Ukraine sent six drones last night deep into Russia and destroyed what might be the largest ammunition depot of the war so far.
The depot was in the town of Toropets in the Tver region of Russia, which is about 400 km northwest of Moscow towards the Latvian border.
The depot is massive — about three miles long and a mile wide at places. It held tens of thousands of tons of ammunition, S-300, S-400, Iskander and North Korean missiles. Windows were shattered five kilometers away.
It is believed the explosion destroyed 19,000 metric tons of ammunition/missiles.
The site's construction was overseen by former Deputy Minister of Defence General Dmitry Bulgakov, who was arrested for fraud in July 2024.
The smoke plume from the explosion was visible from space.
From a distance the burning ammo dump looks like a series of prehistoric volcanoes.
The explosion was so large it registered on the Richter scale.
This looks like a good idea.
As you might imagine, Russian bloggers are not happy.
Last night in Toropets, the enemy blew up the largest missile arsenal of the Russian Armed Forces. How long will we keep lying and making mistakes? How many times have we heard, "Stop panicking, stop writing things, stop blaming the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff - we're at war." Well, indeed, those sitting with calm faces watching explosions that look like mushrooms, maybe you should panic a little-WE ARE AT WAR, and we keep messing up again and again.
It's impossible to interpret this as anything other than the betrayal of the country by an internal enemy. Yesterday, they reported another assembly in the DPR, and a strike hit there, killing our soldiers. Back in 2018, Bulgakov stated that only a utility block for 200 servicemen was planned in Toropets. How many of our people died there? Judging by the explosions and the footage, nothing was left of their bodies.
They lie and make mistakes. They lie and make mistakes. How much longer, men? Have your brains and consciences completely atrophied?
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It's the third year of the Special Military Operation, and the idiocy continues:
- Troop assemblies remain visible to the enemy;
- Convoys still move without maintaining proper distance;
- Ammunition is still stored in one place, visible to the enemy, both at the front and in the rear;
- Photo and video confirmations of Ukrainian hits are still being filmed and posted;
- Helicopters and planes are hidden in foil hangars or not hidden at all;
- There's no discipline, no unified command
Any time a competent Russian commander is taken off the battlefield is a good thing for Ukraine.
The terrorist is regarded as a highly competent and successful commander, with notable participation in the battle for Avdiivka. A native "Donetsk miner", Beliy has been fighting against Ukraine since 2014.
The case stems from Bely reportedly cracking down on drug dealers who were distributing narcotics to the fighters. The conflict was allegedly provoked by the "bearded dealers" [Akhmat], but despite his reputation, the high command has not come to Bely’s defense.
Several prominent war correspondents now claim the unit was unjustly beheaded, leading them to scale back their own operations in protest. They're now begging Belousov to help him out.
It makes no sense to try to take the Dnipro River islands near Kherson unless it is a prelude to attacking across the river.
A Russian warehouse storing lubricants was blown up in Yaroslavl.
A long, thoughtful post of the systemic problems in the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
1. Disconnect in Command and Combat Readiness There is an apparent disconnect between higher command assessment and the actual combat readiness of units. In many cases, units with limited operational capacity are tasked with responsibilities far beyond their capabilities.
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2. The Lack of Truth and Realistic Reporting The previously discussed disconnect raises the question: Why don’t officers report their unit’s inability to perform certain missions? The answer is simple: Brigade commanders and senior officers are ultimately responsible for the combat and mobilization readiness of their units per regulations. Admitting that a unit cannot perform a task is often seen as a failure of brigade leadership.
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3. Systematic Problems with Recruitment and Training The quality and quantity of new recruits continue to fall short of expectations. Although some training centers have made improvements, overall readiness remains alarmingly insufficient. Many newly arrived soldiers are not prepared for the realities of frontline combat, forcing brigades to develop and implement their own internal training programs.
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4. Little to no Accountability Three years into the war, Ukraine has yet to fully implement an After Action Review (AAR) process, which hasn't been implemented except in cases where individual officers took the initiative. The tactical level is the highest level where it's used. The blame for operational failures often falls on mid-level officers, and in some cases, even soldiers on the ground. Even in rare cases, after public scandals, when generals are removed from their posts following catastrophic failures, they are typically reassigned to other command positions rather than being held accountable, leaving little room for new, younger, and more innovative officers to rise through the ranks.
Halt! Who goes there?
