Ukraine’s cancelled conscription and postponed demobilization suggest that it mat be contrasting its own mobilization with Russia’s troubles. State actors in the Baltic pipeline sabotage seem the likely suspects to most US analysts, It’s Russia because the attack on an inactive line isn’t costly and could be profitable in terms of current fossil fuel deliveries using alternative means. More likely it’s a message to demonstrate the vulnerability of other pipelines in the region like the seven in Norway.
Eastern Ukraine: (Vovchansk-Kupyansk-Izyum-Lyman Line)
Ukrainian forces liberated Lyman on October 1. The Russian Ministry of Defense and various Russian milbloggers confirmed that Russian troops withdrew from Lyman to “more advantageous lines,” and geolocated social media footage shows Ukrainian troops in various parts of Lyman throughout the day on October 1.[10] Russian sources indicated that the BARS-13 detachment that was holding the Russian defensive line in Drobysheve, just northwest of Lyman, withdrew to Kreminna (about 25km east of Lyman).[11] Details about Ukrainian advances remain unclear, however. Several Russian sources reported that Ukrainian troops blew up a bridge on the eastern outskirts of Kirove, 10km northeast of Lyman.[12] However, the footage is not corroborated by social media geolocation communities. The dynamic nature of ongoing Ukrainian counteroffensive operations in this area is likely generating confusing and contradictory reporting. Russian sources also discussed Ukrainian attacks north of Lyman around Torske, Terny, and Yampilske, suggesting that Ukrainian troops are continuing efforts to take settlements north of Lyman as well.[13] ISW will continue to monitor developments around Lyman and provide updates on control of terrain as they become corroborated.
www.understandingwar.org/...
Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian forces conducted ground attacks in the Bakhmut and Avdiivka areas and continued routine fire along the line of contact in Donetsk Oblast on October 1.[20] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian ground attacks directly on Bakhmut, to the northeast near Soledar, and south of Bakhmut near Vesela Dolyna (6km southeast of Bakhmut), Zaitseve (8km southeast of Bakhmut), and Niu York (15km west of Horlivka), and west of Avdiivka near Pervomaiske.[21]
www.understandingwar.org/...
Southern Ukraine: (Kherson Oblast)
Ukrainian military officials reiterated on October 1 that Ukrainian troops are continuing to conduct counter-offensive operations in Kherson Oblast and setting conditions for future advances in various areas along the frontline.[14] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command noted that Russian forces are drawing up reserves and regrouping in the face of constant Ukrainian actions in southern Ukraine.[15] Ukrainian officials additionally stated that Ukrainian forces are continuing an interdiction campaign to target Russian concentration areas in Kherson Oblast.[16]
Social media footage indicates that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian ammunition warehouse in Tavriisk, 57km east of Kherson City and on the outskirts of Nova Kakhkova.[17]
Russian sources identified one main area in which Ukrainian troops conducted active ground maneuvers in Kherson Oblast on October 1. A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces attacked Russian positions in Davydiv Brid, in western Kherson Oblast near the Kherson-Mykolaiv Oblast border near the Inhulets River.[18] The milblogger claimed that Russian troops repelled the attack and forced Ukrainian troops to withdraw across the Inhulets, but maintained that Ukrainian troops are focused on taking Davydiv Brid.[19]
www.understandingwar.org/...
2/ The full text of the speech in English. I recommend reading it all - while providing a couple of breaks to vomit. It is anti-Anglo-Saxon, anti-LGBTIQ, anti-‘elites’, anti-West, and anti-US. And anti-Ukraine of course.
3/ The principal audience for the speech was the domestic one. Putin used the speech as a war update, with the message that Russian progress so far is significant, securing 4 regions of Ukraine to return to the Russian motherland.
4/ Another audience was Russia’s military leaders. In essence, Putin said “I have given you this great and historic mission, so sort your act out with mobilisation and get on with deploying more soldiers to Ukraine.”
5/ And, Putin probably believes that this speech will be well-received in certain, non-aligned parts of the world including South Asia and Africa, who still buy his energy and other products. He might be right.
6/ But what does this mean for the course of war in
#Ukraine? There are multiple impacts of Putin’s new - and flawed - strategy.
7/ First, it is another demonstration of Putin’s inability to align his desired political outcomes with the capacity of his military. This has been a characteristic of the war from day one. The Russian military is incapable of achieving what Putin has directed it to do.
8/ Even the scaled back strategic objective of liberating the Donbas, announced in Putin’s 9 May speech, has proven beyond the Russian military. This expanded approach, encompassing 4 provinces, is likely to be well beyond Russian military capacity to seize or hold.
9/ So, Putin has actually set himself up for failure in this regard alone. He has set out large objectives, which his military are unlikely to achieve, which will place further strain on his credibility and that of the Russian military. It is terrible strategy.
10/ A second impact is that this will encourage Ukraine to step up its efforts to take back its territory illegally seized by Russia. So far, it is doing a pretty good job of this and battlefield momentum is currently with the Ukrainians.
11/ Ukraine, with its strategy of corrosion, has out fought and out thought the Russians throughout this war. They have brilliantly used the indirect approach to destroy Russian units and morale. And they have magnificently applied the operational art in sequencing campaigns.
12/ As a consequence of Putin’s announcement, the Ukrainians have reinvigorated purpose. We should expect to see offensives continue, including (maybe at a slower pace) through the winter. And resistance attacks in annexed areas will increase.
13/ But the continuation of Ukrainian tactical and operational success also relies on the continuation of western support.
This leads to the third impact.
14/ Putin has given the west greater reason to support Ukraine. This illegal land grab goes against the all principles of self-determination and democracy. And it sets a terrible precedent for behaviour by large states - this can’t be allowed to stand.
15/ Fourth, Putin has continued his campaign to normalize the potential use of nuclear weapons. His reference to US use of nuclear weapons in WW2 as a precedent means he may see them as a final option to prevent a catastrophic loss in Ukraine. And to deter further NATO support.
16/ Fifth, Putin is continuing his ‘energy warfare’ against Europe. His speech again asked Europeans why they support the war, noting that “Europe have to convince their fellow citizens to eat less, take a shower less often and dress warmer at home.”
17/ A final impact of the speech is it shows that there is no negotiated end to this war in the near future. Putin stated that the future of the 4 provinces will not be discussed. Coupled with mobilisation, Putin has painted himself into a corner. He now has to win this war.
18/ This makes him probably even more dangerous. But it will also result in greater pressure on the Russian economy and on Russian society. The ultimate impact of this is unpredictable - but unlikely to be good. A good piece on this is from
@anneapplebaum
19/ Putin may also give the west no option but to further increase its aid to Ukraine. And, possibly, new consideration of Ukrainian entry into
#NATO. Putin’s war and annexation nearly guarantees what he sought to prevent by invading Ukraine.
president.gov.ua/en/news/mi-rob…
20/ The other irony of the speech is that it comes as Ukraine is about to capture
#Lyman & show its military prowess again by humiliating the Russian Army. It is another demonstration of Putin’s constant incapacity to align his political desires with military capacity.
21/ And if the ‘professional’ Russian military that has been trained and re-equipped over the last decade can’t prevail in Ukraine, it is extraordinarily unlikely that a mass of conscripts with just weeks of training will provide a solution to Putin’s territory aspirations.
22/ So Putin’s speech marks a more dangerous phase of the war, because he has shown himself to be more desperate. But the annexations, and mobilisations, are unlikely to change ultimate outcome of this war.
23/ Because, there is little else that Putin can do to Ukraine he has not already done. City destruction, rape, torture, murder, annexation and nuclear threats have not cowed the Ukrainians. They continue to show how a free people can defeat authoritarians. Take note Xi!
24/ The trajectory of the war remains for an eventual Ukrainian victory. But Putin’s recent announcements mean that
#Ukraine winning this war will take longer, and have a much higher price - for Ukraine and Russia. End.
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