Eastern Ukraine: (Oskil River-Kreminna Line)
Russian sources claimed that Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks in northeastern Kharkiv Oblast to regain lost positions on October 18. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian troops recaptured Horobivka, a settlement in northeastern Kharkiv Oblast about 16km northeast of Kupyansk.[15] The Russian MoD also claimed that Russian troops conducted a limited spoiling attack around Kyslivka, around 20km southeast of Kupyansk. The Ukrainian General Staff and Russian sources notably stated that Russian forces shelled Kotlyarivka, just south of Kyslivka, indicating Ukrainian forces have advanced southeast of Kupyansk up to the Kotlyarivka area.[16]
Russian forces likely continued defensive operations west of the Svatove-Kreminna line on October 18. The Russian MoD claimed that Russian troops repelled Ukrainian attempts to cross the Zherebets River around Stelmakhivka and Andriivka, both about 14km west of Svatove.[17] A Russian milblogger also reported that Russian troops stopped Ukrainian forces from advancing directly on Svatove.[18] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that Ukrainian troops repelled a Russian attack on Bilohorivka in Luhansk Oblast (10km south of Kreminna), which suggests that Russian troops continue to conduct limited ground attacks in western Luhansk Oblast to regain ground near the Severodonetsk-Lysychansk area.[19] Russian sources indicated that Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) troops are focusing on defensive operations and attempting to regain ground west of Lysychansk.[20]
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Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian forces continued ground attacks near Bakhmut and Avdiivka on October 18. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks northeast of Bakhmut near Bakhmutske and south of Bakhmut near Ivanhrad and Klishchiivka.[27] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces conducted assaults on the eastern outskirts of Bakhmut and Soledar to the northeast.[28] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar stated on October 17 that Russian forces plan to capture Bakhmut by the end of October, though ISW assesses they are highly unlikely to do so.[29] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Ukrainian forces repelled ground attacks northeast of Avdiivka near Novokalynove and southwest of Avdiivka near Marinka and Pervomaiske.[30] The Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) People’s Militia claimed that DNR forces are using UAVs to consolidate control over Pervomaiske, and geolocated footage indicates that Ukrainian forces still maintain positions in Pervomaiske as of October 18.[31]
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Supporting Effort—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)
Russian authorities are struggling to cope with their reduced logistics capacity through Crimea following the Ukrainian attack on the Kerch Strait Bridge on October 8. Russian Deputy Prime Minister for Construction and Regional Development Marat Khusnullin stated on October 18 that authorities will complete dismantling the damaged spans of the Crimean bridge by the end of December 2022, indicating that Russian forces will likely have reduced logistics capabilities through Crimea for months.[32] Ukrainian sources shared footage of a large traffic jam in front of the Kerch Strait Bridge and claimed that one car passes through the inspection point every 40 minutes.[33]
Russian forces continued routine artillery, air, and missile strikes west of Hulyaipole and in Mykolaiv and Dnipropetrovsk Oblasts on October 18. Ukraine’s Operational Command South reported that Russian forces struck Berenezhuvate and Kutsurub hromadas in Mykolaiv Oblast, Dnipro City, Nikopol, and Kryvyi Rih.[34] Ukrainian and Russian sources also reported that Russian forces targeted Zaporizhzhia City and Odesa City with loitering munitions.[35] The Russian Ministry of Defense claimed that Russian forces destroyed the Ukrainian Government Communications Center space communications station in Paliivka, Odesa Oblast, about 17km northwest of Odesa City, but ISW cannot confirm this claim or assess its possible impact.[36] Zaporizhia Oblast occupation official Vladimir Rogov claimed that Russian forces fired artillery against Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance groups in the Zaporizhia direction and force concentrations near Orikhiv.[37]
Russian occupation authorities kidnapped Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) personnel on October 17, likely to strengthen physical control over the ZNPP’s operations. Ukrainian state nuclear agency Energoatom reported that Russian authorities kidnapped and relocated ZNPP Information Technology Service Head Oleh Kostyukov and Assistant General Director Oleh Oshka and that their current whereabouts and condition are unknown.[38] A member of the Russian occupation administration in Zaporizhia Oblast criticized the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) call to establish a demilitarized zone at the ZNPP and stated that ZNPP occupation authorities have ruled out the possibility of demilitarization.[39]
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2/ "From Kherson and practically to Donetsk, the terrain is flat fields, sometimes riddled with gullies and small rivulets. The fields are divided by "zelenki", narrow flat plantations of deciduous trees and shrubs.
3/ In the middle of the fields are small villages with 2-3 streets, usually with a farm and a school. To the north of Donetsk, there are agglomerations and villages, sometimes moving from one to the other.
4/ To the south and north of the Siverskiyi Donets [river] is a small strip of forest, then again fields.
Despite the fact that probably 90% of military ranges are fields, it is combat operations in these conditions that present the greatest difficulty.
5/ Concentrations of equipment are easily detected by UAVs and if the artillerymen are well trained, even an attempt to reach the attack line will end badly.
6/ [Ukraine] has created a solid minefield along the line from the Dnipro [river] to Marinka, which also makes it very difficult to use armoured vehicles.
7/ Attempts to occupy strongholds without armour support, in small groups that try to approach the enemy stealthily, ninja-party style, also often end miserably, mainly due to enemy artillery that cannot be suppressed.
8/ Attacking without suppressing artillery is a great sin, this has been known since World War I, but for some reason this commandment has been forgotten [by Russia].
9/ After all, it doesn't matter how many men are advancing on a stronghold, 10 or 100 – shells will cope with any number.
10/ In order to suppress enemy artillery you need more modern artillery radars or UAVs capable of hovering behind enemy lines (if they were kamikaze drones, there would be no problem at all), and high-precision munitions.
11/ The asymmetrical way of counterbattery warfare – destroying supply depots, logistics centres and bridges ... significantly reduces the enemy's artillery potential, but does not solve the problem completely. There is a need for comprehensive work here." /end
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