Russian forces’ momentum from territorial gains around Bakhmut and Avdiivka in late July is likely exhausted, and Russian attacks in eastern Ukraine are likely culminating although very small Russian advances will likely continue. Russian forces seized Novoluhanske and the Vuhlehirska Thermal Power Plant (TPP) southeast of Bakhmut on July 25 and 26, respectively, consolidating Russian control around difficult water features after many weeks of fighting. Russian sources celebrated these gains as a significant military victory without noting that Ukrainian military Ukrainian forces successfully broke contact and withdrew from the area.[1] Russian forces also celebrated the capture of Ukrainian fortifications around the Butivka Coal Mine ventilation shaft southwest of Avdiivka, after Ukrainian forces withdrew from the area on July 30.[2] Russian forces capitalized on these gains to a limited extent and have been attacking toward Bakhmut from the northeast and southeast, and around Avdiivka, but these attacks are now stalling. Russian forces have not made significant territorial gains around Bakhmut or Avdiivka since their advances through Novoluhanske, the power plant, the Butivka Coal Mine, and a few small settlements near those areas.
Russian forces’ failure to capitalize on prior gains around Bakhmut and Avdiivka is an example of a more fundamental Russian military problem—the demonstrated inability to translate tactical gains into operational successes. Russian forces have consistently failed to take advantage of tactical breakthroughs to maneuver into Ukrainian rear areas or unhinge significant parts of the Ukrainian defensive lines. They therefore continually give the Ukrainians time to disengage tactically and re-establish defensible positions against which the Russians must then launch new deliberate attacks. This phenomenon helps explain the extremely slow rate of Russian advances in the east and strongly suggests that the Russians will be unable to take much more ground in the coming months unless the situation develops in unforeseen ways. Russian forces will likely remain unable to commit enough resources to any one offensive operation to regain the momentum necessary for significant territorial advances that translate to operational successes. Russian forces will also need to generate and commit additional assault groups, equipment, and morale to resume even these limited territorial advances yielding small tactical gains.
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Subordinate Main Effort—Southern Kharkiv, Donetsk, Luhansk Oblasts (Russian objective: Encircle Ukrainian forces in Eastern Ukraine and capture the entirety of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian forces conducted several assaults southwest and southeast of Izyum on August 21, likely in an effort to reverse Ukrainian counterattacks or regain control over Ukraine-liberated territories in the area. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully conducted a reconnaissance-in-force operation in the direction of Pasika-Bohorodychne and launched a failed assault in the direction of Dovhenke-Dolyna, both directions southeast of Izyum.[7] Russian forces also launched an unsuccessful reconnaissance-in-force attempt in the direction of Petropillia-Dmytrivka and failed to advance in the directions of Nova Dmytrivka, Dibrivne, and Kranaukhivka (all southwest of Izyum).[8] ISW previously assessed that Ukrainian forces liberated Bohorodychne, Dmytrivka, and Dibrivne, and Russian attacks in these directions may indicate that Russian forces are attempting to regain lost territories and prevent Ukrainian forces from advancing from these liberated positions further into Russian-held territory.
Russian forces launched a ground attack southeast of Siversk but failed to advance towards the settlement on August 21. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully attempted to advance from Berestove to Ivano-Daryivka, approximately 17km and 12km southeast of Siversk, respectively.[9] Russian and Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces shelled Siversk, Hryhorivka, Verkhnokamyanske, and Ivano-Daryivka.[10]
Russian forces continued to wage battles northeast and south of Bakhmut on August 21. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian ground assaults on Bakhmutske (about 11km northeast of Bakhmut) and Zaitseve (about 8km southeast of Bakhmut).[11] Russian forces also launched airstrikes near Zaitseve, Bakhmut, and Soledar (approximately 13km northeast of Bakhmut).[12] Geolocated footage published on August 20 showed Ukrainian artillery striking Russian infantry in the southeastern outskirts of Soledar, which likely indicates that Russian forces are still operating in the vicinity of the Knauf Gips Donbas gypsum factory.[13] The Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Territorial Defense claimed that Ukrainian forces are shelling Zaitseve from their positions southwest of the settlement, after DNR officials previously claimed that Russian forces seized the settlement on August 20.[14] Russian and DNR sources have claimed to control major areas of Zaitseve since August 10, and ISW cannot independently confirm these claims.[15] Geolocated footage also showed fire and smoke reportedly after Ukrainian forces struck an ammunition depot in Horlivka.[16]
Russian forces made limited territorial gains west of Donetsk City and continued attacking settlements northeast and southwest of Avdiivka on August 21. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces were “partially successful” when advancing in the direction of Lozove-Pisky, 12km west and northwest of Donetsk City, respectively.[17] Russian forces also attempted to advance to Nevelske (about 18km due northwest of Donetsk City) but retreated. Russian forces unsuccessfully attempted to improve their tactical positions in the direction of Novoselivka Druha-Krasnohorivka (northeast of Avdiivka) and conducted a failed reconnaissance-in-force attempt in the direction of Opytne (about four kilometers southwest of Avdiivka).[18] Head of the Chechen Republic Ramzan Kadyrov claimed that Russian forces consolidated control over Pisky and are currently clearing the settlement of Ukrainian mines.[19] Kadyrov also claimed that Russian forces are continuing to advance with “minimal risk to civilian population and infrastructure,” despite geolocated footage previously showing Russian forces firing TOS-1A thermobaric artillery systems at Pisky.[20] The Russian Defense Ministry has also claimed that Russian forces “fully liberated” Pisky on August 13.[21]
Russian forces attempted to advance southwest of Donetsk City and did not conduct offensive operations on the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast administrative border on August 21. Russian forces launched unsuccessful assaults on Mariinka (about 24km southwest of Donetsk City) and Pobieda, approximately four kilometers west of Mariinka.[22] Russian forces continued to launch airstrikes on Novomykhailivka and Pavlivka, approximately 30km and 52km southwest of Donetsk City, respectively.[23] Social media footage showed the destruction of civilian infrastructure in Vuhledar (about 49km southwest of Donetsk City) following Russian artillery fire on the settlement.[24]
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Supporting Effort #1—Kharkiv City (Russian objective: Defend ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to Izyum and prevent Ukrainian forces from reaching the Russian border)
Russian forces did not conduct any confirmed ground assaults along the Kharkiv City Axis on August 21. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted an airstrike near Staryi Saltiv, approximately 45km northeast of Kharkiv City.[25] Russian forces continued using tank, tube, and rocket artillery to shell Kharkiv City and settlements to the north, northeast, and southeast and conducted aerial reconnaissance near Velyki Prokhody, approximately 28km north of Kharkiv City.[26]
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Supporting Effort #2—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Defend Kherson and Zaporizhia Oblasts against Ukrainian counterattacks)
Russian forces conducted several assaults on the Mykolaiv-Kherson line on August 21. Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces again tried and failed to advance to Tavryiske, about 38km northwest of Kherson City, and to Potomkyne, south of Kryvyi Rih on the T2207 highway.[27] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces made partial advances towards Blahodatne, east of Mykolaiv City.[28] Russian sources made various claims that Russian forces control part or all of Blahodatne.[29] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported that Russian forces struck industrial and military infrastructure in Mykolaiv City with S-300 anti-aircraft missiles.[30] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted at least seven airstrikes along the line of contact, including near Lozove and Bila Krynytsia, likely targeting the Ukrainian bridgehead over the Inhulets River.[31] Ukrainian forces shot down three Russian UAVs in unspecified areas of Kherson Oblast.[32] Russian forces continued shelling throughout the Kherson-Mykolaiv line of contact.[33]
Russian forces are using barges to transport equipment across the Dnipro River in occupied Kherson Oblast. Geolocated satellite imagery shows that Russian forces have repaired barges and are using them to transport unknown materials across the Dnipro River close to Kherson City, confirming ISW’s August 17 assessment.[34] Russian forces have had to resort to other methods of maintaining ground lines of communication (GLOCs) across the Dnipro after consistent Ukrainian strikes have successfully rendered unusable both road bridges into western Kherson Oblast. These large barges likely require dedicated dock infrastructure to load and unload on both sides of the Dnipro River, which Ukrainian forces will likely target with further HIMARS strikes.[35]
Russian forces did not attempt any reported ground assaults in Zaporizhia Oblast on August 21. Russian forces conducted airstrikes on Hulyaipole and east of the city near Olhivske and Chervone.[36] The Russian Defense Ministry claimed that Russian forces struck a Ukrainian ammunition depot in Charivne, southwest of Hulyaipole.[37] Russian forces also targeted Nikopol, Marhanets, Vyshchetarasivka, and Illinka on the right bank of the Dnipro River, Myrivske on the northern outskirts of Kryvyi Rih, and the Zelendolsk and Apostolove hromadas, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast overnight on August 20-21 with heavy MLRS fire.[38] Russian forces continued heavy shelling throughout the line of contact.[39]
Ukrainian officials expressed continued concern about a possible Russian provocation at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) in the coming days. Ukrainian nuclear energy company Energoatom reported that Russian forces again shelled the ZNPP on August 20, damaging a personnel overpass into the power units.[40] Energoatom also warned on August 21 that the ZNPP remains at risk of radiation leakage but stated that the plant continues to operate.[41] Ukraine’s Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that Russian occupation authorities extended a short-term break for Ukrainian ZNPP employees and have brought in Russian nuclear energy company Rosatom employees and more military equipment to the ZNPP grounds.[42] GUR warned that Russian forces may be trying to disconnect the ZNPP from Ukrainian power systems, which GUR claims could increase the risk of a disaster at the plant.[43] Ukrainian Melitopol Mayor Ivan Fedorov stated on August 20 that Russian forces transported powerlines and oil barrels to Melitopol to prepare to connect the ZNPP to the Russian energy system, stealing energy from Ukraine.[44]
Russian forces launched five Kalibr missiles toward Odesa Oblast overnight on August 20-21. Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported that Ukrainian air defenses intercepted two missiles and that the remaining three missiles struck open land and did not start fires.[45] The Russian Defense Ministry claimed that Russian forces struck complexes containing HIMARS in Maiorske, Odesa Oblast, but there is no evidence that the missiles struck military targets.[46]
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“Ukraine is the most corrupt country in Europe after Russia. Ukraine ranked 130th among 180 countries in the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) 2017
A former member of Russia’s Duma who was expelled for anti-Kremlin activities has claimed that Russian partisans were allegedly behind a car bomb which blew up the daughter of one of Vladimir Putin’s close political allies on the outskirts of Moscow.
Speaking in Kyiv, where he is based, Ilya Ponomarev alleged the explosion on Saturday evening was the work of the National Republican Army, which he claimed was an underground group working inside Russia and dedicated to overthrowing the Putin regime.
The Guardian has not verified the authenticity of Ponomarev’s claims. Russian commentators have blamed Ukraine for the attack, a claim Kyiv strongly denies.
“This action, like many other partisan actions carried out on the territory of Russia in recent months, was carried out by the National Republican Army (NRA),” Ponomarev said. He was speaking in a 7pm broadcast on February Morning, a Russian-language opposition TV channel he launched in Kyiv earlier this year.
He added: “A momentous event took place near Moscow last night. This attack opens a new page in Russian resistance to Putinism. New - but not the last.”
The blast killed Darya Dugina, the 30-year-old daughter of the Russian political commentator and far-right ideologue Alexander Dugin, both of whom had been sanctioned by the UK and US for acting to destabilise Ukraine.
Ponomarev said partisans inside Russia were ready to conduct further similar attacks against high-profile Kremlin-connected targets, including officials, oligarchs and members of Russia’s security agencies.
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