In both a tactical and strategic sense, it certainly seems as if Ukraine has played its hand smartly. In the most heavily contested areas of the Donbas, they’ve used intelligence about Russian actions, defensive positions built up over eight years since the previous invasion, and dogged persistence in the face of almost constant hammering by artillery, to slow Russian advances in the area to a crawl. Meanwhile, in areas where Russia has drawn down its forces to reinforce that effort in the Donbas, Ukraine has gone on the attack. Most notably, they’ve moved quickly to recapture villages and towns north of Kharkiv, pressing Russian forces kilometers away from Ukraine’s second-largest city and, in some areas, right back to the Russian border.
Ukrainian leadership is well aware that before it can make extensive gains in any area, it has to have some measure of air support, and some ability to push back at Russian artillery. In many areas, that means waiting until new equipment promised by the West is in place, and new training being offered to Ukrainian soldiers is completed.
In some cases, even that may be not enough. Much of the Donbas is not only territory that Russia has held, and fortified, since 2014, it’s also close enough to Russia to be covered by anti-aircraft systems positioned across the border. It’s certainly within easy range of Russian planes and helicopters and it’s the only area of Ukraine that those aircraft feel remotely comfortable flying over. All those factors that have made it so difficult for Russia to capture territory inside Ukraine, go into effect for Ukraine when it’s operating in or near territory that has long been held by Russia. Meaning that Ukraine needs the same kind of massive advantage if it wants to recapture territory without suffering horrendous losses.
Even for recapturing a city like Kherson or Mariupol, where Russia doesn’t have the advantage of long-established fortifications and reliable air support, it’s hard for Ukraine to advance without having at least a localized advantage in numbers. Traditionally, it requires a 3-1 advantage. Better tactics and better technology can shave down that number, but they can’t necessarily make it go away.
For the world of watching keyboard warriors, the fact that Ukraine hasn’t swept back into Kherson—which seemed like a possibility in the week following the Russian retreat from Kyiv, when Ukrainian forces in the Kherson area appeared to be recapturing villages at a steady clip—is frustrating. It has to be far, far more frustrating for the people held hostage in a city that has become a very large-scale prison.
That incredibly bad situation includes ongoing efforts to turn Kherson into an outpost of Russia. Kherson has been taken off the Ukrainian internet and placed on a Russian network. Russian cell towers are going up. Ukrainian products are being replaced on the shelves with ones brought in from Russia as Russian troops insist that business be done in rubles. There are checkpoints throughout the city where Russian forces demand strip searches at gunpoint. And, “My friend says that when they go out now they don’t see familiar faces. Russians are arriving to replace Ukrainians and live in their homes.”
In the last week, Ukraine announced that a counteroffensive was underway in Kherson as well as in Kharkiv and near Izyum. But unlike the Kharkiv area, where there has been the constant excitement of villages and towns captured, including some very fast and unexpected movements by Ukrainian forces, even reports of heavy fighting in the Kherson area have resulted in few changes on the map. Part of the explanation for this can be seen on this map of where Russian cellphones are being used in Ukraine.
This map shows a significant number of Russians positioned across the entire Kherson region. A month ago, some reports had indicated that Russian soldiers were packing up and getting ready to go back across the Dnipro River. Instead, Russia seems to be digging in. As one visiting Russian official told the people in Kherson last week, they expect Russia to be there “forever.”
Rather than pulling out, Russia has been shoving into this area. That’s because they’re supporting two different actions out of Kherson. First, there’s the push toward Kryvyi Rih. Strategically this move for Russia appears pointless. It gets them none of the ground they have set as strategic goals. It moves their forces into a vulnerable position. It gains them nothing except that Kryvyi Rih is Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s home town and Vladimir Putin wants to hurt Zelenskyy. It’s also an industrial center, but count on the personal motive as the real driver here.
The bigger show is going on between Mykolaiv and Kherson. There was a point, almost a month ago now, when Ukraine was retaking settlements in this area rapidly, was pushing toward Kherson from both north and south, and seemed ready to drive Russian troops back across the bridges. This is not currently the case. Russia remains on the west bank in force, struggles over towns are going on at multiple positions along the line, and nothing seems to be moving all that quickly.
Unlike Kharkiv, if Ukraine is going to mount a major counteroffensive at Kherson, they’ll be doing it into the teeth of serious Russian opposition. On the other hand, Kherson is one part of the area Russia now occupies where they’re unlikely to feel safe providing extensive air support and are also less likely to have significant air defense. So Ukrainian armor may be better able to maneuver without a response from above.
However, there’s one other big difference: Kharkiv was already in Ukrainian control. Kherson is not. Every day that Russia remains in control of the city, they do damage to it in ways that may be more subtle than the artillery that leveled Mariupol and has so damaged Kharkiv, but it’s just as real.
With that kind of incentive, Ukraine may be prepared to initiate that offensive, even if the odds are less than great.
Ukrainians capturing Russian Stuff Theater
Rather than looking at Russian stuff blowing up, today it’s Russian stuff that Ukraine is driving away more or less intact. Showing once again that Ukraine understands that you need combined arms, they start with an APV...
Then add a tank ...
Then throw in some artillery (with an appearance from the 101st fighting tractors)...
And finish off with a bit of specialist kit in the form of a TOS thermobaric missile system.
Thursday, May 12, 2022 · 8:31:23 PM +00:00 · Mark Sumner
Somewhere, there is a person who is actually in charge of selecting the musical motif for each weapon deployed in Ukraine. That’s going to be an interesting item on a future resume.
These Brimstone missiles, like the Phoenix Ghost drones created in the U.S., were specially made to fit the situation on the ground in Ukraine, as well as be a system that could be rapidly deployed without intensive training and support.