Don’t expect any public celebratory groupings that will be vulnerable to attack, even as numerous warnings have been issued to consular personnel in Kyiv.
Key Takeaways
- Russian government sources confirmed that Russian authorities are bringing Ukrainian children to Russia and having Russian families adopt them. The forcible transfer of children from one group to another “with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group” is a violation of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.
- Russian authorities are deploying security forces to Luhansk Oblast likely in response to waning support for the war and growing unwillingness to fight among Luhansk residents. This deployment diverts these forces from operations elsewhere in Ukraine, likely contributing to the broader Russian failure to translate limited tactical gains into operational successes.
- Russian officials may have conducted a false flag event in Donetsk City to justify attacks against Ukrainian government buildings on Ukrainian Independence Day.
- Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks northeast and south of Bakhmut, on the northwestern outskirts of Donetsk City, and southwest of Donetsk City.
- Russian forces made limited gains east of Mykolaiv City and in northwestern Kherson Oblast.
- Ukrainian forces continued to strike Russian military assets and ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in Kherson Oblast.
- Russian federal subjects (regions) are continuing to increase one-time enlistment bonuses for recruits, and are likely recruiting personnel with no prior military experience for specialist positions.
- Ukrainian partisan activity continues to disrupt Russian occupation activities.
www.understandingwar.org/…
Supporting Effort #1—Kharkiv City (Russian objective: Defend ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to Izyum and prevent Ukrainian forces from reaching the Russian border)
Russian forces did not conduct any confirmed ground assaults around Kharkiv City on August 23. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces focused on maintaining current positions.[30] The Derhachi City Council reported that Ukrainian forces attempted to break through Russian defensive lines near Dementiivka, west of Kozacha Lopan, and towards Velykii Prokhody and Tsupivka, all north of Kharkiv City, which may suggest that Ukrainian forces are continuing limited ground attacks to contest Russian-held lines in northern Kharkiv Oblast.[31] Russian forces conducted airstrikes near Pytomnyk, Kostyantynivka, and Verkhnii Saltiv.[32] Russian forces continued shelling Kharkiv City and settlements along the line of contact.[33]
www.understandingwar.org/...
Russian authorities are deploying security forces to Luhansk Oblast likely in response to waning support for the war and growing unwillingness to fight among Luhansk residents. The LNR Internal Ministry reported on August 23 that LNR Internal Ministry personnel conducted joint patrols with consolidated police detachments from the Internal Ministries of St. Petersburg and Leningrad Oblast in Starobilsk, Shchastya, and Stanystia, occupied Luhansk Oblast.[5] The LNR Internal Ministry also reported on August 22 that Rosgvardia (Russian national guard) units conducted security for Russian Flag Day celebrations in Starobilsk.[6] Ukraine‘s Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported that Rosgvardia elements in Dovzhansk (formerly Sverdlovsk), Luhansk Oblast are not subordinate to the local LNR forces and that Rosgvardia conducted a search of an LNR official in Dovzhansk.[7] The deployment of Russian security forces to police-occupied areas of Luhansk Oblast supports ISW’s previous assessment that LNR residents and possibly militia forces may be unwilling to continue fighting now that they have reached the Luhansk Oblast borders.[8] Recent intensified Russian efforts to forcibly mobilize residents in Luhansk likely exacerbated this disillusionment, and Russian authorities may be increasing Russian security forces’ presence in Luhansk to suppress any internal instability and/or because they are losing confidence in indigenous Luhansk forces.[9]
Russian authorities’ deployment of Rosgvardia elements to security duties in occupied Luhansk Oblast diverts these forces from operations elsewhere in Ukraine, likely contributing to the broader Russian failure to translate limited tactical gains into operational successes. ISW previously assessed that Russian forces had likely exhausted their momentum from territorial gains around Avdiivka and Bakhmut, Donetsk Oblast – a very small section of the whole Ukrainian theater – partially due to their inability to allocate sufficient resources to offensive operations.[10] LNR forces’ unwillingness to fight in the war, coupled with Rosgvardia forces’ presence in the rear instead of near the front will likely contribute to continued Russian failures to make significant territorial gains.
Russian officials may have conducted a false flag event in Donetsk City on August 23 to justify attacks against Ukrainian government buildings on August 24, Ukrainian Independence Day. Social media networks in Donetsk City reported that a strike caused damage to the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) administrative building, where DNR Head Denis Pushilin works.[11] Pushilin was reportedly absent at the time of the strike. Russian media framed the attack as a direct Ukrainian strike on a DNR government building, potentially to set information conditions for retaliatory strikes against Ukrainian government buildings on Ukrainian Independence Day.[12] Ukrainian government authorities previously warned government workers in Kyiv to work from home the week of August 22 to 26 and cited concerns that Russian forces will target Ukrainian government assets as part of an extended missile and artillery campaign on Independence Day.[13] Russian-backed head of Kherson’s occupation administration Kirill Stremousov also claimed on August 22 that his administration was preparing for Ukrainian provocations on Independence Day, which could have been conditions-setting for a false-flag attack.[14]
www.understandingwar.org/...
Supporting Effort #2—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Defend Kherson and Zaporizhia Oblasts against Ukrainian counterattacks)
Russian forces made limited territorial gains east of Mykolaiv City and in northwestern Kherson Oblast. The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces took control of Blahodatne (which the Russian MoD referred to as Komsomolske) about 45km due east of Mykolaiv City.[34] The Russian MoD added that Russian forces have established a 12 square km zone of control around Blahodatne by advancing three kilometers into Ukrainian defenses. Geolocated footage posted on August 22 also showed Russian forces reportedly firing TOS-1A thermobaric artillery systems at Ukrainian forces in the northern part of the settlement on an unspecified but likely recent date.[35] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on August 22 that Russian forces had unspecified “partial” success in the direction of Blahodatne, and Russian forces likely advanced into the settlement.[36] The Russian MoD also claimed control over Blahodativka, near the Ukrainian bridgehead over Inhulets River, and unspecified settlements in its vicinity.[37] Geolocated footage showed Ukrainian forces striking a Russian BMD-2 airborne infantry fighting vehicle in Blahodativka, which indicates that the settlement is contested.[38] The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces advanced northwest of Oleksandrivka, approximately 38km west of Kherson City, and reached the Kherson-Mykolaiv Oblast administrative border.[39] ISW cannot independently verify this claim, for which the Russian MoD did not provide visual evidence.
Ukrainian military officials claimed several strikes on Russian positions, ammunition depots, and ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in Kherson Oblast. The Ukrainian Southern Operational Command reported that Ukrainian missile and artillery units destroyed the ammunition depot and command post of the Russian 247th Airborne Assault Regiment of the 7th Guards Air Assault Division in Chornobaivka northwest of Kherson City and struck the command post of the 331st Guards Airborne Regiment of the 98th Guards Airborne Division in Novovoskresenke just south of the Kherson-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border.[40] Elements of the 331st Regiment had previously operated near Hostomel, Kyiv Oblast, in February and March and suffered heavy losses.[41] It is unclear how long elements of the 331st Regiment have been operating in Kherson Oblast.[42] Elements of the 247th Regiment have been operating in Kherson Oblast since February 24, the first day of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[43] The Ukrainian Southern Command also confirmed Ukrainian strikes on the Antonivsky and Kakhovka bridges over the Dnipro River, and the destruction of a Russian ammunition depot in Kakhovka on August 22.[44]
Russian forces are attempting to repair damaged GLOCs across the Dnipro River, but Ukrainian forces will likely continue to strike Russian attempts to establish a river crossing. The UK Defense Ministry reported that Russian forces likely started to move barges into position to construct a substantial floating bridge over the Dnipro River immediately neat the Antonivsky road bridge between August 20 and August 21.[45] ISW has previously reported that Russian forces have been using barges to transport unknown equipment between August 17 and August 22.[46] Advisor to the Kherson Oblast Administration Serhiy Khan also noted that Russian forces are building a ”weird construction” under the Antonivsky Bridge and assessed that Russian forces are constructing a pontoon bridge.[47] Russian improvised attempts to improve GLOCs will remain vulnerable to Ukrainian HIMARS strikes.
www.understandingwar.org/...
Since the onset of the Russian invasion, one-third of Ukrainians have been forced from their homes. This has created one of the largest human displacement crises in the world.
According to the UN refugee agency, UNHCR, there are more than 6.6 million refugees across Europe and some seven million internally displaced within Ukraine. The EU has granted Ukrainians the right to stay and work for up to three years in the 27-member state area.
It is mostly women and children who have fled Ukraine, as men aged between 18 and 60 have been instructed to remain and fight.
Since late February the UN has recorded 11.1 million border crossings leaving Ukraine and 4.7 million crossings returning back into the country.
The map below shows where people have been fleeing.
www.aljazeera.com/...
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Ukraine is bracing for possible Russian strikes as it marks its independence day and 31 years since the end of Soviet rule. Authorities have cancelled celebrations in Kyiv as officials warn that Russia is preparing to attack the capital. Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelenskiy, said he had information from Ukraine’s intelligence services and international partners that there was an increased threat, as the US said it believed Russia would target civilian and government infrastructure in the next few days. Ukraine’s defence ministry advised Ukrainians to be especially careful, citing the threat of missile attacks and “provocations” from Russia.
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Many civilians were attempting to leave Kyiv amid fears of a Russian attack, according to an adviser to Ukraine’s president. Alex Rodnyansky said people were worried and that there was “certainly some concern” an attack may strike the centres of decision-making on Wednesday. Russia and the Putin regime “are really obsessed with dates and symbols, so it would be logical to be on the lookout and be prepared for independence day to be attacked”, said Andriy Yusov, the head of the ministry’s intelligence directorate.
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Zelenskiy has warned Russia of a strong response to any independence day attacks. Russia “will receive a response, a powerful response”.
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Zelenskiy said Ukraine will not agree to any proposal to freeze the current frontlines in order to “calm” Moscow, which controls about 22% of Ukraine including Crimea. “At the point where we are, we are not ready for a ceasefire. We explained that there will be no Minsk-3, Minsk-5, or Minsk-7. We will not play these games, we have lost part of our territories this way … it is a trap,” he said during a press conference after a summit of the Crimea Platform in Kyiv.
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Zelenskiy also vowed to return Crimea to Ukraine, saying it would become part of the EU along with the rest of the country. “We will return Crimea, because it is our territory. In any way we decide. We will decide it on our own, without consulting any other state. It all began with Crimea, and it will end with Crimea.”
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The UN nuclear watchdog said it would visit the Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant in Ukraine “within the next few days if ongoing negotiations succeed”.
www.theguardian.com/...
There seems to be general agreement that Putin’s best chance is to hang on until winter, and then hope that cold temperatures and high fuel costs push the West, particularly Germany, to pressure Ukraine into making concessions and stopping the war. It is not clear if this will work. NATO’s rhetoric on the war continues to be strongly supportive of Ukraine. Russia’s war crimes in Ukraine will also make it hard for Germany, given its past, to twist Ukraine’s arm just because of inflation.
Ukraine’s best chance, though, is to actually break the stalemate, at least somewhat, before winter. Hence its much-hyped counteroffensive against Kherson. By retaking a significant metropolis and moving the frontlines on the map, Ukraine would boost Western confidence that it can win without a long war.
Russia cannot defeat Ukraine, but it can demoralize its backers. This is the difference between a stalemate that turns against Russia in the medium term on the battlefield, or in the long term in the form of an insurgency.
www.military.com/...
The Russian state — under Putin and before him — has a long history of manufacturing or manipulating events to suit its agenda. In 1999, then-Prime Minister Putin notoriously seized upon a series of bloody terrorist bombings in Moscow and the heartland to launch a new war against the rebellious Chechens, whom he blamed for the attacks; his hard-line response boosted his own power and his subsequent revival of the police state. To this day, however, the FSB has failed to provide an adequate explanation for a bomb that was discovered to have been planted by its own operatives. (The security service dismissed the incident as part of a “training exercise.”) We may never know the full truth.
Could Russians have carried out the attack on Dugin? A mob hit of some kind, perhaps? There is another possibility: Fearing a public backlash, Putin has so far notably hesitated to declare a general mobilization that might give Russia an even greater advantage in Ukraine. A gruesome attack on a prominent “patriot” right in the suburbs of the capital could be just the thing to whip up flagging public enthusiasm for a bloody conflict that has already dragged on for much longer than anyone in Russia anticipated.
www.washingtonpost.com/...
The war illustrated the resilience of Putin's regime
Despite sanctions and military losses, Kremlin narratives about Ukrainian ultra-nationalism and the existential NATO threat have durably increased public support for Putin, his Cabinet and even the unpopular State Duma /2
The war shows that hardline nationalists pose a greater challenge to Putin than liberals
They pushed him to go all the way to Kyiv and urged him to reject diplomacy with Ukraine, while liberals went underground. They are now pushing for a general mobilization of society /3
Russia is now a totalitarian state
Silence is dissent by other means in Putin's Russia, public loyalty to the war is essential to avoid being a fifth column. However, it is still personalist in nature around Putin, it embraces fascist ideas but is not inherently ideological /4
Sanctions have derailed Russia's development but not caused an economic implosion
The GDP decline is shallower than the 2008 financial crisis and Russia's weaponization of food and energy have prevented a 1990s-style depression. But Russia's long-term outlook is bleak /5
The war exposed inequalities between Russia's regions
The poorest and autonomous regions of Russia, such as Dagestan and Chechnya, have suffered disproportionate costs from the war, while large cities like Moscow and St. Petersburg have been much less impacted /6
Russia's efforts to sow division in the West are more bark than bite
Separatist movements, the far-right and far-left repeat Russia's talking points, but Russian election interference and ability to lobby for diluted sanctions are overrated threats /7
Russia's influence in the post-Soviet space is at a historic low
Only Belarus backed the war, as treaty allies like Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, have stayed neutral. Cooperation against sanctions is uneven as well. Eurasian integration is in crisis /8
Russia's overseas military presence will survive the war
Despite heavy losses in Ukraine, Russia has kept its influence in Syria, Libya, Mali and the Central African Republic. The Wagner Group and local proxies and surrogates ensure its interventions are feasible /9
Russia's soft power in the Global South is durable
Disinformation about Western sanctions, opposition to Western unilateralism, conservative values-based outreaches and authoritarian solidarity have kept its influence in the Middle East, Africa and Latin America /10
Multipolarity is a reality and not just a concept for Russia
From engaging with regional institutions, strengthening ties with China, India, Iran and Turkey, pushing for de-dollarization and expanding its array of military drills, Russia's post-Western pivot is here to stay /END
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