While Donald Trump’s National Approval Rating typically sits between 41-43%, with very little variation, his state approval ratings may be a more important metric of his likelihood of re-election, given that we need to rely on the wackiness of the electoral college for a Presidential victory or defeat.
So I decided to take a look at Trump’s approval rating by state, based on one of the few sources that collects this information with regularity, Morning Consult, who polls registered voters. The latest numbers available are from October of 2019. As of October 2019, Trump’s approval rating was highest in Wyoming, at 62% approval, and lowest in Washington, DC at 17% approval. His approval was below 50% in 34 states (plus DC). In all these states but one, when Trump’s approval rating is lower than 50%, his disapproval rating is higher than his approval rating. The exception is Texas, where his approval rating is 49%, but disapproval is 48%. More on Texas later.
So what does this mean for Trump’s re-election chances? I considered Barack Obama’s approval ratings, to try to understand how approval ratings might help us predict reelection chances. First off, I looked at Obama’s approval in 2011, a year before the election. For Obama, month-by-month numbers by state were not available, but the composite 2011 score by state, is available from Gallup. In 2011, Obama was NOT very popular, with approval ratings below 50% in 40 states in 2011. Obviously, things improved for him by 2012, or he likely would not have won the election—but his aggregate 2012 approval for the year was still under 50% in 34 states (by the time of the election, in November 2012, it was higher than it was earlier in 2012--Obama’s national approval rate was estimated at around 51% in several polls, right before the election, and he won with 51% of the vote).
But you don’t need 50% approval to win an election. We know that Trump won the electoral college with a lower than 50% approval—partly because Hillary Clinton also had a low approval rating. But we don’t know who will face Donald Trump, so we can’t compare his approval to an opponent—yet. What I did instead was examine how many electoral votes Donald Trump would win if: 1) he loses all the states where his approval is under 50%, and disapproval higher than approval (this means that Texas is not included as a state Trump loses, even though his approval is below 50%); 2) he loses all the states where his approval is 46% or lower; 3) he loses all the states where his approval is 45% or lower and 4) he loses all the states where his approval is <45%. Why these numbers? Well, there are a lot of states clustered in this mid-high 40% approval range, and additionally, 46% seemed to be the 2012 approval “tipping point” for Obama—he won most states where his approval was 46% or higher in 2012, and lost states where it was lower than 46%.
So what happens? If Donald Trump loses every state where his approval rating is below 50% (and is higher than his disapproval rating), it is an electoral nightmare for him. He wins only 147 Electoral votes, leaving the Democratic challenger with 391. This is assuming he and his 49% approval win Texas. (I should note that I am giving all of Maine and Nebraska’s electoral votes to Trump or the challenger, based on the approval rating of the state, although I know they might not actually work out that way, and I’m assuming no electoral votes go to a 3rd party). Trump also loses some very unlikely states—Alaska, Montana, and Utah, for example. While I would love for this to happen, doesn’t seem to be too likely.
So next I looked at what happens if he loses states where his approval is lower than 47%. It’s STILL not close. He would win 203 electoral votes, to 335 for the challenger. He’d lose states such as Nebraska and Georgia. But after this he gets closer. If he loses states where his approval is lower than 46%, he still loses, but gets 253 electoral votes to 285 for the challenger. If he loses only states where his approval is lower than 45%, he only wins 1 additional state, and he’s still short in the electoral college, 266 to 272. However, in this scenario Trump would win Virginia, and after witnessing what happened in the 2017 and 2019 elections, I don’t expect him to win Virginia.
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Morning Consult Approval Oct 2019 |
Electoral College Votes |
Electoral Votes for Challenger if Trump Approval <50% and underwater |
Electoral Votes for Challenger if Trump Approval <47% |
Electoral Votes for Challenger if Trump Approval <46% |
Electoral Votes for Challenger if Trump Approval <45% |
Alabama |
59% |
9 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
Alaska |
47% |
3 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
Arizona |
46% |
11 |
11 |
11 |
0 |
0 |
Arkansas |
51% |
6 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
California |
32% |
55 |
55 |
55 |
55 |
55 |
Colorado |
40% |
9 |
9 |
9 |
9 |
9 |
Connecticut |
36% |
7 |
7 |
7 |
7 |
7 |
Delaware |
37% |
3 |
3 |
3 |
3 |
3 |
District of Columbia |
17% |
3 |
3 |
3 |
3 |
3 |
Florida |
47% |
29 |
29 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
Georgia |
46% |
16 |
16 |
16 |
0 |
0 |
Hawaii |
32% |
4 |
4 |
4 |
4 |
4 |
Idaho |
57% |
4 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
Illinois |
36% |
20 |
20 |
20 |
20 |
20 |
Indiana |
50% |
11 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
Iowa |
42% |
6 |
6 |
6 |
6 |
6 |
Kansas |
51% |
6 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
Kentucky |
54% |
8 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
Louisiana |
54% |
8 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
Maine |
42% |
4 |
4 |
4 |
4 |
4 |
Maryland |
35% |
10 |
10 |
10 |
10 |
10 |
Massachusetts |
32% |
11 |
11 |
11 |
11 |
11 |
Michigan |
42% |
16 |
16 |
16 |
16 |
16 |
Minnesota |
41% |
10 |
10 |
10 |
10 |
10 |
Mississippi |
56% |
6 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
Missouri |
51% |
10 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
Montana |
48% |
3 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
Nebraska |
46% |
5 |
5 |
5 |
0 |
0 |
Nevada |
41% |
6 |
6 |
6 |
6 |
6 |
New Hampshire |
39% |
4 |
4 |
4 |
4 |
4 |
New Jersey |
40% |
14 |
14 |
14 |
14 |
14 |
New Mexico |
40% |
5 |
5 |
5 |
5 |
5 |
New York |
36% |
29 |
29 |
29 |
29 |
29 |
North Carolina |
47% |
15 |
15 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
North Dakota |
51% |
3 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
Ohio |
46% |
18 |
18 |
18 |
0 |
0 |
Oklahoma |
52% |
7 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
Oregon |
36% |
7 |
7 |
7 |
7 |
7 |
Pennsylvania |
44% |
20 |
20 |
20 |
20 |
20 |
Rhode Island |
35% |
4 |
4 |
4 |
4 |
4 |
South Carolina |
52% |
9 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
South Dakota |
52% |
3 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
Tennessee |
56% |
11 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
Texas |
49% |
38 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
Utah |
47% |
6 |
6 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
Vermont |
32% |
3 |
3 |
3 |
3 |
3 |
Virginia |
45% |
13 |
13 |
13 |
13 |
0 |
Washington |
34% |
12 |
12 |
12 |
12 |
12 |
West Virginia |
58% |
5 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
Wisconsin |
42% |
10 |
10 |
10 |
10 |
10 |
Wyoming |
62% |
3 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
SUM ELECTORAL VOTES (Challenger) |
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391 |
335 |
285 |
272 |
SUM ELECTORAL VOTES (Trump) |
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147 |
203 |
253 |
266 |
In ALL these scenarios, Trump loses in the following “swing” states:
Iowa
Michigan
Minnesota (which Trump barely lost in 2016)
New Hampshire (which Trump barely lost in 2016)
Pennsylvania
Wisconsin
The following would be also be considered swing states, just based on approval rating around 46-47%:
Alaska (47% approval)
Arizona (46% approval)
Florida (47% approval)
Georgia (46% approval)
Nebraska (46% approval)
North Carolina (47% approval)
Ohio (46% approval)
Utah (46% approval)
The Democratic candidate doesn’t NEED to win any of these swing states to win the presidency, but it would provide some insurance and it also might lead to some important gains in the Senate.
For clarity, Barack Obama won every state in which his aggregate 2012 approval rating was 46% or higher, excluding two: Georgia, where his approval rating was 46% (actually, 45.6%, but rounded up), and North Carolina, where it was 47% (actually, 46.6%, rounded up). So by the same logic, Trump could win every state where his approval rating is 46% or higher in 2020, but this would not win him the election, because he’d still lose in Iowa, Michigan, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin (and Virginia). If his approval dips just a little in Arizona, Florida, Georgia, North Carolina or Ohio, he has a higher likelihood of losing those states. I don’t think he will lose Nebraska, but he could lose 1 electoral vote there (Obama won Nebraska’s Omaha-based district and an electoral vote there, in 2008). He will not lose Alaska or Utah despite low approval—those states are just too Republican-leaning. They may give a sizable portion of their vote to a 3rd-party candidate if there is one.
Now onto the Senate. How do Presidential Approval ratings affect the Senate races? I’d have to run a linear regression on the correlation to be sure, but for now let’s just say, they’re related. When people come out to vote for the President, they more often vote for the Senator from the party they voted for President—we all know the President can lift up or drag down a Senate candidate. In 2016, for the first time, Republican Senate candidates won every race that was held in states that Trump won. Democratic Senate candidates won every race held in States that Hillary won.
But of course, the Senator’s own approval ratings matter too. Morning Consult also has Senator approval ratings, which are updated every quarter, so we have data for Q3 to inform the analysis. Here the absolute approval ratings are less informative, because a lot of people neither approve nor disapprove. For example, Gary Peters of Michigan has an approval rating of only 36%, but a disapproval rating of 28%--the majority of voters have no opinion of him. Additionally, because several incumbent Senators are retiring, their approval ratings are not useful for understanding what will happen in the 2020 election. Retirements affect the Senate picture in Tennessee, Kansas, Georgia (Johnny Isakson’s seat—resulting in a Special Election), Wyoming, and New Mexico. So for Senate, I looked at whether the Senator had a positive approval, compared to disapproval, and by how many points, and then judged that against Presidential approval in the state, to understand how the Senate might play out. If the incumbent Senator is retiring, I relied only on presidential approval to determine the party of the Senator who will win.
If we look at states with a 2020 Senate election, where President Trump has a lower than 50% approval rating, and a higher disapproval rating than approval (again, all states but Texas) and we ignore Senate approval ratings, then Democrats would flip an astounding 10 Senate seats (including 2 in Georgia) and would lose 1 seat—that of Doug Jones, in Alabama. In fact, Doug Jones loses his seat in every analysis, simply because Donald Trump’s approval is so high in Alabama, at 59%. So that’s a net gain of 9 seats, including seats in Alaska, Montana, and Nebraska. But once we consider Senator approval rating, this number shrinks. For example, Senator Dan Sullivan from Alaska is +11 in his approval rating, so he’s not likely to lose in Alaska even as Trump’s approval rating is 47%. Same for Steve Daines of Montana, who is +16 on approval even as Trump’s approval is 48%. David Perdue of Georgia and Ben Sasse of Nebraska are both +18 in their approval, making it unlikely they will lose even as Trump’s approval sits at 46% in both states.
When we only include States where Trump is at 46% approval or less as wins for Democrats (and where we exclude Nebraska and David Perdue’s Georgia seat as unlikely pickups), Democrats have a net gain of 4 Seats—winning in Arizona, Colorado, Georgia (special election seat), Iowa, and Maine, and losing in Alabama. When we include States where Trump is at 45% approval or less as wins for Democrats however, we only net 2 seats: winning Colorado, Iowa and Maine, but losing Alabama. Now, considering Senate approval ratings, how could this really play out? Cory Gardner, Joni Ernst, and Susan Collins all have net negative approvals. This, combined with low presidential approval, seems to make these seats the most likely to flip. Doug Jones has a net +5 approval, with a lot of people who neither approve or disapprove. I don’t think this approval will be enough to counteract the partisan lean of Alabama and Trump’s popularity. Unsurprisingly, Arizona, North Carolina and Georgia are less predictable. Trump’s approval is 46% in Arizona, and Martha McSally has a +2 net approval rating. Dems have a great candidate in Mark Kelly. I’m cautiously optimistic about this one. In North Carolina, Trump’s approval is at 47%, indicating he would scrape by to win the state. But Thom Tillis has a -5 approval, he’s facing a primary challenge from the right, and there will be a competitive Governor’s race with a Democratic incumbent. So I’m cautiously optimistic about North Carolina as well, but of course a lot depends on the Democratic candidate. In Georgia’s special election, we have no Senate approval rating to go off, and Trump’s approval is 46%. All candidates run on one ballot, with a runoff held in January if no one gets 50%+1 of the vote. We don’t know who the candidates will be. I think it likely that we won’t know who wins this seat until January 2021 when the runoff is held. And by then we’ll know who the President will be and the makeup of the rest of the Senate. So a race in January 2021 could determine Senate majority! Yikes!
What about some less likely states? The least popular Senator in the country is Mitch McConnell, at -13 net approval. But Trump has a 54% approval here. Unfortunately, I think Mitch wins this one—by less than Trump wins Kentucky, but a win is a win. In Texas, Trump has a 49% approval rating and John Cornyn is at +18 on approval (although with 30% of voters having no opinion). I think Cornyn wins here, and Texas stays red at the state level. Finally, in Kansas, we don’t know who the candidates will be and Trump sits a 51% approval. A strong Democrat against a weak Republican is a possible path to victory in the Senate for Kansas, but Trump will win the state.
My prediction based JUST on presidential approval ratings, one year out: Democratic candidate wins the Presidential Election, winning Iowa, Michigan, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin, and probably one other swing state, like North Carolina or Arizona, for a total electoral college victory somewhere between 285-300. Democrats lose the Senate race in Alabama, and win in Maine, Iowa, Colorado, and either North Carolina or Arizona.
What could change these predictions? Well a lot, obviously. Donald Trump was quite unpopular in 2016, but he won the election anyway. Donald Trump’s approval could go up (or down) in key states—his national approval rate is pretty stable, but it has jumped up and down a bit by state, and an impeachment by the House (and lack of removal by the Senate) could affect both his own approval and that of certain Senators by quite a bit, depending on state. Additionally, He could remain as unpopular as he is now, but his running mate could be just as unpopular, or more unpopular. In 2016, when both candidates were unpopular, voters who disliked both candidates tended to vote for Donald Trump. However, now that Donald Trump is a known quantity, such voters may decide to take a risk on the challenger. Votes for a 3rd party could mess up the state totals—this did not happen for Obama in 2012, but was certainly a factor in 2016. Approval ratings only matter if those that approve or disapprove go out and vote, so low voter turnout in certain groups, could result in wins for Trump even in states with relatively high disapproval.
I’ll keep tracking Presidential and Senate approval as we move forward, so stay tuned!