ukrainian Air Forces reported that Russia launched a total of 76 Shaheds at Ukraine from Kursk Oblast; Yeysk, Krasnodar Krai; and occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea—72 of which Ukrainian forces shot down, two of which got "lost" and did not reach their intended targets in Ukraine, and two of which flew back into Russian airspace.[74] Independent Belarusian monitoring group Hajun Project reported on September 14 that a Shahed drone flew into Belarusian airspace from Lviv Oblast for 30 minutes overnight before returning to Ukraine.[75] Ukrainian forces shot down nine Shaheds over Odesa Oblast and the rest over Mykolaiv, Kherson, Poltava, Kharkiv, Kyiv, Donetsk, Zhytomyr, Dnipropetrovsk, Cherkasy, Vinnytsia and Sumy oblasts.[76]
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- Ukrainian officials and sources indicated that Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast has prompted the Russian authorities to increase the size of the Russian force grouping in Kursk Oblast by upwards of a factor of three.
- Ukraine and Russia conducted a prisoner of war (POW) exchange on September 14 — the third POW exchange since the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk Oblast, which appears to have generated the short-term effect of increasing incentives for Russia to engage in POW exchanges.
- Some Russian field commanders continue to make decisions that degrade the overall quality of their subordinate forces—prioritizing infantry-led frontal assault tactics over cultivating technical specialists who would allow the Russian military to better field technologies and innovations in combat operations.
- The Kremlin continues efforts to leverage global informational instruments of influence to develop new capabilities to conduct election interference, destabilization measures, and sanctions evasion schemes.
- Officials of Georgia’s ruling Georgia Dream party continue to elevate narratives echoing Kremlin information operations justifying Russia’s occupation of internationally recognized Georgian territories.
- Ukrainian forces continued to advance in Glushkovsky Raion and Russian forces recently regained territory near Korenevo and Sudzha.
- Russian forces recently advanced near Chasiv Yar, Pokrovsk, and Vuhledar.
- Russian forces are reportedly repairing captured Soviet-era Ukrainian equipment to replenish Russian vehicle stocks.
Ukrainian officials and sources indicated that Ukraine's incursion into Kursk Oblast has prompted the Russian authorities to increase the size of the Russian force grouping in Kursk Oblast by upwards of a factor of three. Ukrainian Pivnich (Northern) Operational Command Spokesperson Vadym Mysnyk stated on September 14 that Russian forces had 11,000 personnel deployed in Kursk Oblast at the start of Ukraine's incursion in early August 2024.[1] Mysnyk stated that there are various estimates that place the current size of the Russian grouping in Kursk Oblast between 30,000 and 45,000 personnel.[2] Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on September 13 that Russian forces have concentrated 40,000 personnel in Kursk Oblast and aim to concentrate a total of 60,000 to 70,000 personnel in the area.[3] The individual number breakdown for each of the Russian services (Rosgvardia, border guards, regular units, irregular units, and conscript forces) contributing to these figures remains unclear. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets stated on September 14 that there are roughly 61 various Russian units of various sizes comprised of roughly 35,500 Russian personnel within the Russian Northern Grouping of Forces' Kursk Group (which has responsibility for Glushkovsky, Korenevsky, Sudzhansky, Rylsky, Lgovsky, Kurchatovsky, and Kursky raions).[4] The reported growth in the size of the Russian grouping in Kursk Oblast is reflective of how operational pressures caused by the incursion have forced the Russian military command to redeploy elements from Ukraine to Kursk Oblast and commit newly generated forces from within Russia to the area instead of the frontline in Ukraine.[5] A Russian counteroffensive operation to retake territory seized by Ukrainian forces in Kursk Oblast will very likely require even more manpower and materiel than Russia has already concentrated in the area and therefore additional Russian redeployments from Ukraine.[6]
