French Political Geography, Part 4: The South

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Friday October 07, 2016 · 9:10 AM PDT

2016/10/07 · 09:10

This is part four of a five-part diary on France’s political geography.

[Note: Throughout this diary, I will be using the Partisan Voting Index. For those unfamiliar, a PVI of S+3 means that in an average election, the Socialists will receive 53% of the two-party vote, while a PVI of R+7 means the Republicans will receive 57%. In some areas, one of the minor parties earns more votes than one of the major parties. I will note areas with strong third-party presence but PVIs are going to be calculated among the two traditional major parties]

Here is a map of France, with the region being covered today in blue.

Auvergne (2.1% of France’s population) could be classified as either an extension of Southwestern France or as part of Southeastern France. Since it’s east of Paris, I put it with the southeast, but politically it’s more a part of the southwest, with a strong left-wing working class base.

Cantal is a rural, mountainous department in Auvergne’s southwest. Those of you who have read this series since part one may remember Aveyron, a neighboring department contained in the region of Midi-Pyrenees. Cantal is part of a different region but is politically extremely similar. Both (like Bretagne) are traditionally areas with strong Catholicism, a contrast from the more anti-clerical southwest of the country. Thus, both stuck with the French right despite being poor, rural, and southern. However, in today’s very secular France, Cantal has begun to vote like its poor neighbors. A department which was R+10 forty years ago is now R+1 and continuing to move leftward. The main town and agricultural center of Aurillac (famous for Cantal cheese) has consistently been ten points to the left of its department.

To the east of Cantal is Haute-Loire. It is also a part of heavily Catholic south-central France and exhibits the same patterns as Cantal, moving from R+8 in the 1970s to exactly 50-50 today.

In Auvergne’s center is Puy-de-Dome and its main city, Clermont-Ferrand. Like Nantes and Lille, Clermont-Ferrand is pretty unknown outside of the country because there are no tourist attractions, but it is sizeable (metro area of 467,000). Based on population relative to the country, Cincinnati is a good comparison. Politically, however, it behaves much differently, as the Puy-de-Dome department is S+8. Clermont-Ferrand also has a significant university presence, but I don’t think that’s enough to explain the fact that both the city and the department lurched over 5 points leftward between 1995 and 2007. I don’t have a good explanation; maybe somebody else does. Clermont-Ferrand, once best known for being the home of Michelin, has lost many manufacturing jobs over the years, but it has done a decent job replacing them with “knowledge economy” jobs thanks to its universities. The city is now a very left-wing S+12.

Finally, in Auvergne’s north sits Allier. Both in and out of France, it is best known as the department which contains Vichy, the seat of the Vichy French government during World War Two. Politically it is an interesting place. It has been moderately left-wing for decades, hovering around S+4 for at least forty years. Its largest town, the industrial town of Montlucon, is S+9 (another very left-wing part of France with a declining population, having lost almost 40% from its peak), but Vichy remains right-wing; its R+7 PVI score makes it one of the most conservative places in this part of France.

You may be wondering, after reading this series, where all the votes for the French right come from. After all, the French right has never in the modern era earned less than 46% of the two-party vote, an impressive achievement not matched in most other major Western countries. Other than some parts of Northeastern France, we haven’t really encountered them. But they are about to start coming fast and furious as we move into true Southeastern France.

The first region, and the only remaining non-Mediterranean one except Paris, is Rhone-Alpes (9.8% of France’s population). Relative populations are important to keep in mind at this point as well; Rhone-Alpes is about the size of France’s six smallest regions combined (Corsica, Limousin, Franche-Comte, Champagne, Basse Normandie, and Bourgogne).

In the region’s southwest sit Ardeche and Drome, separated by the Rhone River. Both have stayed close to 50-50 for decades. Today, mountainous Ardeche is S+1 and Drome is R+2; it appears Drome may be moving slightly rightward. Drome’s major town, Valence, is S+2.

Northwest of them is Loire, which has always been just a tad right of center. Today it is R+1. Its rural areas are R+4, while its three towns are all left of center. The largest, St. Etienne (metro area 500,000), is S+6 with a significant leftward trend, as we have seen in most larger cities. The smaller St. Chamond is S+2.

The most important department here is Rhone, home to Lyon, France’s second city (although the gap between first and second city is more like the UK than Spain, Italy, or Germany). In most of the Western world, one might expect the department containing the second most important city in a country to lean left, or at the very least the second-largest city to do so. As we’ve discovered throughout this series, however, France is different. There are two Socialist strongholds in the Rhone department, but Lyon is not one of them. The first is the heavily Muslim suburb of Vaulx. Today, it is S+19. This is the first heavily Muslim area encountered in the diary, but I would figure nobody is surprised that Muslims in France overwhelmingly oppose politicians such as Sarkozy. Another characteristic of Muslim areas is a strong vote for the leftist candidates such as Melenchon and low vote totals for the liberal centrist Francois Bayrou; both are reflected here. Interestingly, Muslim turnout is not as low relative to the national average as Hispanic turnout in the US; however, it is not as high as Black turnout either.

Lyon’s largest suburb, Villeurbane, is the other Socialist area. It is S+5. It used to be an industrial city, but like Clermont-Ferrand, has successfully transitioned into a city with a 21^st century economy. Of its 146,000 residents, 37,000 are students, which presumably explains the lean to the left and the weak support for the National Front.

Lyon has nine other significant suburbs, most of which are purple, including the next largest, St. Priest. However, there are two exceptions, R+8 Caluire-et-Cuire (cool name!) and R+11 St. Foy. Both are wealthy.

Lastly, there is the city of Lyon itself. Lyon used to be a relative bastion of the right, but as with most French cities this has declined somewhat. In 2012, for the first time in a very long time, it was to the left of the country, at S+1 (this is down from R+7 as recently as 1995). Lyon and its suburbs combined are today S+1 as well, making the Lyon Metro Area one of France’s more right-wing ones. Of course, France’s urban area range from socialist to centrist, with one glaring exception. And finally, there are some rural areas in Rhone. These are R+9 and are what keep the department conservative.

And at this point we have reached the Alps.

Northeast of Lyon is Ain. It is R+8 and contains the S+2 town of Bourg-en-Bresse, situated just at the foot of the Alps.

The finals three departments in Rhone-Alpes are very mountainous.

Isere can be divided into two very different areas. The northwestern half of the department is the last part of the Rhone Valley before the Alps begin, and it is center-right with 50-50 towns and somewhat conservative rural areas, just like neighboring regions.

The Grenoble area is another beast entirely. This is the only left-wing part of Eastern France, which is pretty incredible when you think about it. 8 and a half regions and it’s just Grenoble. But why is it so different? Well, it is one of France’s leading high-tech centers. Rennes, the other one mentioned so far, is also pretty left-wing. It is definitely more of a globalist city, having the second most international high-skilled workers after Paris. Like most high-tech areas, it also has a major university, and the city has 54,000 students. If there is a Silicon Valley in Europe (there isn’t exactly, obviously), the Grenoble area has as good of a claim to the title as anywhere. What is interesting about Grenoble and its suburbs, however, is not just the support for left-of-center parties, as in the US, but also the support for actual leftists, which is strong here. Why that is, I cannot say. The city and suburbs are politically similar, all hovering around S+13.

With all that, one would expect Isere to be a Socialist stronghold. Interestingly, because of its overwhelmingly rural nature, it isn’t. R+2 rural areas keep the department at only S+1.

Finally, way up in the Alps are Savoie and Haute-Savoie. Both are popular areas for mountain tourism, such as skiing and hiking. Savoie is R+4, although its largest town (Chambery) is S+4. Nearby Aix-Le-Bains is more of a tourist destination and is R+9 (this is a big variation from touristy areas in the US, which tend to be Democratic). Further north, in Haute-Savoie (R+11) sits the tourist mecca of Annecy (R+4 with a weak Front National), only about 15 miles from Geneva.

The first of France’s three Mediterranean regions is Languedoc-Rousillon (4.1% of France’s population). It stretches from the Spanish border to almost halfway to the Italian border.

First, on the Spanish border and containing some of the Pyrenees is Pyrenees Orientales. This is 50-50 territory, melding France’s left-wing southwest with its right-wing Mediterranean coastline. It is R+2. The main city, Perpignan, is also R+2, although it is moving left more quickly than the region is.

Neighboring Aude contains the towns of Narbonne (S+2) and Carcassonne (S+3), but in true southwestern France fashion, it’s the rural areas that provide Socialists with big margins, as the department is S+5.

Herault contains the coastal towns of Montpellier and Beziers. It is here that we really see the merging of the Cote d’Azur with Southwestern France, and the result is once again a 50-50 department. And at this point it’s probably important to talk about the Cote d’Azur.

Southeastern France was historically (and I mean historically, as in the 19^th century) the base of the French left, such as the opposition to Napoleon III. This effect gradually petered out, but it did not become a base of the right until two events occurred in the midst of France’s 30 Glorious Years (1945-1975). First, people began moving for retirement purposes. America has Florida, and France has the Cote d’Azur. These older people were overwhelmingly middle class, as the older poor remained in their original homes in colder parts of the country. Secondly, France lost/gave up Algeria. This led to an exodus of about a million French people, most of whom held very right-wing views and most of whom settled in various cities along the Mediterranean coast, including Perpignan, Montpellier, Marseille, Toulon, and Nice. This dual shock to the existing population led to a strong move to the right. Imagine if Florida didn’t have Caribbean immigration and you’ll get a sense of the impact. Anyways, back to Herault…

Montpellier, the larger town (or city, arguably), has 61,000 students among its 150,000 residents, making it one of the most student-heavy places in France. It is the only reason Herault is 50-50 instead of pretty safe territory for the Republicans. Today, it is S+10, with a strong Left (similar to many college campuses), a weak National Front (also par for the course), and a very strong red trend.

Beziers, not having a major university, is R+5 and really fits in better with the medium-sized and smaller towns in Herault, all of which give much love to the Le Pen family. Most of the rest of the department is just a tad right of center, except for the town of Agde, which for whatever reason is R+10.

The French National Front does not have one specific base, but if one were to choose a department as its base, Gard would be the best choice. This coastal department is the only one where Marine Le Pen came in first in the 2012 presidential election. Interestingly, it is not a stronghold of the right generally, as it is only R+3. Nimes, the largest town, is R+1. As with Herault and Aude, rural areas (many of which are actually small beachfront communities rather than agricultural) are exhibiting a significant trend to the right.

Finally, there is the only non-coastal department in Languedoc-Rousillon, which is Lozere. Like neighboring Aveyron and Cantal (neither of which are in Languedoc-Rousillon), Lozere is traditionally a bastion of the Catholic right, but secularization has diminished this significantly. R+13 in the 1970s, it is now R+2.

Jumping into the water and swimming for quite a while, one reaches Corsica (0.5% of France’s population), the smallest region in European France. Famously, Corsica was home to Napoleon and has a significant Italian influence. The island is steadily blue, at R+7. Its largest city, Ajaccio, is R+8 and more white-collar, but its second city, the impoverished port city of Bastia, is only R+1.

Finally, swimming back across part of the Mediterranean one reaches France’s secondary tourism center, Provence-Alpes-Cote d’Azur (Provence for short, 7.5% of France’s population). This is the third-largest region in France by population after Ile-de-France and Rhone-Alpes. Nord is fourth, and together they combine for more than two in five French residents. The south of France is as steadily conservative as the south of America.

There are three less-populated inland departments and three more-populated coastal ones. The two rural Alpine provinces in the northeast of the department are Hautes-Alpes and Alpes de Haute Provence. France isn’t always known for creative names! Mountainous France, whether in the Massif Central, the Pyrenees, or the Alps, tends to be 50-50 at worst for the Socialists, and this is no exception. Hautes-Alpes is R+1, as is its main town of Gap. Alpes de Haute Provence is 50-50 territory and, interestingly, has a strong leftist movement.

Vaucluse lies in the Rhone Valley a little under 100 miles south of Lyon. It is most well-known for containing the well-preserved and historic town of Avignon, home to the antipopes for a while a few centuries ago. Avignon is the only red spot in a sea of blue, and it is a pale red at that (S+2). The rest of the department is politically similar to the coastal parts of Provence: a pretty deep hue of blue with a strong National Front. Vaucluse’s rural areas are R+9, while the smaller towns of Orange, Carpentras, and Cavaillon range R+10 to R+14.

In the southwest of France’s southeast lies Bouches-du-Rhone, home to Marseille. Marseille has a reputation as a relatively dirty, unsafe city, not a tourist destination. Marseille itself is an R+1 city, and in fact there is not a single suburb of Marseille which is more red than S+2 Martigues, which given its location about 12 miles west of Marseille along the coast may not even count as a suburb at all. Interestingly, Martigues, along with three other towns in the western part of Bouches-du-Rhone (Istres, which is next to Martigues; Miramas, on the other side of Istres; and Arles, at the far western end of the department) used to be red territory until the Sarkozy realignment of 2007. Just as many urban centers moved a few points leftward in response to the moderate National Frontification of the French right, many more culturally conservative areas moved the other way. The most conservative of all towns in the department is Marignane, a working-class town home to Marseille’s airport, which has a very strong National Front and is R+12. Aix-en-Provence, probably the most touristy place in the department, is R+5, although it’s the only town with a significant trend leftward.

On the whole, Bouches-du-Rhone is R+5, a three point rightward shift since 1995 and a twelve point one since the 1970s, when the demographics here were very different. The city of Marseille has moved two points leftward, while almost everywhere else has moved a few points the other way. While Bouches-du-Rhone is a mostly urban department, its rural turf is still significant, and conservative, at R+8.

Heading east down the coast, the next department is Var. Var is hard right, the fourth most conservative department in all of France, and also is a good area for the National Front. The towns here range from medium blue to deepest blue. Interestingly Var, like its neighbor, was purple until the 1990s. The main city in Var is R+10 Toulon, which contains a strong military presence, some manufacturing, shipbuilding, and other economic sectors. The least blue town in the department is La Seyne sur Mer (R+5), located across a small bay from Toulon. It’s historically a shipbuilding center, but this is disappearing and the town is becoming more immigrant-heavy, as with some of the old manufacturing centers in Northern England. At the other end of the spectrum are R+19 Frejus and R+22 St. Rapahel, both at the far eastern end of the department. Rural areas of the department are R+14, and Var as a whole is R+12.

I apologize for the length of this diary but I hope you found it worth the read. We have now reached the end, with the department of Alpes-Maritimes. This was Nicolas Sarkozy’s best department in the entire country, at R+16. It has always been the bluest in Provence, but it was a much more reasonable R+5 a few decades ago. In the US, even the most conservative states, like Utah or Alabama, have some Democratic cities. Not so in Provence. Avignon is the only place in the whole region which can charitably be described as left-wing. And here in Alpes-Maritimes, the most left-wing place is R+11 Grasse, located in the hills above Cannes. Coming in a close second is the city of Nice, which is R+12. Everywhere else is at least R+15, including the two other famous towns, Cannes (R+20) and Cagnes-sur-Mer (R+19). But the honor of most conservative town in France outside the Paris area goes to R+23 Mandelieu-La Napoule, a beachfront town just west of Cannes.

French Political Geography, Part 3: North By Northeast

jncca

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Monday September 26, 2016 · 1:13 PM PDT

2016/09/26 · 13:13

This is part three of a five-part diary on France’s political geography.

Here is a map of France, with the region being covered today in red (and a bit of orange)

Today’s diary will cover North and Northeast France, from the Belgian border areas down to Alsace.

Nord-Pas de Calais (6.1% of France’s population) is France’s northernmost region. Historically, it has a strong labor/mining heritage, much like central Appalachia. The great novel Germinal, among others, is set here. It consists of only two departments, as it is one of France’s smallest departments geographically despite its relatively large population. This area, like neighboring Belgium, is very dense.

Pas de Calais contains most of the province’s Atlantic coast but does not border Belgium. As in Appalachia, the left has seen better days. However, unlike West Virginia, Pas de Calais still favors the Socialists, just not by the margins it used to. A good comparison could be West Virginia in the 1990s, when it was still a Democratic state but the Republican margins of defeat were starting to shrink. Every major town in Pas de Calais supports the Socialists, and the rural areas (many of which are actually small mining communities historically, rather than agriculture) do as well. The most left-wing is Lievin, at S+17. No major community is worse for the Socialists than S+5, but the rural areas are only S+4.

The department as a whole and most of its towns have moved about five points to the right in the last 20 years. Many voters in this part of France now support the National Front, which is strong here, and have as an ideological preference National Front > Socialists > Republicans. This is similar to UKIP in parts of Northern England’s historic coal-mining areas. Three ideological outliers in the department are Arras, Calais, and Boulogne-sur-Mer; the latter has actually moved left while the others are stable. Boulogne’s movement could be explained by the fact that its economy is historically fishing-based rather than mining-based or perhaps due to its medium-sized university providing a liberal influence.

Nord is essentially Pas de Calais with more people and a bit more variance. It has also moved about five points rightward, but since it was never as left-wing as Pas de Calais it is now swing territory rather than light red. Rural Nord is essentially 50-50, a big drop from S+7 in 1995. There is a much larger ideological range among Nord’s cities, and there is more support for the Left/Communists here. They include bastions of the left which remain left-wing ( S+18 Grande-Synthe, S+9 Armentieres), left-wing bastions abandoning their heritage (Coudekerque was S+14 in 1995 and is now S+6, while Wattrelos has dropped from S+15 to S+3, among the largest shifts in the nation), wealthy suburban right-wing turf (R+7 Lambersart and R+15 (!) Marcq-en-Baroeul), traditionally swingy territory (Tourcoing and Dunkerque), and two cities that are moving leftward rather than rightward, S+14 Roubaix and S+10 Lille, the base of France’s most anonymous large metropolitan area.

Over the next decade, it will be interesting to see whether Nord-Pas de Calais continues to move rightward like West Virginia has. I would expect it to, although Lille has more of a white-collar liberal base than Charleston does.

In the US, Champagne (2.0% of France’s population) is a cause for celebration, but the Socialist Party has little to celebrate about their recent performances in this rural part of France.

At the north end of the province lies the department of Ardennes, a well-known area to World War I and Franco-Prussian War history buffs. Today, Ardennes is also a battleground, which is likely disappointing to Socialists who remember solid victories here prior to 2007. This area has a mix of agriculture and industry (trains and cars, but no longer metallurgy). The National Front is strong here and in the rest of rural Champagne, as in neighboring Nord-Pas de Calais.

Champagne’s population center, Reims, is located in Marne. Marne has seen the second-largest rightward shift among Champagne’s departments. In the 2012 election, it was R+7, a sharp decline from the purple status it had prior to 2007. Clearly, something about Nicolas Sarkozy helped draw normally Socialist voters into his party. It is the rural areas in this part of Champagne which really stand out. I’ve noted in previous diaries that rural France tends to be somewhat close to 50-50, unlike rural America, but rural Marne is about 60% Republican. Reims, the major city, is S+2, while the smaller Chalons is exactly 50-50.

Aube, south of Marne, has gone from 50-50 in 1974 to R+2 in 1995 to R+8 today. Its major town of Troyes has stayed put at R+2.

Haute-Marne, the “tail” of Champagne, has also seen about a seven-point rightward shift from the days of Francois Mitterand.

Lorraine (3.6% of France’s population) is probably best known for being split in half after German victory in the Franco-Prussian War. It doesn’t appear this split had much political effect. Interestingly, both Lorraine and neighboring Alsace had strong improvements for the Socialist Party in the late 1980s and the 1990s, only to see those gains reversed in the last decade.

Meuse, in the region’s west, is R+5, the most right-wing it has been in the last forty years, although it has never been anywhere better for the Socialists than 50-50.

Meurthe et Moselle has the clunkiest name of any French department and is the only one in Lorraine to lean to the left, even if it is slight (S+2). It has remained slightly but consistently left-of-center for at least four decades. Interestingly, this is not due to its main city, the college town of Nancy, which gained an S+ PVI for the very first time in 2012 as the right has continued to move in a populist direction. Meurthe et Moselle’s second city, Vandoeuvre, is the left-wing one (S+7 at present), while its rural areas have stayed close to 50-50, often a bit left of center.

In Lorraine’s northeast, Moselle is R+4 after a period of being just about 50-50. The main town of Metz is in fact 50-50, with rural areas leaning to the right a bit. This area borders the German Saarland, known as a coal area historically, so there may be a mining heritage on this side of the border too, although I’m not certain about that.

Finally, there is Vosges in the region’s southern end, which is R+2, but contains the left-leaning town of Epinal.

Alsace (2.8% of France’s population) has no American equivalent today, as it is an extremely conservative and very wealthy area, while also having a strong Catholic heritage. The best political comparison is probably Bavaria, although it is much smaller in population. This region consists of two departments.

In the south is Haut-Rhin and in the north is Bas-Rhin. As they are both R+14, I will analyze them together. No area in Alsace can really be considered left-wing, but some are purple. On the “far left” is the well-educated city of Strasbourg, currently S+2 and with a leftward trend. The Strasbourg suburb of Schiltigheim is S+1, and Mulhouse is 50-50. The rest of Alsace ranges from R+8 (Colmar) to R+19! (rural areas). For reference to the US, rural Alsace is as far right within the French political context as Idaho is in the US. Unlike Champagne and Lorraine, Alsace does not show an above-average Front National vote, although it’s not low either.

Franche-Comte (1.8% of France’s population) is one of France’s least populous regions, bordering Switzerland on its west side. It consists of three departments and an independent city, Belfort.

Belfort is R+1 and, interestingly, has a Socialist heritage, unusual for this part of France, as it was S+4 up until 2007.

Haute-Saone in the north and Jura in the southwest are both extremely rural. Both used to be 50-50 and have inched rightward, sitting at R+2.

Doubs contains the large town of Besancon (S+7), the smaller town of Montbeliard (50-50), and it as a whole is R+3, meaning its rural areas are pretty conservative.

Bourgogne (Burgundy in English, 2.5% of France’s population) is known for wines and castles.

Yonne, in the northwest, is R+5, having similar moderately right-wing leanings as in much of this part of France.

Nievre, on the other hand, is just south of Yonne but politically totally different. While it has lost some left-wing support from its past Socalist heyday, it’s still S+7; only one other department in eastern France (Aude) comes close to this level of Socialist support. For whatever reason, all the red wine must lead to Socialism.

Cote d’Or, containing Dijon, is more normal for this area, at R+3. Dijon itself is S+1.

Finally, there is Saone et Loire, south of Dijon and for whatever reason not highlighted on the map. This department is 50-50, with perhaps the slightest tilt to the Socialists. Both major towns are more left-leaning, with rural areas tilting right. Chalon is S+4 and Macon is S+5.

EDIT: I realize I skipped Picardie...Picardie makes up 2.9% of France's population. It stretches from France's coal mining areas to the outskirts of the Paris metro area.

Oise, in southern Picardie, could be considered in some respects to be exurban Paris, at least in its southern end. Beauvais, its largest town, has been consistently light red in recent elections, while Compiegne is R+5 with a Socialist trend and Creil is now up to S+16. I assume this is due to immigration; immigrants tend to vote pretty heavily for the left. Oise as a whole, however, is R+4 with a strong National Front, a testament to its conservative rural areas. Oise has trended rightward, like neighboring areas in Nord.

Somme, in the north of Picardie, is S+3. The town of Amiens is S+8, while smaller Abbeville is S+6. Here, even the rural areas are left-leaning.

Finally, there is Aisne. Like Oise (but unlike Somme) it has a rightward trend; it was S+7 as recently as 1995 and is now 50-50. This is one of the largest trends in the country and again mirrors neighboring areas in Nord and Champagne. This trend has mostly occurred in rural areas; the three largest towns have only inched rightward.

French Political Geography: Part 2

jncca

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Monday September 19, 2016 · 12:08 PM PDT

2016/09/19 · 12:08

I will be exploring the orange part today

This is part two of a five-part diary on France’s political geography.

Here is a map of France, with the region being covered today in orange. This is Northwest France.

Pays de la Loire (5.5% of France’s population): This region, on France’s Atlantic Coast and also stretching inland, is not a part of France’s historically left-wing, anti-clerical Southwest. It contains the city of Nantes (metro 900,000), a significant city in France but a small enough one to be unknown across the ocean. The rest of the region, like Northwest France in general, is heavily agricultural.

Vendee, as touched upon in the first diary, was the site of a counter-revolution by loyalists to the Bourbon Dynasty. 240,000 Frenchmen died in this 3-year war, a stunningly high total given France’s population at the time (29 million). An equivalent total, given the US’s present population, would be a war which killed 2.6 million Americans. Ever since, the Vendee region has been heavily Catholic and conservative. As Catholicism has declined in France, the Vendee has moved to the center. In 1974, it stood at R+16, but today it is only R+6, still making it the only significantly right-of-center department in Western France. While the rural areas are conservative, its main town, La Roche, is not, sitting at S+10. This is among the largest disparities of any region in generally unpolarized France, larger than the neighboring department of Deux-Sevres.

Situated just north of Vendee is Loire Atlantique, which contains the city of Nantes. The department is S+5 thanks to the Nantes metro being one of France’s most left-wing, tying with Toulouse for that distinction. Both are S+11. Nantes and its suburbs are weak areas for the National Front. Nantes began to thrive in the 18^th century due to the slave trade (it was the main port of departure to France’s colonies), and in the French Revolution it supported the revolutionaries in contrast to much of the region. In 1826, it created the world’s first public transit system, a horse-drawn bus. Today, the city itself is S+10, with suburbs ranging from Vertou (S+3) to Reze (S+17, with a strong Left presence as well). As with most rural areas in France, rural Loire Atlantique is nearly 50-50, currently S+2.

Historical Loire Atlantique is another matter. In 1974, this historically Catholic area was R+6; in the 1980s and 1990s it was nearly 50-50. The city of Nantes itself has leaped leftwards, as it was only S+3 in 1995.

Maine et Loire is located east of Nantes and contains the large town of Angers. Like Loire Atlantique, it has a right-wing past but has moved away from it. However, it has stagnated in its move recently, probably because it doesn’t have a major city like Nantes. Angers is S+5, although it was 50-50 in the 1995 election. Two other significant towns in the region are Cholet (S+3) and Saumur (R+5). The rural areas are R+4. Looking back a few elections, it was totally different. A 1974 PVI of R+12 slowly receded to R+5 in 1995 before a leap leftward in 2007. This leap was felt strongly in Angers and Cholet, modestly in the rural areas, and wasn’t felt at all in Cholet, France’s largest center for farm animal sales.

Mayenne, north of Angers (the map is incorrect and didn’t color it purple), contains a red town and blue rural areas, similar to Vendee or Maine et Loire but still a pretty unusual situation in France. The population center, Laval, is S+5, while the department is R+4, down from R+16 in 1974. This is a similar pattern to neighboring Maine et Loire.

Sarthe, the last of the five departments in Pays de la Loire, contains the town of Le Mans, best known for its auto race. Le Mans itself is S+9, but this mostly rural department is only S+2 and hasn’t seen the same leftward movement as its more coastal neighbors.

Bretagne (5.0% of France’s population): Better known in English as Brittany, this region has a Celtic heritage, a minor nationalist movement, and a history of autonomy within the French kingdom. More so than any other in the country, Bretagne has seen a sharp turn to the left as Catholicism, traditionally a major influence in rural northwestern France, has declined precipitously. Generally, Bretagne also has poor National Front performances, probably due to their lack of total support for the concept of French ethnic identity politics.

Brittany likes social democracy much more than Britain

Morbihan, in southwest Bretagne, has the most obviously non-French name for a French department, was once R+11 but is now S+1. Its three towns vary in political makeup. Lorient, the largest, is S+8 and has moved away from the Republicans even more than the rest of Morbihan. Vannes, the next largest, is R+1. Finally, unlike a certain conservative family from a TV show, the citizens of Lanester love their left-wing politics. This working-class suburb of Lorient is S+14 and shows a strong affinity for France’s Left.

Finistere is France’s Maine, with a rugged coastline, windy weather, and independent politics. It has moved a full 15 points leftwards over the last thirty-eight years and is now S+7. Brest, one of the two main population centers in Bretagne, is S+11, while the smaller Quimper is S+12.

Cotes d’Armor, another coastal department, is S+8, while its main town of St. Brieuc is S+11.

Ille et Villaine contains Rennes, the largest city in Bretagne as it exists today (Nantes is a part of historical Bretagne). Public education (there are over 60,000 students in the city) and technology/telecommunications are both significant parts of Rennes’s economy; if Finistere is Maine Rennes is probably Boston. Thus it is no surprise that it is left-wing. However, Rennes also retains elements of an older economy, including a large auto industry. Ille et Villaine, today, a department which is S+5, was R+11 back in 1974; its shift has been as large as Finistere’s. No department anywhere in France moved either direction as quickly over the last forty years. Rennes itself is even further left; it sits at S+15 and has a strong Left party as well. St. Malo, a smaller coastal town also in this department, is S+1, more conservative than rural areas of the department.

Like almost everywhere else we will encounter for the rest of this diary series, Centre (3.9% of France’s population) is not that left-wing. The French left’s winning margins come almost exclusively from Western France (already profiled) and working-class areas of Paris and its banlieues, the poor, heavily Black and Arab suburbs. Centre has been stably centrist for decades.

Indre is the only department in Centre which is pretty safe for the Socialist Party, at S+3, although in a poor year it can easily go Republican. It contains the modestly left-wing town of Chateauroux and some swingy rural territory.

To Indre’s northwest is Indre et Loire, which contains some of France’s most fabulous chateaux as well as the small city of Tours. Tours is S+4, and its cosmopolitan nature makes it a poor fit for the National Front. Rural areas of the department are just a tad right of center.

Cher, in Centre’s southeast, is a sonny province (get it?). Presently, it’s S+2, with 50-50 rural areas and two more left-wing towns. Bourges, the larger one, is S+4 and still moving leftward, while formerly factory-heavy Vierzon is S+13 with a strong Left due to historically strong labor movements. Interestingly, Vierzon was split 50-50 during World War Two; half the city was part of Vichy France while half was occupied by the Nazis.

Loir et Cher is in Centre’s center and also contains many chateaux. Its rural areas are more conservative than in most of this region, giving it a light blue hue (R+3). This has been a new development and I am not sure what has caused it, although neighboring Eure et Loir, in Centre’s north, has had the same occurrence and today is R+5. The town of Blois is S+5, while Chartres, home to a famed cathedral, is S+1 and Dreux is S+10 and marching ever leftward for reasons I do not understand.

Loiret has always been a bit more conservative than the rest of the region, although now for the first time in decades it is not the most conservative of the 6 departments. Orleans is an S+2 large town, but conservative rural territory makes the department R+5.

Rural Basse Normandie (2.2% of France’s population) is best known as the site of the D-Day invasion; politically speaking it is a battleground (pardon the pun) with perhaps the slightest tilt toward the Republicans.

Manche, the northward-extending part of the region, has much in common with its Breton neighbors to the west. Like them, it was once deep blue (R+14 in the 1974 election) but has now moved left all the way down to R+2. Its main town, Cherbourg, has done the same, ending up at S+7. Its main attraction is the stunning Mont-St. Michel.

Orne is the most conservative part of this geographically small region, similar to neighboring areas to the east. It sits at R+5, with the main town of Alencon at S+5.

Finally, there is Calvados, France’s other obviously non-French named department. Calvados contains history from medieval and present times, with the Bayeux tapestry and Omaha Beach both contained within its borders, as well as the heavily-bombed city of Caen. Caen today has a major agricultural industry and a university. I would guess the university is the main region it is S+8 and is an unusually weak area for the National Front relative to most of northern France; the city has also reacted poorly to Sarkozy. Working-class Herouville-St. Clair, just outside Caen, is an industrial suburb with a strong union movement which sprung up from nothing in the 1960s and 1970s. At S+21, it is one of the most left-wing places in the nation. The smaller town of Lisieux helps temper Calvados’s left-wing side, coming in at S+1; the department as a whole is S+2.

Haute-Normandie (2.8% of France’s population) has traditionally been very industrial. It is swingy and contains only two departments. Haute-Normandie, unlike most of France but similar to much of France’s far north, has seen some movement to the right among its rural voters.

To the south is Eure, which is conservative except for the S+3 town of Evreux. Eure itself is R+4 despite a swingy heritage thanks to this rural rightward movement.

On the coast is Seine Maritime, which contains the dual cities of Le Havre and Rouen. Its rural territory has also shifted to the right, from S+4 in 1995 to S+1 today. Rouen, the smaller of the two cities, was where Joan of Arc was executed. Many centuries later, it was one of France’s two heavily bombed cities (along with Caen) in the aftermath of D-Day. Like Caen, its university is very important to the local economy. Politically, it has moved from swingy to S+7 due to Sarkozy; like Caen it has a weak National Front. The port city of Le Havre contains France’s largest container port. It is S+5 but has a stronger Socialist heritage than Rouen does. Both Caen and Rouen’s suburbs are working-class and further left than the cities, which means together all cities and suburbs in Seine Maritime are S+9. This makes the department S+3, helping to even out Eure.

Contrary to the map posted at the beginning, I will be saving France’s actual north for Part 3 as this took longer than I expected.

This concludes Part 2 of my diary. I hope you learned something and enjoyed!

France's Political Geography: Southwestern France

jncca

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Thursday September 15, 2016 · 11:27 AM PDT

2016/09/15 · 11:27

France's five regions, as I have divided them.

As one of only two countries outside North America I’ve been to more than once, France holds a special place in my heart. France also has a very interesting election coming up over the next year. France, unlike every other major European country, has primaries that are somewhat similar to the US’s presidential primaries; the major two will take place in November (for the Republicans) and in January (for the Socialists). The Front National’s candidate is already a given. This post will mostly not be about the 2017 election, except where necessary. It will be background to set the stage for those who want to follow this year’s election. However, a brief overview is probably needed.

Socialist Party – France’s Socialist Party is similar to other social-democratic parties across Western Europe, such as the Social Democrats in countries like Germany and Sweden. Like these parties, it has moved somewhat to the center over the last few decades but still sits significantly to the left of the Democratic Party. The incumbent Socialist president, Francois Hollande, is France’s most unpopular president in decades, if not ever.

Republican Party – France’s main party of the right constantly changes its name, but for now it is known as the Republican Party. In the Fifth Republic period (post-1958), the right has been led by the somewhat authoritarian nationalist Charles de Gaulle (1958-1968), then became more liberal in the vein of Britain’s Conservative Party under Georges Pompidou and Valery Giscard d’Estaing. Under Jacques Chirac (1988-2007), the party placed itself on the right in matters both fiscal and cultural, and Nicolas Sarkozy (2007-2012) increased the party’s popularity among voters concerned about immigration, Islam, and terrorism. However, the party remains a supporter of the European Union and the euro.

National Front – The National Front, like other culturally conservative populist parties, dislikes European federalism, immigrants, and cultural change, while attacking the mainstream right for cutting social programs and hurting French workers.

France is divided into regions (some were combined recently, but I will be using the traditional ones), which are further divided into departments.

Southwestern France is one of the lesser known French areas; it isn’t visited by tourists in significant numbers.

Here is a map of France, with Southwestern France in yellow.

Bordeaux and Basques and Bay of Biscay, oh my.

Aquitaine: The southwesternmost region of France is known as Aquitaine (5.0% of France’s population). Aquitaine contains beaches, mountains, and farmland, as well as the major city of Bordeaux. Like the rest of France’s southwest, it tends to vote for the Socialists.

Four of Aquitaine’s five departments are relatively safe for Socialist Party candidates. Pyrenees Atlantiques, in the south of the province, contains France’s Basque country and the city of Pau. While it is generally safe for the Socialists, it is the only one of the five departments with a conservative heritage. It shifted from R+4 in 1988 to S+6 today, among the largest shifts of any French department. The region was the strongest for France’s centrist party, represented in the 2012 presidential election by Pau Mayor Francois Bayrou. This is an interesting parallel to the UK, where the Liberal Democrats perform well in rural areas with distinct ethnic heritage going back centuries, such as Cornwall and parts of Scotland. Pau is the largest city in Pyrenees Atlantiques (pop. 85,000) and has a PVI of S+8. The other major urban area, Biarritz-Bayonne-Anglet, is swingier, at S+1. The rural areas of the department are S+6 (a pattern we will see consistently in France is that the urban-rural divide is much weaker than in the US).

Landes, also coastal and situated between Pau and Bordeaux, is an overwhelmingly rural department with a PVI of S+6.

Gironde, the department containing Bordeaux (pop. 245,000, metro 1.14 million), is S+5, but this disguises wide ideological variance within it. La Teste de Bouch, a medium-sized town, and Le Bouscat, a suburb of Bordeaux, are the only population centers in the department to vote for Sarkozy in 2012 (R+10 and R+3, respectively). Bordeaux itself comes in at S+5, mirroring the province (French cities tend to be only moderately left-leaning, a stark contrast to America). Like most French cities, the Front National performs poorly there. Two Gironde towns stick out for how left-wing they are, the working-class suburbs of Cenon (S+19) and Begles (S+20, with strong support for France’s Left).

Lot et Garonne, another small rural department situated upriver from Bordeaux, is Aquitaine’s only swingy province, voting for the winner in every French election since 1974, when it voted Socialist. Its former Socialist heritage has been lost, and it is now perfectly perched in France’s center, with an even PVI.

Dordogne, the northeasternmost department in the region, is both physically beautiful and pretty strongly left-wing, with an S+7 PVI. It is also famous for containing the caves at Lascaux. Like some neighboring departments in other regions, its Socialist margins decreased significantly in the 1980s and 1990s due to the regional hometown popularity of Jacques Chirac in and around France’s Massif Central.

Just the right color scheme for a left-wing stronghold.

Midi-Pyrenees (4.5% of France’s population) is the heart of southwest France, touching neither the Atlantic nor the Mediterranean. It too is a strong region for the Socialist Party.

The tiny mountainous departments of Ariege and Hautes Pyrenees are both left-wing strongholds. The former is S+12, while the latter is S+10.

Haute Garonne, home to Toulouse, is S+7. The city of Toulouse is one of France’s only major cities that has a strong Left (probably due its industrial nature); it too has a weak Front National. Toulouse exemplifies a common pattern in France; the 2007 election marked a leftward shift for nearly every major city in France as some culturally liberal voters on the right left the party due to Sarkozy. One could parallel 2007 in France to 1992 in the United States in this respect. While Toulouse is S+11 today, it was only S+4 in 1995, the last normal election prior to 2007. Every population center in the department, as well as its rural areas, gave Hollande at least 56% in 2012.

Gers, a rural but flat department west of Toulouse most interesting for containing the town of Condom, is moderately left-leaning like most of southwestern France’s agricultural areas. Its PVI is S+5, which is actually lower than it used to be.

Tarn et Garonne, is north of Toulouse, and like the neighboring Lot et Garonne in Aquitaine is distinct because of its perfectly 50-50 status. Like Lot et Garonne, it used to lean to the Socialists, but this gradually disappeared between 1988 and today.

Tarn, northeast of Toulouse, is half farmland and half mountains and is S+4. Its two main towns, Albi (S+7) and Castres (EVEN), essentially average out to equal the department’s PVI score.

Aveyron, in the region’s far northeast, is unique within the region for its right-wing heritage. In 1974 it was R+5, and as recently as 1995 it was still R+4, but it now sits at S+3. I don’t have a good reason as for why, however.

Finally, there is Lot, an S+10 department containing some of southwestern France’s tourism jewels. It too had a “Chirac effect” but is now more left-wing than ever.

Not many people in Limousin can afford limousines.

Limousin, Jacques Chirac’s home region, is small (1.1% of France’s population), rural, and poor, and voters there had significant allegiance to him in a “local boy makes good” kind of way, similar to Bill Clinton in Arkansas, despite Limousin’s status as the most left-wing place in France.

Creuse, the epitome of poor rural “backwards” France, is S+8. One can contrast this with its American equivalent, West Virginia, which is now over R+10, to understand some of the differences between French and American politics. Despite this Socialist heritage and strength, Creuse was R+1during Chirac’s 1995 election.

Correze, where Chirac’s family is from, jumped from S+8 pre-Chirac to R+9 under Chirac and is now S+10.

Haute-Vienne contains Limoges, the only large locality in the region. Both Limousin and the rural areas are over S+10.

Poitou-Charente, on and near France’s central Atlantic coast, contains only 2.7% of France’s residents. It is the last of the traditional left-wing strongholds in rural France (although Bretagne, profiled in Part 2, is a newer region of strength for the Socialists).

Charente, in the southeast of the region, is S+7 and the is the only part of the region which has been left-leaning for decades rather than a newer convert to the Socialist cause; not coincidentally it borders some very left-wing areas.

Vienne, in Poitou-Charente’s northeast, contains the strongly left-wing (S+13) city of Poitiers. The department as a whole is S+5, but until 2007 it was pretty swingy, voting for the winner all four times between 1974 and 1995. The more northwestern part of France, which Poitou-Charente is near, has been turned off by Nicolas Sarkozy and his policies.

Charente-Maritime, containing the S+10 town of La Rochelle, is nonetheless a 50-50 department due to some uncharacteristically right-wing rural territory. This area, the Vendee (see Part 2), has been a traditionalist, reactionary, strongly Catholic region ever since they attempted to launch a counter-revolution to the French Revolution. Time has tempered many of these impulses, but the unusually conservative voters remain.

Deux-Sevres has seen a rapid move leftward mirrored only by Basque Country and Bretagne (see Part 2). An R+6 PVI in 1974 has changed into one of S+7 today. Its main population center, Niort, has seen a similar move and is now S+13.

This concludes my look at Southwestern France, France’s most safe territory.

2016 (and some prior history) Under Proportional Representation: An Alternate History

jncca

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Sunday May 29, 2016 · 12:54 PM PDT

2016/05/29 · 12:54

I had to take a few liberties here, but I used 2016 primary results, with some adjustments, to guess how well each of five theoretical parties would do in a 2016 proportional representation election. A few states were excluded (Alaska and Hawaii, the Dakotas, Montana, and New Mexico), while California was estimated based on an average of Arizona, Oregon, and Washington and New Jersey is an average of New York and Delaware.

Liberal Party (30%): America’s pre-eminent party, although just barely, is the Liberal Party. Since Prime Minister Franklin Roosevelt established his New Deal Coalition, the party has mostly been successful nationally. They ruled for 20 consecutive years, coming back only 8 years later behind the youthful Prime Minister Kennedy. Upon his assassination, Prime Minister Johnson took office and proceeded to infuriate many members of his own party by pushing for a Civil Rights Act. Worried about triggering a no-confidence vote, Johnson waited until 1968 to do so before stepping down, having already attempted to create his Great Society. At this point, the party unraveled, and a new party known as the American Party was created by George Wallace, taking many “Dixie Liberals.” This party ruled in coalition with Conservative Prime Minister Nixon, Liberal Prime Minister Carter, and Conservative Prime Minister Nixon, while the Liberals sat in the wilderness for over a decade. Prime Minister Bill Clinton attempted to move the Liberals to the center in the 1990s, running the country in a grand coalition with the Conservatives in an attempt to break with the party’s past. The party base began to tilt leftwards in response to the Iraq War under opposition leader John Kerry, and Kerry was overthrown in 2005 by the left-wing of his party and its Black members, with Barack Obama assuming the party leadership and eventually taking over as Prime Minister, ruling in coalition with the Social Democrats, creating America’s first truly center-left government since Jimmy Carter. Now, with his 8-year term limit reached as Prime Minister, the party is running Hillary Clinton. This is their expected electoral map.

This year, polling shows the Liberals significantly lower than in 2008 and 2012, perhaps reflecting their turn to the center under Hillary Clinton or Barack Obama’s unique charisma. The party’s base sits in the Deep South and on the coasts, both East and West. They are weakest in the Mountain West, on the Great Plains, and in the Upper South. Perhaps in an attempt to make certain that she is the largest vote-getter on the left, Clinton has promised to join a coalition with the Social Democrats rather than the Conservatives as her husband did.

Social Democratic Party (22%): The left’s step-child, the Social Democratic Party was created in in the mid-1930s after Prime Minister Roosevelt’s turn to the center and was led by Henry Wallace from that year until he stepped down for health reasons in 1959. They were never too successful with Wallace nor with other leaders Wayne Morse (1959-1970), George McGovern (1970-1992), Russ Feingold (1992-2003), or Howard Dean (2003-2013). However, they did rule in a coalition with Prime Minister Kennedy from 1961 until his assassination in 1963, and they briefly became the opposition party in the mid-1970s as the Liberals were still dealing with fallout from the Civil Rights Act and Vietnam War. In 2009, Dean led the party into its first government since 1964. The party helped provide votes for a public option as part of health care reform and for a cap-and-trade bill and appears headed for its greatest success since the 1970s in this election behind the surprisingly beloved Bernie Sanders.

The party shares some similar bases with the Liberals, such as the coasts, although it is stronger in New England and may be the largest party in California for the first time since 1972. However, due to its very White base, the party is extremely weak in the Deep South. Another above-average area is the Upper Midwest, including Michigan and the Chicago area. The party has a sharp north-south division, polling weaker than its national average in every state in the southern half of the country geographically except California.

Conservative Party (14%): The Conservative party shifted to the center in response to the New Deal and was rewarded with 8 years of unrestrained rule under Prime Minister Eisenhower. They narrowly lost the 1960 election but came back to power in 1968 in coalition with George Wallace’s American Party. In 1976, a break-away occurred on the party’s right flank, with religious conservatives joining some strident conservatives in the Revival Party, a party which emphasized both religious revival and a revival of America’s constitutional principles. Conservative Prime Minister Reagan ruled in a 3-way coalition with the American and Revival Parties, but his successor George H. W. Bush chose to jettison this in favor of a grand coalition with the Liberals (after his infamous “Read My Lips: No Grand Coalition” promise during the campaign). For 12 years, 4 under Bush and 8 under Clinton, the country was ruled by a grand coalition.

The 2000 election was a turning point, marking the end of this coalition. It appeared Clinton’s designated successor, Al Gore, would become Prime Minister, but at the last minute George W. Bush offered the Social Democrats a deal that was too good to pass up: he would make Feingold Deputy Prime Minister, a new position, would promise not to cut entitlements, and would let the Social Democrats choose his first Supreme Court nominee, a key concession given the delicate split on the court as it was currently constituted and particularly a concession on the part of the Revival Party, the other element in the coalition. Feingold agreed, but in 2003, Bush announced plans to invade Iraq. The Social Democrats promptly withdrew from the coalition, and Bush had to scramble and create a four-way grand coalition with every party but the Social Democrats. After the 2004 election, he narrowly was able to recreate the “three-legged stool coalition” and kick out the Liberals, who promptly overthrew Kerry in favor of a novice with little experience but lots of talent. Now, after 8 years in the wilderness, the Conservative Party has nominated Marco Rubio, who has promised to appoint John Kasich as Treasury Secretary and make him responsible for all economic policy.

The Conservative Party is strongest in parts of the South and in Upper New England, although polls show them with pretty weak numbers all around. I excluded Ohio because Kasich dramatically changes the results there. The American Party has stolen much of their base in the Mid-Atlantic states. They very well may end up the smallest of the five parties after this election, an unthinkable result for a party used to being one of the top two.

American Party (20%): The American Party was very successful at serving as a coalition partner, doing so from its creation in 1968 until 1988, for both Conservative PMs Nixon and Reagan and Liberal PM Carter. Since then, however, it has been in the political wilderness, as American sensibilities on racial issues have become more liberal. The party’s slow decline began to reverse itself after the Great Recession, with Jeff Sessions taking over as party leader from the aging Jesse Helms in 2002 and, after a decade-long rebuild, steering the party to modest success in the 2012 elections. For 2016, however, he stepped aside and let businessman Donald Trump run the party. Trump is also notable as the first Northerner to run the party.

The American Party draws strength from the Deep South, Mid-Atlantic, and Southwest, and is weakest in the Midwest and among Mormons.

Revival Party (14%): The Revival Party is the most explicitly religious major party in the developed West, unless one counts Israel as the West. They served in coalition from their creation in 1976 until 1988 and then again from 2005 until 2009. Their previous leader, Rick Perry, stepped down after a very poor 2012 showing. The party let Sam Brownback lead them for a couple years as a caretaker and then surprisingly chose political novice Ted Cruz as their new leader.

The Revival Party shows extreme weakness in the Northeast and great strength on the Great Plains and especially in Mormon Country, with a solid showing in the South.

UK 2015 Election: Charts and Final Thoughts

jncca

Community (This content is not subject to review by Daily Kos staff prior to publication.)

Thursday May 14, 2015 · 4:09 AM PDT

2015/05/14 · 04:09

Thankfully for those of us who enjoy election data analysis, Lord Ashcroft conducted a huge telephone poll that is very similar to an exit poll, and thus we can examine the voting behavior of various groups of people. I'd like to note two unrelated things.

1) I don't have any real affinity for a British party. There are things I like and dislike about all parties. Hopefully that makes me more sober in my analysis but I have political views just like anyone else and they may influence the opinion part of this post

2) The national polls weren't really off in this election. They had a small error, but that's very common in pretty much every election on Earth. It was similar in magnitude to 2012 in the United States, a year that we don't consider a polling fail, but rather a small misfire.

So, without further ado, the most complex chart of them all.

Party colors are as follows:
Labour = Red, Tories = Blue, Liberal Democrats = Yellow, UKIP = Purple, Greens = Green, Scottish National Party = Orange

Here's a key, because I understand this is one complicated pie chart. This is a chart of (nearly) all British voters, grouped by how they voted in the last two elections. Solid colors means they stuck with the same party both times. If they switched, the dominant color is their new party, while the less prominent color is their party from 2010. So what can we see? About two-thirds of British voters remained loyal to their party from the previous election. The LibDems saw significant defections everywhere (including UKIP, proving once again that some people just vote for protest parties regardless of ideology), and the Tories saw significant defections to UKIP. Those are both things everyone knew before the election. The first other interesting fact I can find is that most new Green voters came from the LibDems. Maybe Brits reading this will think that is obvious, but for we Americans it's surprising that the centrist party supplied more voters to the furthest-left one than the center-left party. The second interesting "new" fact is that 4.5% of voters switched between the two major parties, and they were split about evenly in the direction they moved.

It is my opinion after seeing some of these results that analysts were foolish to think Miliband really could have toppled Cameron. Even though the UK has a parliamentary system, the party leader matters. In the Ashcroft poll, Cameron beats Miliband in a head-to-head 50-33. That is absolutely atrocious; The Super-Huggable Ted Cruz wouldn't even get destroyed by that margin. In fact, such a total is in line with blowout elections in the US like 1984, 1972, and 1964. And in my opinion Ed Miliband was just as bad of a candidate as George McGovern or Barry Goldwater. I can't say I was smart enough to note all of this in advance, though.

The real killer in terms of head-to-heads comes within the major parties. The Tories choose Cameron 97-1. Labour? Miliband wins easily, but only 79-7. 21% of his own party is uncomfortable with the idea of him as prime minister. Again, those kinds of defections are in line with landslide losses, not squeakers. If you're wondering about the minor parties, they show the following: UKIP Cameron 56-13, LibDems Cameron 52-21, SNP Miliband 39-16, Greens Miliband 47-19. Note also how poorly Miliband does with LibDem voters.

Actually I lied. There are two more killers, and they're not about Miliband per se but give more evidence why a Cameron win should have been more expected. The first is in this chart:

46% of British voters want more austerity. Yes, almost a majority want tax increases and spending cuts. Only 24% (including just 40% of Labour and bare majorities of the Greens and SNP) say austerity was bad. Keynesian economics has lost in the UK for the time being. People liked what Cameron was doing with the budget. Why throw him out?

The second reason Cameron was going to win, and again I'm not tooting my horn as much as trying to learn for future prognostication, was that the economy wasn't voters' #1 issue. There are generally four reasons an incumbent can lose: the economy, unpopular war, corruption, or incompetency. The latter three were not issues in this campaign. What was the most important issue, according to voters? The National Health Service, traditionally a Labour base issue. But the only reason the NHS could be number one is that people no longer were as worried about the economy, and that points to a win for the incumbent.

Finally, let's look at the election demographically. Not racially (the UK's electorate is only 6% non-White), but by age, class, and education level.

The UK exhibits remarkable generational polarization, larger than America's. In 2012, Obama won by about 20 with voters 18-34 and lost 65+ by 12. That's a 32% marginal difference. In the UK, the left won young voters by 22, nearly identical to the US. But they managed to lose seniors by a 2:1 margin! I'm not sure how Labour pulled off losing 46-22 to the Tories with people 65+, but they did it. It's very tough to win that way.

Class in the UK is measured a bit differently than the US. People are ranked A through E, which more or less corresponds with how we think of class in the US (upper/upper middle/middle/lower middle/lower), but it's more formal there. Here are the charts:

A few things are apparent, none too surprising. Labour and UKIP do better with the lower class, and the Tories and LibDems are the opposite. Overall the right won with classes A and B by 12, win with class C by 6, and lost classes D and E by 10.

And finally, here is education:

In the US, Obama won the highest education levels by 13, lost college graduates by 4, and won people with no degree by 3. The UK is a different story. The left did well among the higher education levels, winning by 8. They lost college graduates by 6. So far, that would point to a 50-50 election. But the left got slaughtered with high school graduates, losing by 18. These people should be voting for Labour, especially given how much less important religion is in British politics. Part of the problem is UKIP, which took 18%, but even then Labour lost to the Tories 33-30 here.

The Path Forward for Labour?

Labour stands at a crossroads, and in many ways I think it's similar to the crossroads the Republican Party faces here. They have three choices:

1) Move to the center on social issues, particularly immigration. Losses to UKIP are hurting the party; if Labour had not lost a single voter to UKIP (yes, I realize that likely means some voters on their other flank would have abandoned them, but it's a thought exercise) they would have been boosted by 2%, and that's not including Tory voters who might have switched if not for immigration. Britain is far too White for immigration issues to be a net positive for Labour like it is for Democrats in the United States.
2) Move to the center on economic issues, embracing Blairism. For whatever reason, Miliband wasn't trusted. Part of it may be that his economic platform was too far left for Britain. Only 24% of British voters think austerity was wrong. The deficit ranks higher than the cost of living on the list of important issues. The AB social class is Labour's worst demographic despite Labour's progressive stances on social issues.
3) Labour isn't the problem, their candidate was. This was essentially Republicans' view after Mitt Romney's loss in 2012. Romney was a weak candidate, possibly the Republicans' worst since Goldwater. Try again in 2016 with a better candidate and win. Labour can imagine the same thing. Miliband was in many ways a left-wing Romney, and perhaps with a new leader who combines Blair's likability with Miliband's policies, they can win in 2020.

I'm not sure which path is right. I think it's an interesting thought exercise.

Poll

83 votes Show Results

What's the main reason Labour lost?

83 votes Vote Now!

What's the main reason Labour lost?

Economy was good enough

15 votes

Didn't offer policy alternatives to Cameron's

18 votes

Too far left

10 votes

Ed Miliband

19 votes

Cultural issues

3 votes

People liked Cameron

12 votes

Other

6 votes

Israeli Election Liveblog

jncca

Community (This content is not subject to review by Daily Kos staff prior to publication.)

Monday March 16, 2015 · 8:21 PM PDT

2015/03/16 · 20:21

Hi everyone. The Israeli election is tomorrow (March 17); polls close at 1PM Pacific (and now you East Coasters finally know what it feels to always do the math!). No idea how long results will take. Anyway, this is a place to do the following:

a) Discuss the election results
b) Ask questions about the various political parties and potential coalitions

This is not a place to:

a) Discuss how Israel is a genocidal oppressor or how Palestinians are evil and don't deserve a single acre of territory for themselves.

If you want a primer, read my previous diary:
http://www.dailykos.com/...

Let the discussion begin!

Poll

142 votes Show Results

What will the ultimate outcome be?

142 votes Vote Now!

What will the ultimate outcome be?

Netanyahu PM, Herzog opposition

41 votes

Herzog PM, Likud opposition

67 votes

Unity gov't Netanyhau/Herzog

15 votes

Unity gov't Other Likud Member/Herzog

18 votes

The 2015 UK Election, Projected and Mapped

jncca

Community (This content is not subject to review by Daily Kos staff prior to publication.)

Monday February 09, 2015 · 8:01 PM PST

2015/02/09 · 20:01

What's that, you say? The 2015 UK election hasn't happened yet? Well, it's happening soon, May to be exact, and thankfully for us there is a website called Electoral Calculus which posts projections for all the seats. So let's get going.

The Landscape:

The UK, like most other Anglo countries (and unlike the rest of the Western world), elects its legislature through the first-past-the-post system. For those unfamiliar with political science terms, that simply means every legislator represents a district, and whoever gets the most votes in that district gets elected, even if they don't obtain a majority. In the US, that's usually not a problem, because it's very rare to win under 50% of the vote, and winning under 45% is almost unheard of (in primaries, that's another story). That's how, in 2010, the Conservative Party received 36% of the vote and won 47% of the seats, with the Labour Party obtaining 29% of the vote and 40% of the seats. If you're astute, you'll notice that neither 47 nor 40 is greater than 50, the percentage of seats required for legislative control. In came the Liberal Democratic Party, which unfortunately for them received 23% of the vote but only 9% of the seats. However, 47 + 9 = 56, and thus the Tories (Conservative Party's nickname) earned themselves a coalition government with the LibDems for the next five years.

PM David Cameron's government has pushed through a few pieces of serious legislation. Major reforms enacted include some cuts to welfare housing allowances, an education reform that I frankly don't understand but would love a British commenter to explain to me, a very controversial health care law, an immigration crackdown law, and the legalization of same-sex marriages. However, all this has been done in the shadow of the global financial crisis, which has lasted longer in Europe than in America. The Cameron government pushed austerity measures, which many including myself argue helped prolong the recession. The UK economy seems to be recovering some, with GDP growing 2.3% in 2013 and 2.6% in 2014 after a disastrous 0.4% growth rate in 2012, but Cameron has certainly been hurt by the economy.

While Cameron has weathered his term in mediocre (but definitely not good) shape, Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg, leader of the Liberal Democrats, has been an unparalleled disaster. Much of this isn't his fault; any party which normally serves as a protest vote but then joins the government will lose half their support, but Clegg was also hurt by a quick flip-flop on his promise not to raise student fees which helped him earn a disproportionately high percentage of the youth vote in 2010.

Labour, on the other hand, is led by the hapless Ed Milliband, sort of a left-wing version of Mitt Romney. They both share the same awkwardness around average Americans, and both are frequently attacked for being out of touch and elitist (as is Cameron, to be fair). Milliband has presided over a party that polled at 42% in 2012 and is now polling at 33%, while the Tories have essentially stayed stable.

Remember that in the rest of the world, red=left and blue=right. The LibDems are yellow.

What's that purple, you ask? Why, that's the UK Independence Party. If the Tories are the Chamber of Commerce Republicans, the LibDems are the New Democrats, and Labour are the Progressive Caucus (all of which I think are fairly accurate), the UKIP is Britain's Tea Party. They have surged from being a non-factor in elections to polling at 15% of the vote by running against the European Union and attacking the major parties on immigration. Due to first past the post, they will likely obtain 5 seats at most out of 650, but they are a factor by drawing votes away from the Tories and increasingly Labour as well. The Green Party is also increasing, mainly as a protest vehicle for left-wing voters who dislike Milliband or centrist voters who just want to vote for a party which is neither Labour nor in government.

Electoral Geography:

Britain is, like the United States, geographically polarized. Also like the United States, Labour tends to do well in cities, with the Tories doing well in rural areas. However, one major difference is the suburbs, where the Tories run up dominant margins in the types of areas that have abandoned the Republican Party during the 1990s and 2000s, the British equivalents of the Upper East Side or Lake County, Illinois. The color code here is extremely complicated, owing to the number of parties involved. Keep these simple things in mind.

Red=Safe Labour seats
Blue=Safe Tory seats
Black=Safe Nationalist seats (we'll get to those, I promise!)
Purple=Pure Tossups between Tories and Labour
Green=LibDems
Other combinations you don't see=projected close races between two parties, one of which is a minor party

[I got all my data from electoralcalculus.co.uk, so blame them if this is all wrong]

Generally, the Tories do extremely well in the South of England outside of London. Labour holds only a handful of seats in this half of the country, and only about a dozen more are expected to be close. The LibDems won 23 seats (scattered, but many in the southwest of the country) in this region in 2010; many will flip back to the Tories, while a handful will be held and a couple will go to Labour. Labour tends to be competitive only in larger towns and small cities like Exeter, Plymouth, Bristol, and Southampton. In 2010, Labour won only 10 seats in the South outside of London; in 2015 they will need at least twice that many.

London's suburbs are almost uniformly Conservative, as cultural issues matter less in British elections and thus there is no reason for these wealthy, business-oriented voters to choose Labour. There are about five competitive seats for Labour out of the entire suburban region.

London itself votes significantly for Labour, but there are large areas which vote for the Tories, and a few LibDem seats, too. Labour should hope to pick up 6 seats in London; 8 gains are plausible, and the Tories will gain a couple more from the LibDems, too.

The Midlands are home to the major city of Birmingham, the smaller cities of Leicester and Nottingham, rural areas, and former small-town manufacturing hubs. In many ways, everything in the northern half of the country mirrors the Midwest of the United States. It's pretty heavily White (almost everywhere is outside of a few large cities) and it has a strong organized labor history due to its manufacturing. The further north one goes within England, the better it generally is for Labour, and as you can see from the map they will win over 20 seats in Birmingham alone and should take another dozen in the Nottingham/Leicester area. There are also a decent number of scattered "marginals" (the British term for swingy seats) scattered around between the deep blue ones.

Wales is a Labour stronghold, and the party should gain nearly every seat there, with a handful split between the Tories, Welsh nationalists, and possibly even a LibDem seat or two.

Manchester, Lancashire, and Yorkshire (the North) are Labour's base. Historically centered around mining and manufacturing, one could think of the area as the equivalent to Western Pennsylvania and Eastern Ohio. Labour's hold on them is slipping a bit, but not as much as the Democrats' here. Liverpool, Manchester, Leeds, and Sheffield and their surrounding areas (the inset) contribute about 60 seats or more to Labour while only giving the Tories a single-digit number. Head up even further north and there are a few more Tories, but there are also twenty more Labour seats in the coastal areas.

Scotland has been the most interesting part of the country in the past year. About 45% of their voters opted to support independence, and now nearly all those voters are supporting the Scottish National Party instead of the traditional Scottish party of choice, Labour. This is likely what will cost Labour their majority, as Scotland was formerly Labour's best region, with some LibDem support there too. Now, Labour will have to make up at least 30 seats in other parts of the country, a difficult task given polling. Within Scotland, Glasgow has retained much more support for Labour (about a 50-50 split in seats with the SNP) as compared to Edinburgh and the North of Scotland, where every seat will likely go SNP except the Shetland/Orkney seat which always votes for the LibDems.

Northern Ireland has completely different political parties, so I'm ignoring them. No offense to any of you Northern Irelanders out there.

So where does that leave us? Well, ElectoralCalculus says there is a 58% chance of a certain Labour government (split about evenly between a Labour majority and a coalition) and a 29% chance of a certain Tory government, also split about 50-50. The remaining scenario is that the SNP gets to choose which party it wants to give the majority too. One would expect them to choose Labour based on ideological similarity, so I'd say there is in reality about a 2/3 chance of PM Ed Milliband come this summer and a 1/3 chance of PM David Cameron. This also means there is a 57% chance of something unprecedented in modern British politics: back-to-back coalition governments. It'll be a fascinating ride, that's for sure.

What the Hell is Happening Over There? A Guide to Israel's Upcoming Elections

jncca

Community (This content is not subject to review by Daily Kos staff prior to publication.)

Sunday January 04, 2015 · 11:59 AM PST

2015/01/04 · 11:59

Israel's politics are complicated, to say the least. They're also absolutely fascinating. Luckily for those of us who love to discuss elections, one is coming up quite soon, on March 17 to be exact. In this diary, I will discuss the major (and minor!) parties who will make up Israel's next Knesset (Parliament), as well as explore the geographic and cultural divisions within the parties' voting bases.

I have two things to note here before I continue.

1. This diary is not a place to discuss the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Many people have strong views on the subject on both sides. That's perfectly acceptable. However, argue about it somewhere else. No derails here. On the other hand, if you are discussing the conflict only as it impacts Israel's elections, that's fine.
2. The Israeli political system is nearly always in flux; parties align and dealign with one another frequently, and they also are created and die every election. While most things appear set for the next election, there will likely be substantial change.

Poll

153 votes Show Results

Which Israeli party would you support this time around?

153 votes Vote Now!

Which Israeli party would you support this time around?

Likud

16 votes

Labor

63 votes

Meretz

48 votes

Yisrael Beiteinu

1 vote

Jewish Home

5 votes

Shas

2 votes

UTJ

2 votes

Yesh Atid

4 votes

Kulanu

4 votes

Hadash

6 votes

UAL/Balad

2 votes

For All the Marbles: My Final Race Ratings of 2014 (with a few maps thrown in)

jncca

Community (This content is not subject to review by Daily Kos staff prior to publication.)

Sunday November 02, 2014 · 2:18 PM PST

2014/11/02 · 14:18

Well, it's that time again. On Tuesday, everybody will vote, and that means that I need to put myself out there again with some predictions. Last time around, I did quite well. I messed up only one Senate race (in Montana) and ten House races, one of which was Dem-on-Dem, but correctly predicted a Democratic gain of 8 in the House. This time, I'm predicting the following:

Democrats lose 7 in the Senate
Democrats gain 3 governorships
Democrats lose 6 in the House

I'm going to begin with the Senate, where quite a few races are nailbiters. Races which some predicted becoming competitive (Minnesota, Virginia, Oregon, and New Mexico) have been put away by solid Democratic incumbents and B-list or worse Republican challengers. Terri Lynn Land's abysmal campaign in Michigan has locked that one up for Democrat Gary Peters as well. Right now it appears the biggest question is whether Peters outperforms Obama 2008; he appears likely to exceed Obama's 2012 performance. Finally, there are three rock-solid Republican pickups: Montana, West Virginia, and the surprisingly competitive South Dakota, where Mike Rounds has at least had to fight for his right to win with a likely vote total below 50%.

Now let's move on to the real battlegrounds. I will compare my ratings to those of other prognosticators:
Tilt (50-70%)
Lean (70-90%)
Likely (90-98%), although I personally don't do Likely races

Lean Republican:

Arkansas (Mark Pryor vs Tom Cotton): My personal prediction is Cotton by 8. Pryor has run a mediocre campaign. For that matter, so has Cotton. In fact, I think Cotton's has been worse. But this is Arkansas in 2014, where there's a good chance the entire state goes red this year for the first time in over a century. Pryor's last real glimpses of hope were in late spring and early summer, and since then it's been all downhill.
Of the 8 raters I care about (Cook, Sabato, Rothenberg, 538, NYT, RCP, RRH, and DK), the median rating is: Lean Republican.

Louisiana (Mary Landrieu vs Bill Cassidy): This race will go to a runoff, and on Tuesday I expect Landrieu to receive between 44 and 48 percent of the vote. If I had to make a hard prediction I'd go with 46. To win, Landrieu will need a map like the following:

I just can't quite see it with Louisiana's current racial polarization. But with a runoff, you never know. And if anyone can do it, it's a Landrieu. Median Rating: Tilt Republican

Kentucky (Mitch McConnell vs Alison Lundergan Grimes): This race has barely budged all cycle, with McConnell having a stable 4-7 point lead. I'll go with McConnell by 6. Median Rating: Lean/Likely Republican

Georgia (David Perdue vs Michelle Nunn): The runoff makes for a really uphill battle here, but most importantly, Nunn can get 46%, potentially even 47%, and still lose outright on Tuesday. I think she basically does how Jim Martin did in 2006 and manages to keep this race going until January. Median Rating: Tilt Republican.

Lean Democratic:

New Hampshire (Jeanne Shaheen vs Scott Brown): Shaheen by 5 sounds right. New Hampshire tends to swing fast and hard, so who knows? But I think it's pretty clear Brown doesn't have enough gas in the tank to beat the incumbent here. Median Rating: Lean Democratic

North Carolina (Kay Hagan vs Thom Tillis): Tillis is not too popular, which has hurt his odds in a purple state, and being outspent didn't help. Hagan by 3. Median Rating: Tilt Democratic. A map would look like this:

Watch how Hagan does in Forsyth County (Winston-Salem). If she's winning there, she should hold on. Franklin and Nash Counties northeast of Raleigh should be nailbiters, too.

Tilt Republican:

Alaska (Mark Begich vs Dan Sullivan): Almost nothing would shock me here. I'll say Sullivan by 3, with Begich's ground game helping but not making the difference, but there are lots of question marks up north. Median Rating: Tilt Republican

Kansas (Pat Roberts vs Greg Orman-I): Orman has a one point lead or so in the polls. With about 15% undecided and no party infrastructure, that's a recipe for defeat in a red state. I say he loses by 4. Median Rating: Pure Tossup.

Iowa (Joni Ernst vs Bruce Braley): Boy was I wrong here. I initially figured there was no way Braley could lose to a far-right state legislator and pegged his win at 6-10 points. Now, I'm forced to say he will lose by 2. There's just not much for me as a Democrat to bank on here. No untapped reservoir of minority voters, no history of polling error, no cause for the polling average to be wrong. Median Rating: Tilt R.

Tilt Democratic:

Colorado (Mark Udall vs Cory Gardner): The lone bright spot of the big four unknowns (AK, KS, IA, CO) for Democrats will be out in Colorado. While Gardner has run a very strong campaign and Udall hasn't, I think Udall should win by 1. And it may be all thanks to vote-by-mail. I'm going against the prognosticators here, who have their Median Rating at Tilt R. If Udall does win, he'll need this map:

Watch whether he wins suburban Jefferson and Arapahoe Counties, as well as Larimer County, home to Fort Collins. If either candidates sweeps all three, they will win.

Median Projected Senate Pickup: R+7.5
My Projection: R+7, for a 52-48 Republican Senate

The statehouses are, if anything, even more difficult to project.

Off the Board: Georgia (newly moved), Arkansas, Rhode Island, Minnesota, Oregon, Maryland, Pennsylvania, Arizona, New Hampshire

Leans Republican:

Michigan (Rick Snyder vs Mark Schauer): Rick Snyder has basically been in the same boat as Walker: close race, strong labor opposition, light blue state, and narrow polling leads. He has not trailed in a non-Internet poll since September 10. I say he takes it by 4 points. Median Rating: Tilt Republican

Leans Democratic:

Colorado (John Hickenlooper vs Bob Beauprez): Hickenlooper has had a strange cycle: elected easily in 2010 over split opposition, a controversial gun control bill, loss of two state legislators in recalls, an aura of doom, and now, a strong chance at victory. He mirrors Scott Walker in these respects. I think he can beat Beauprez by 4. Median Rating: Tilt Democratic

Florida (Rick Scott vs Charlie Crist): I've had this race at Lean D all cycle; I figured Crist would bounce back when he started spending money. And he has. Amazingly, he has not trailed in a telephone survey since September 22's SurveyUSA poll, a streak of ten. He won't win big, but I'll say 3 points. Watch Volusia County; a Crist win there would be great news for him. Median Rating: Pure Tossup

Alaska (Sean Parnell vs Bill Walker-I): Walker isn't really a Democrat, and he's not really even center-left. But on two big issues for the Alaska Democratic Party (oil taxes and Medicaid), he's on their side. And come January, I think he'll be in Juneau. Alaska is hard to poll, but it seems clear Parnell is down. I think he'll lose by 6. And to think Charlie Cook just moved it to Tossup! Median Rating: Pure Tossup

Maine (Paul LePage vs Mike Michaud, competitive thanks to Eliot Cutler-I): I've never worried about Michaud, and I can't say I worry now. But it appears LePage could get closer to 43% than 39%, and that must worry Team Blue at least a bit. I say Michaud by 5. Median Rating: Pure Tossup

Tilts Republican:

Massachusetts (Charlie Baker vs Martha Coakley): I really didn't think that Coakley could blow another race, but it appears decently likely. Regardless of final outcome, this and the Iowa Senate race were probably my biggest misses of the cycle. Massachusetts is still a Democratic state, however, and Democratic states tend to have undecided voters who vote Democratic at the last minute. So I will say Baker by 2. Median Rating: Tilt R

Wisconsin (Scott Walker vs Mary Burke): Scott Walker has generally held small leads, with the occasional tied race. That's a recipe for victory, and I'll say he takes it by 3 points. If Burke takes all 5 counties in the state's southwest corner, she should take her place in Madison in two months. Median Rating: Tilt Republican

Tilts Democratic:

Kansas (Sam Brownback vs Paul Davis) This is an inverse Massachusetts, and Brownback should close strong. I project a one-point loss for the incumbent. People just hate his tenure too much. Watch Sedgwick County, home of Wichita. Median Rating: Pure Tossup

Illinois (Pat Quinn vs Bruce Rauner) and Connecticut (Dan Malloy vs Tom Foley): I put these races together because they are stunningly similar. Blue state that is okay with GOP executives? Check. Income tax increases that weren't popular? Check. Multimillionaire, out-of-touch GOP nominees? Check. Polling deficits that have turned to small leads? Check yet again. So what is my projection? Quinn by 3 and Malloy by 4. Median Ratings: Pure Tossups for both

My Projection: Democrats pick up PA, ME, KS, FL, and AK, while losing AR and MA. Net D+3.
Median Rating: Democrats pick up PA, lose AR and MA, with FL, KS, ME, IL, AK, and CT as tossups. Net no gain.
Apparently my projections are quite different, perhaps based off the fact that I don't view this year as a Republican wave at all, but rather one where the swing states get split pretty evenly and a lot of Republican governors are vulnerable.

The House is of course the toughest to project.

Off the board (but formerly on it): MT, NV-3, MI-8, IA-4, WI-6, MN-2, NY-23, MI-1, MI-7, NY-21, IL-13, CA-26, ME-2. You can tell 2014 clearly started tilting to the GOP by the seats which have moved off; they break down as 9 GOP held, 3 Dem held, and 1 GOP pickup.

Leaning Democratic:

NH-2 (Ann Kuster vs Marilinda Garcia), NY-18 (Sean Patrick Maloney vs Nan Hayworth), NY-24 (Dan Maffei vs John Katko): These three are all light blue northeastern seats which could definitely fall if it were 2010, part two, but which look okay for their Democratic incumbent freshmen. Median Ratings: NH-2 Lean D, NY-18 Lean D, NY-24 Tilt D. My projection is Kuster by 7, Maloney by 5, Maffei by 4.

IL-10 (Brad Schneider vs Bob Dold): Like ME-Gov, this is a race I've never sweated. Dem-leaning suburban seats tend to stay blue once they go blue, the inverse of places like NC-7. I think Schneider takes it by 5. Median Rating: Pure Tossup

NV-4 (Steven Horsford vs Cresent Hardy): This one broke later than anything else on the map thanks to horrific Democratic turnout in Nevada. Horsford by 7, thanks to Hardy's lack of cash. This definitely could've been a GOP win, and may be similar to NE-2 last cycle, where a party just straight blew it. Median Rating: Lean D

GA-12 (John Barrow vs Rick Allen), MN-7 (Collin Peterson vs Torrey Westrom): Republicans will win both when the incumbents retire, but potentially not until then. Barrow by 6, Peterson by 8. Median Ratings: Both Lean Dem.

MA-6 (Seth Moulton vs Richard Tisei): Democrats did the smart thing and ditched their underperforming incumbent, and Moulton will be rewarded for his primary success with a 6 point victory. Median Rating: Lean Dem

HI-1 (Mark Takai vs Charles Djou): Think of HI-1 like IL-10, and Djou like Dold, and you'll understand why this is a close race. But also remember there's no real reason Takai won't win. I say he does it by 7. Median Rating: Lean Dem

IA-1 (Pat Murphy vs Rod Blum), IA-2 (Dave Loebsack vs Marianette Miller-Meeks): Personally, I think Democrats are a bit more scared than they need to be that Braley will drag down the whole ticket, but these are definitely competitive. Murphy by 5, Loebsack by 10. Median Ratings: IA-1 Tilt D, IA-2 Lean D

CA-7 (Ami Bera vs Doug Ose): I'm not too worried here because of Bera's strong totals in the June primary. I think he wins it by a close but comfortable enough 4. Median Rating: Tilt Dem

Leans Republican:

AR-2 (French Hill vs Patrick Henry Hays): If Mark Pryor is losing by 8 and Mike Ross by similar margins, I don't see why a non-incumbent Democrat would get elected to the House from the Natural State. AR-2 is probably fool's good. Hill by 5. Median Rating: Tilt Republican

WV-2 (Alex Mooney vs Nick Casey): Outside groups are getting involved, vindicating my prediction that this would be close. Ultimately, it just doesn't seem West Virginia is willing to elect Democrats of any kind outside of Charleston and Coal Country anymore. Mooney by 7. Median Rating: Tilt/Leans Republican

NJ-3 (Tom MacArthur vs Aimee Belgard): This just wasn't the year for Republicans to lose a district like this with a decent nominee. MacArthur by 5. Median Rating: Leans Republican

VA-10 (Barbara Comstock vs John Foust): Comstock's weak summer campaign appears to have improved, and Foust isn't setting the world on fire. In a Romney district, that's enough. Comstock by 6. Median Rating: Leans Republican

CO-6 (Mike Coffman vs Andrew Romanoff): This was another big surprise for me, as I thought Coffman was the most vulnerable GOP incumbent after his weak 2012 performance. It appears nobody agrees. I'm still going to say it's closer than expected. Coffman by 3. Median Rating: Tilt Republican

Tilts Democratic:

MN-8 (Rick Nolan vs Stewart Mills): I don't trust the SUSA poll, and it seems to me Nolan should squeak this one out; I'll say he manages it by a mere point. Median Rating: Tilt Republican

AZ-2 (Ron Barber vs Martha McSally): I expected Barber to lose back in spring and summer, but he seems to have run a more energetic campaign than last time around and I project a 3 point win. Median Rating: Tilt Democratic

IA-3 (Staci Appel vs David Young): Young has inspired enthusiasm from essentially no voters, coming in fifth in his own primary and running a poor campaign with some weird ads. The poor Democratic fortunes upballot are his only hope, but IA-Sen is close enough that Democrats are likely to show up. I think Appel by 4. Median Rating: Tilt Republican

IL-12 (Bill Enyart vs Mike Bost): I admit this is the call I'm least confident of, and I will show it by projecting Enyart to win in a recount. Bost just seems too unstatesmanlike. But then again, this isn't 1920 anymore. Anger may play well here. Quinn's likely victory statewide also helps Enyart out. Median Rating: Tilt Republican

NE-2 (Lee Terry vs Brad Ashford): A chronic underperformer, it appears this is the end of the road for Lee Terry. I doubt Omaha will miss him. Ashford by 3. Median Rating: Tilt Democratic

Tilts Republican:

NY-11 (Michael Grimm vs Dominic Recchia): Recchia has managed to make himself seem like the worst option even when the alternative is likely to be a convicted felon by next election. That's very hard to do. Along with IL-12, however, this is my toughest call. I think it's very possible people decide they just can't pull the trigger for Grimm. I'll say he takes it by 4, though. Median Rating: Tilt Republican

AZ-1 (Ann Kirkpatrick vs Jonathan Paton): Kirkpatrick seems to generally outrun expectations, and I might regret making this call. I'll project this as the other race which goes to a true recount. Paton by a quarter of a percent. Median Rating: Tilt Republican

CA-52 (Scott Peters vs Carl DeMaio): I'm gradually losing support for the idea that DeMaio will win, but I still believe he will. It just depends on how much people believe the allegations against him. DeMaio by 2. Median Rating: Tilt Democratic

WV-3 (Nick Rahall vs Evan Jenkins): With Rahall's defeat, the West Virginia wipeout will be complete. Should, he lose, he could be the answer to a trivia question: which congressman who lost re-election to a member of the opposite party outside of a wave had the most seniority? I'm gonna say Jenkins by 5. Median Rating: Tilt Republican

FL-2 (Steve Southerland vs Gwen Graham): I'm just not seeing how Graham takes this one; Republican turnout will be extremely high due to the governor's election and students are the most likely group of the Democratic coalition to drop off in a midterm (this district is home to Florida State). Southerland by 1. Median Rating: Pure Tossup

FL-26 (Joe Garcia vs Carlos Curbelo): Garcia managed to beat a corrupt man to take this seat, but Curbelo is simply another member of Miami-Dade County's strong Cuban GOP machine, and I think he'll defeat the earwax-eating incumbent by 4. Median Rating: Tilt Republican

NH-1 (Carol Shea-Porter vs Frank Guinta): Shea-Porter has never been strong, and New Hampshire loves to toss out its incumbents. I think she'll lose by 3. Median Rating: Pure Tossup

NY-1 (Tim Bishop vs Lee Zeldin): I don't know what to make of this one. Bishop nearly lost in 2012, like Barber. Usually that means high vulnerability, but this hasn't appeared to be considered a top five GOP pickup. Democrats, however, have no reason to turn out, with Cuomo poised to romp at the top of the ticket, and so I think Zeldin takes this by a point. Median Rating: Pure Tossup

Intraparty Races:

WA-4 (Dan Newhouse vs Clint Didier): Establishment vs insurgent can lead to insurgent win in the GOP primary, but not in a Republican-on-Republican general. Newhouse should take this by double digits.

CA-4 (Tom McClintock vs Art Moore): I initially thought McClintock could lose like Pete Stark did. He's not beloved by the median voter in his district, certainly. But I've heard no buzz about Moore, and I'm now inclined to think McClintock takes between 53 and 58 percent.

CA-25 (Tony Strickland vs Steve Knight): Knight may have geographic advantage, but he's appeared to run a weaker campaign than Strickland. Ideology isn't really a factor here. I think Strickland by high single digits.

CA-17 (Mike Honda vs Ro Khanna): [Disclosure: I interned on this campaign over a year ago for Team Honda]. Mike Honda's campaign has not been too stellar, thanks in part to his being a 74 year old who hasn't had to campaign hard in over a decade. Khanna is a fresh face with appeal to the South Asian and business communities in the district. I admit this is the toughest race to make a call in because I have a stronger stake in it, and I may be biased, but I think Khanna goes down by about five.

Prognosticators' projections (including 3 safe Republican pickups and 1 safe Democratic one): R+8
My Projection: R+6

Poll

128 votes Show Results

Which Senate race will be the closest?

128 votes Vote Now!

Which Senate race will be the closest?

New Hampshire

6 votes

Iowa

35 votes

North Carolina

19 votes

Colorado

26 votes

Georgia

16 votes

Alaska

12 votes

Kansas

12 votes

Other (state in comments)

2 votes

Race Ratings 3.0: Two Weeks Out

jncca

Community (This content is not subject to review by Daily Kos staff prior to publication.)

Monday October 20, 2014 · 5:51 PM PDT

2014/10/20 · 17:51

Well, it's time for another installment of my race ratings. Here we go! I will put previous ratings in parentheses, with my September ratings first and my August ratings second

Tilt = 60% chance of victory
Lean = 75% chance of victory

At this point in the cycle, Likely and Safe are essentially identical. Time is running out.

Senate ratings:

New Hampshire (Lean D, Lean D, Likely D)
Colorado (Tilt D, Lean D, Lean D)
Iowa (Pure Tossup, Tilt D, Lean D)
North Carolina (Lean D, Tilt D, Tilt D)

New Hampshire and North Carolina appear to have stabilized at mid-single digit leads for the incumbents. With only two weeks left, they should both have 75% chances at winning. Colorado and Iowa continue to move the wrong way for Democrats, but I don't think Republicans have the clear edge in either one of them. Assuming pollster error in Colorado both feels ridiculous and is well-founded.

Alaska (Tilt R, Tossup, Lean D)
Arkansas (Lean R, Tilt R, Tossup)
Kansas (Tilt R, Tilt R, Safe R)
Louisiana (Lean R, Lean R, Lean R)
Kentucky (Lean R, Lean R, Lean R)
Georgia (Lean R, Lean R, Lean R)

LA/KY/GA have all been very stable races, with significant but not impossible hurdles to Democratic victory. Kansas appears to no longer be going Greg Orman's way. His money disadvantage is a real problem, as is Kansas's blood red hue. Arkansas has seen more bad polling for Democrats, as has Alaska. Both have broken in Republicans' favor over the past two months, and my ratings changes reflect that.

Everything else has been off the playing field since at least July. South Dakota is still a Likely R race unless Rounds gets indicted.

Governorships:
Alaska (Pure Tossup, Lean R, Safe R)
Illinois (Tilt D, Tilt R, Lean R)

These two have seen big movement against Republican nominees.

Wisconsin (Tilt R, Pure Tossup, Lean R)
Connecticut (Tilt D, Tilt D, Lean D)
Kansas (Tilt D, Tilt D, Pure Tossup)

These three have bounced around somewhat, and any could flip within the next two weeks.

Florida (Lean D, Lean D, Lean D)
Georgia (Lean R, Lean R, Lean R)
Colorado (Tilt D, Tilt D, Tilt D)
Michigan (Tilt R, Tilt R, Tilt R)

Crist was only down because of being outspent. I expect him to climb until he wins by about five. Deal should win in an underperformance. Hickenlooper may well win with under 50%, and the same goes for Snyder. All four of these races have been fundamentally stable.

Arkansas (Safe R, Tilt R, Tilt R)
Massachusetts (Lean D, Likely D, Too early to call)

Apparently the DGA was not seeing what I thought they were seeing in Arkansas. That one is over. Massachusetts is blue enough I expect a Coakley win, but she is not polling wonderfully and I consider it competitive now.

As for the House...

Formerly Competitive, now Safe:
Open MT-AL (Daines --> Zinke)
NV-3 (Heck)
Open MI-8 (Rogers --> Bishop)
IA-4 (King)
Open WI-6 (Petri --> Grothman)
MN-2 (Kline)
NY-23 (Reed)
MI-7 (Walberg)
Open NY-21 (Owens --> Stefanik, GOP pickup)
IL-13 (Davis)

These were all potential Democratic victories back when the political climate was a bit less clear. Over the past two months, it's become clear Democrats are highly unlikely to win any of them.

CA-26 (Brownley)
Open ME-2 (Michaud --> Cain)
NH-2 (Kuster)

The playing field on the other side has shrunk much less, but these three appear close to over.

Leaning Democratic:
NY-24 (Maffei: Lean D, Safe D)
MN-7 (Peterson: Safe D, Safe D)

These two later additions to the playing field are still probable Democratic holds.

CA-7 (Bera: Lean D, Lean D)
NY-11 (Grimm --> Recchia, Dem pickup: Lean D, Lean D)
GA-12 (Barrow: Lean D, Lean D)
IL-10 (Schneider: Lean D, Lean D)
NY-18 (Maloney: Lean D, Lean D)
Open MA-6 (Tierney --> Moulton: Lean D, Lean D)

All these should be single-digit Democratic wins.

Leaning Republican:

Open VA-10 (Wolf --> Comstock: Tilt R, Tilt R)
Open NJ-3 (Runyan --> MacArthur: Lean R, Tilt R)
Open WV-2 (Capito --> Mooney: Lean R, Lean R)

Tilting to the Incumbent:

AZ-1 (Kirkpatrick: Lean D, Lean D)
MN-8 (Nolan: Tilt D, Lean D)
IL-12 (Enyart: Lean D, Safe D)
FL-2 (Southerland: Tilt R, Tilt R)
CO-6 (Coffman: Tilt D, Tilt D)
NE-2 (Terry: Tilt R, Tilt R)

AZ-1 and IL-12 have gotten more competitive than I expected, while CO-6 appears to have Coffman in control.

Tilting toward Defeat:
WV-3 (Rahall --> Jenkins: Pure Tossup, Pure Tossup)
FL-25 (Garcia --> Curbelo: Tilt R, Tilt D)
NH-1 (Shea-Porter --> Guinta: Tilt R, Tilt D)
AZ-2 (Barber --> McSally: Tilt R, Tilt R)
NY-1 (Bishop --> Zeldin: Tilt R, Tilt R)
CA-52 (Peters --> DeMaio: Lean R, Lean R)
Open IA-3 (Latham --> Appel: Pure Tossup, Pure Tossup)

Total: GOP pickup of 6 in House, Democratic pickup of 3.5 Governorships, GOP pickup of 6.5 in Senate.

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Where are the Winnable Voters for Each Party: A Comprehensive Look

jncca

Community (This content is not subject to review by Daily Kos staff prior to publication.)

Monday September 29, 2014 · 6:22 PM PDT

2014/09/29 · 18:22

What factors cause areas to vote in a certain manner? Inherently we know some of them. But we cannot completely project elections based on one factor alone. After all, the state with the largest Black population is also one of the most stubbornly Republican, while the wealthiest state votes Democratic in most elections. While a comprehensive projection system is impossible (and unnecessary, since we already have actual results from many past elections), I thought it would be interesting to try to reverse-engineer the results in order to find out what areas are not voting the way they “should.” By “should,” I’m not trying to engage in “What’s the Matter with Kansas?” style analysis. That type of analysis is simplistic. No matter how much one wants or does not want American politics to be a class struggle, the reality is that it’s not. Looking at American politics through the lens of class and class alone misses quite a bit, arguably the majority, or what goes on here. Instead, the reason I am undertaking this exercise is to attempt to figure out where it would be easiest for the respective political parties to grow. In other words, where are there many voters who for the most part should be voting Republican, based on key characteristics (including but not limited to income), but actually vote Democratic? After all, that’s where the Republican Party should be investing (and vice versa).

In order to get data for this diary, I put demographic traits from every county with a population of 150,000 or greater into a table, and then roughly weighted them so that Los Angeles County does not count the same as Ventura County even though both meet the population threshold. For rural areas, I randomly selected a county from each Census PUMA (Primary Use Microdata Area, but that’s not really important) so that the number of low population rural counties did not skew my analysis. All in all, including duplicates (for example, Salt Lake County is included five times due to its large population), I have 1735 units of analysis. Alaska is excluded, as they don’t really do the whole “county” thing.

I began with a basic statistic that impacts politics everywhere: income (specifically median household income, adjusted for cost of living). I then ran a simple regression, looking for the largest outliers.

Here is the chart; as you can see there is a general but very weak trend, with a correlation value of only 0.08. Which, if you are at all knowledgeable about US politics, should not be surprising.

When one looks at the list of places with the largest error from the projection, it’s immediately clear there is more work to be done. The Top 10 “Too Democratic” Outliers:
1.    Prince George’s County, Maryland
2.    Washington, DC
3.    Montgomery County, Maryland
4.    Howard County, Maryland
5.    San Francisco, CA
6.    Maui County, HI
7.    Arlington County, VA
8.    Marin County, CA
9.    Alameda County, CA
10.    Santa Clara County, CA

And the Top 10 “Too Republican”:
1.    Cimarron County, OK
2.    Winston County, AL
3.    Casey County, KY
4.    Rockcastle County, KY
5.    Knox County, KY
6.    Real County, TX
7.    San Saba County, TX
8.    Johnson County, KY
9.    Gilmer County, GA
10.    Erath County, TX

At this point, the list is really just a list of places with lots of wealthy liberals and places with lots of poor conservatives, and there is more to politics than income. So let’s add another variable, one that we know affects politics in a huge way: race and ethnicity.

The correlation has grown much stronger, up to 0.30. That's a bit better, but we’re ignoring religion, which is another huge factor driving voting patterns. With the list once again adjusted (based on the New York Times’ map of the “religious right” which unfortunately excludes religious Catholics, with projections adjusted up or down based on the number of religious people relative to the national average), here’s what we’ve got.

There are a couple clear problems (The Bronx can't give Obama 120%, nor can Utah County give Romney 114%), but overall the trend is strong. A 0.60 correlation is nothing to sneeze at. That is not to say that my findings here are anything special. What's interesting is what comes next.

First, however, here are the largest outliers.
Top 10 “Too Democratic”:
1.    Chittenden County, VT
2.    Boulder County, CO
3.    Dane County, WI
4.    Howard County, MD
5.    Multnomah County, OR
6.    Marin County, CA
7.    Nicollet County, MN
8.    Haywood County, NC
9.    Windham County, VT
10.    Ballard County, KY

Top 10 “Too Republican”:
1.    St Martin Parish, LA
2.    Karnes County, TX
3.    St Landry Parish, LA
4.    Claiborne Parish, LA
5.    Brazos County, TX
6.    Washington County, CO
7.    Morton County, KS
8.    Elk County, KS
9.    Lee County, SC
10.    Yuma County, AZ

This list looks a bit more realistic on both sides. The “Too Republican” counties are now more than just the South, and the “Too Democratic” counties are not quite the same as the list of “counties with the most white liberals.” In case you were wondering, the leaders on each end are a whopping 28 points (Chittenden) and an even larger 34 points (St. Martin) away from their expected vote percentages. However, most of the country does vote somewhat similarly to how we’d expect given only income, cost of living, race, and religion.

There are a few caveats to this data, before I begin to discuss the results and how they relate to the premise of this post.

1.    Mormonism: For some reason, all Mormon-heavy counties were listed as far more Democratic than they should be, probably due to the overwhelmingly observant religious nature of these areas, which dwarfs anything in even the Deep South. Thus, I ignored these counties. Hopefully that isn’t too much of a problem, since I doubt Democrats are going to be competing for the religious Mormon vote anytime soon.
2.    Conservative Catholicism: Many Catholics are just as religious and just as conservative as their evangelical counterparts, but unfortunately there’s no way to distinguish between them and “cafeteria Catholics” at the county level. This may be a particular concern in Louisiana.
3.    Cheap, Wealthy Areas: A few cheap, wealthy areas (such as Williamson County, TN) have projected Republican percentages approaching 100%, which is unrealistic. I did not ignore them, but I’d just like to note this occurrence. The inverse problem occurs in the Bronx, which has such a high cost of living and is so non-White that the expected Democratic vote percentage is over 100%.
4.    Assumes 100% Voting: This is a very big one. Poorer Americans vote less, and many aren’t citizens or are ineligible felons. An American electorate with 100% voter turnout would be very different than today’s electorate. This effect is particularly large in heavily Hispanic and/or Asian areas, which have many non-citizens.

With that said, obviously the most fertile places to look for gains by one party or the other (with some exceptions) are the areas voting out of sync with the projections. In some cases these are due to localized factors which need to be taken into account, and in other cases it seems to be more of a fluke. But let’s begin to take a look, starting with places which are too Democratic (and therefore would be fertile areas for Republicans to adopt persuasion-based techniques).

Category 1: Peoples’ Republics
Target Level: 3 out of 10
Population: 13 million
Examples: King County, WA; San Francisco County, CA; Boulder County, CO; Tompkins County, NY; Washtenaw County, MI; Cumberland County, ME; Johnson County, IA; Dane County, WI
Analysis: There’s a reason the secular Whites here are more liberal than their secular White counterparts in the rest of the country: these places attract those on the left. Everywhere in this category is either a college town (Iowa City, Ann Arbor, Boulder, Ithaca, Lawrence, Madison, Fort Collins) or has some other reason for liberal politics (environmental issues in Maui or Gilpin County, CO; traditionally liberal cities like both Portlands, the Bay Area, or Asheville). The GOP could probably attract some of these voters by moderating on social and environmental issues, but it likely would not be worth the cost. If I were a Republican strategist, this would not be a top priority.

Category 2: Government Counties
Target Level: 1 out of 10
Population: 6 million
Examples: The entire DC Area, Eaton County, MI; Thurston County, WA
Analysis: It’s a feature, not a bug, that the anti-government party does poorly with government workers. Improving in these areas would hurt the GOP with base groups. Not worth the cost.

Category 3: Upper Midwest
Target Level: 6 out of 10
Population: 8 million
Examples: Small and medium-sized counties in Minnesota, Wisconsin, and Iowa
Analysis: This region’s Nordic heritage and collectivist mentality has made it a tough nut to crack for Republicans relative to how one would expect they’d be performing. However, there’s no crystal-clear reason they shouldn’t be doing better here. And for a party desperate to expand the playing field in the Electoral College, Minnesota (and to some extent Wisconsin, which still tilts Democratic but is very competitive) is a good place to start. But it would probably require a bit of movement leftward on economic issues.

Category 4: Oregon, Washington, and Idaho
Target Level: 5 out of 10
Population: 6 million
Examples: Western Washington and Oregon and the larger Idaho counties
Analysis: Eastern Washington and Oregon are performing at expected levels for the GOP, which means it’s time for them to try harder West of the Cascades. I’m as surprised as you that Idaho is on this list at all, but Ada (Boise), Bonneville (Idaho Falls) and Kootenai (Coeur d’Alene) counties are all worse for Republicans than they should be, which apparently means the GOP should be racking up the score like crazy. This won’t matter one iota in the Electoral College or in any race whatsoever, really, so it’s not a priority but is interesting nonetheless. Oregon and Washington are more socially liberal than the Upper Midwest, and it’ll take some balancing to appeal to both. But these last two categories really show that the late 90s/early 00s gains in these rural White states have been lost but really shouldn’t have been.

Category 5: Philadelphia Metropolitan Area
Target Level: 6 out of 10
Population: 2 million
Examples: Chester and Montgomery Counties (PA), Gloucester and Burlington Counties (NJ)
Analysis: The Philly suburbs are electorally important, at least on the Pennsylvania side of the river, and the upper-income ones are weak for the GOP. This should be a pretty easy place to improve.

Category 6: Border South
Target Level: 9 out of 10
Population: 4 million
Examples: Grundy County, MO; Roane County, TN; Trigg County, KY; Anderson County, TN; Christian County, MO; Anderson County, KY
Analysis: This should be the juiciest fruit of all, and it would pay dividends at the state level in defeating the remaining Blue Dogs. These areas should continue their realignment for the forseeable future, but it’s noteworthy that they haven’t made it there yet. Perhaps the evangelicals here are less conservative than other areas. But if an evangelical isn’t voting GOP by now, it’s hard to imagine what else could win them over.

Category 7: Rural New England
Target Level: 4 out of 10
Population: 2 million
Examples: Hampshire County, MA; Kent County, RI; Tolland County, CT; Berkshire County, MA
Analysis: These are more rural versions of Peoples’ Republics in many cases, but they slipped away from the GOP more recently as the party took on a Southern-fried flavor. Winning the areas back would require some major shifts, and it isn’t really that much territory in the first place.

Thus, if I were a GOP strategist, I’d advise making a play for: the Border South (where the party hasn’t maxed out), the Upper Midwest, Western Oregon and Washington (where the party has really lost ground in the past decade), and the Philadelphia suburbs.

Finally, here is a list of populous counties which fit none of these eight categories but are also fertile Republican ground (or should be).

McLean, Tazewell, and Lake Counties, IL
Monroe, Bay, and Oakland Counties, MI
Wayne and Wood Counties, OH
Porter County, IN
Jefferson County, CO
Warren County, NJ

Most of these are in the Midwest and many are in electorally important states; they could use work too. I’m not sure what’s up with Jefferson County.

Democrats, despite a moderately advantageous Electoral College position, have plenty of areas to grow as well. Here they are.

Category 1: Hispanic Semi-Rural
Target Level: 10 out of 10
Population: 12 million
Examples: Yuma County, AZ; Kings County, CA; Madera County, CA; Cameron County, TX; Yakima County, WA; Fresno County, CA; Nueces County, TX; El Paso County, TX; Dona Ana County, NM
Analysis: These areas suffer from one of two problems: Hispanics are disproportionately non-citizens or Hispanic citizens vote at lower rates than they do nationally. The first problem just takes time, while the second could use some immediate work, but either way Inland California, South Texas, Yakima, Yuma, and New Mexico are good areas for Democrats to focus on. But of course, most of you knew about all the unregistered Hispanics. The next group, however…

Category 2: Deep South and >33% Black
Target Level: 7 out of 10
Population: 8 million
Examples: Williamsburg County, SC; Lowndes County, AL; Sumter County, GA; Bolivar County, MS; Marion County, SC; Randolph County, AL; Ouachita County, LA; Dougherty County, GA
Analysis: I’m a bit confused how, even with the highest Black turnout ever in 2012 (evident even in non-swing states in the county level results), these areas show underperformances. It isn’t racism, because the discrepancy essentially only appears in counties with large minorities (or majorities) of Black voters. So I guess that, surprisingly, there’s still room to grow with rural Black turnout in the Deep South.

Category 3: East and Central Texas
Target Level: 5 out of 10
Population: 4 million
Examples: Brazos County, TX; Grimes County, TX; Nacogdoches County, TX; Rusk County, TX; Erath County, TX; McLennan County, TX
Analysis: This problem is mostly unique to Texas and exists in both rural and more populous counties. It’s clearly due to White voters and not Hispanic ones. I have no idea what could be causing it. But Democrats involved in Battleground Texas shouldn’t forget about the Eastern or Central parts either.

Category 4: Retirees
Target Level: 2 out of 10
Population: 3 million
Examples: Indian River County, FL; Onslow County, NC; Cochise County, AZ; Yavapai County, AZ; Ocean County, NJ; Jones County, NC; Sumter County, FL
Analysis: This is one of those geographical quirks I mentioned before. Age matters.

Category 5: Cajun Country
Target Level: 3 out of 10
Population: 2 million
Examples: Essentially all of Southern Louisiana
Analysis: Probably lots of conservative Catholics here. If that’s the cause, this region is voting how one would expect. If it isn’t, then I’m not sure what would be causing it, but Democrats should be trying harder. John Kerry performed quite well just ten years ago, despite being a New England liberal.

Category 6: Super-Rural Plains
Target Level: 4 out of 10
Population: 2 million
Examples: western Kansas, Nebraska, Oklahoma, and Texas, plus eastern Colorado
Analysis: This area is super White. It’s not extremely religious, yet votes as if it were. The states listed don’t really matter, other than Colorado, so it’s not really too much worth focusing on as a party, but many of these voters could very well be persuadable (or perhaps they aren’t, due to other issues such as guns which aren’t accounted for here).

Category 7: Coal Country
Target Level: 1 out of 10
Population: 2 million
Examples: West Virginia and Kentucky, plus Fulton County, PA
Analysis: Definitely not worth the cost. We know why these not-so-religious, poor voters are Republican supporters. The Democratic Party has made a calculated decision to embrace environmentalism and abandon coal. That has cost them tons of support in these two states (and some in the more important state of Pennsylvania), but also led to gains in other places. While I would personally prefer to win West Virginia and lose Connecticut, that’s not the route the party has chosen to go and it would be dumb to risk so much to gain so little.

Category 8: Rural West
Target Level: 4 out of 10
Population: 1 million
Examples: Lake County, OR; Fremont County, CO; Tehama County, CA; Lake County, MT
Analysis: See Category 6. Guns may be a factor here, too. Again we see parts of Colorado show up; it’s just a demographically strange state when it comes to voting. If not, I’d say the party should go for it: Colorado and Montana could both pay dividends.

Category 9: Pennsyltucky
Target Level: 7 out of 10
Population: 2 million
Examples: Central Pennsylvania
Analysis: Pennsylvania is a key state, and Republicans are doing better than they should in the central part of the state. I’m not sure what else would be causing it except historical loyalty, which means it should be fertile for Team Blue.

Other Populous Counties Democrats Should Work For:
Randolph, Wayne, Davidson, and Alamance Counties, NC
Whitfield County, GA
Colleton and Berkeley Counties, SC
Lee County, AL
Allen County, OH
Richmond County, NY

As you can see, a majority of these counties are in the Carolinas and nearly all are in the South. They aren’t heavily evangelical, though. North Carolina is of course key and should be priority number one for the party after Hispanics. Allen County, Ohio is an interesting one to appear, as is Staten Island.

So those are the areas each party should go for. I hope you learned something from this diary. Please express your thoughts in the comments.

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