Battlefield progress may be moving toward that promised major counteroffensive in the south. Kos has discussed some of the Russian personnel problems with forming new, undertrained battalions.
The Kakhovka Operational Group have published a video in which it is said that the Ukrainian army broke through the first line of Russian defence in Kherson Oblast.
Source: Kakhovka Operational Group; Ukrainska Pravda sources in the Ukrainian Armed Forces; Dom TV channel
Quote: "The 109th regiment of the so-called ‘DPR’ (Donetsk People's Republic) has withdrawn from its positions in Kherson Oblast, and the Russian elite Airborne, who supported them, fled the battlefield."
www.pravda.com.ua/...
30 minutes later:
Russian President Vladimir Putin signed two decrees on August 27 in a reported effort to assist stateless peoples and residents of Donbas and Ukraine live and work in the Russian Federation. The first decree allows Donbas residents, Ukrainians, and stateless peoples to live and work in Russia indefinitely.[1] The decree also allows Ukrainian and Donbas residents to work in Russia without a permit so long as they have acquired an identification card within 30 days of the August 27 decree.[2] The order also requires that all Donbas and Ukrainian residents arriving to Russia undergo mandatory fingerprint registration and a medical examination for the use of drugs, psychotropic substances, infectious diseases, and HIV.[3]
The second decree orders Russian social services to provide social payments to individuals forced to leave Ukraine and the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republic (DNR and LNR) for Russia after February 18, 2022.[4] The decree mandates that social services provide monthly pension payments of 10,000 rubles (approximately $167) to all affected peoples, pension payments of 3,000 rubles (approximately $50) to those with disabilities or those over the age of 80, and payments of 5,000 rubles (approximately $83) to World War II veterans.[5] The decree also orders that social services pay pregnant women 10,000 rubles during pregnancy and an additional 20,000 rubles (approximately $332) when the child is born.[6] The decree excludes refugees and specifies that Russian Federal Republics must execute the payments to the parties.[7]
Russian and Ukrainian forces continued to trade claims of shelling at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, including at the Tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.[8] Russia blocked a proposal aimed at strengthening the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons on August 27 in objection to a clause concerning Ukrainian control of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant.[9] The Ukrainian Mission to the United Nations published a statement signed by a large proportion of NPT signatories at the last meeting of the conference that condemned Russian aggression in Ukraine, nuclear rhetoric, and provocative statements as “inconsistent with the recent P5 Leaders Joint Statement on Preventing Nuclear War and Avoiding Arms Races.”[10]
Russia has further begun to implement strategies similar to those used by Iran in attempt to manipulate and possibly delay an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) mission to the plant in the near future. The New York Times reported on August 27 that the IAEA had assembled a mission consisting of IAEA Chief Rafael Mariano Grossi and 13 experts from “mostly neutral countries” to visit Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant for observation next week.[11] The list notably excludes the United States and the United Kingdom, which Russia views as unfairly biased. The IAEA stated that the IAEA remained in active consultations for an upcoming mission.[12] Ukrainian official sources have reported that Russian special forces are torturing Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant employees to prevent them from disclosing safety violations to IAEA inspectors, that Russian authorities are attempting to limit the presence of Ukrainian employees at the plant, and that occupation authorities have begun collecting signatures from Enerhodar residents demanding an end to Ukrainian shelling to present to inspectors.[13] Manipulation of the nationality of inspectors and attacks on the “fairness” of IAEA inspections are tactics that Iran has long used to obfuscate its obstruction of IAEA inspections.
www.understandingwar.org/…
Key Takeaways
- Russian President Vladimir Putin issued two decrees in a reported effort to assist stateless peoples and residents of Donbas and Ukraine live and work in the Russian Federation.
- Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations northwest of Slovyansk.
- Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks southeast of Bakhmut and west and southwest of Donetsk City.
- Russian forces conducted a limited ground attack north of Kharkiv City.
- Russian forces did not conduct any reported offensive operations in Kherson or Zaporizhzhia Oblasts.
- The Kremlin likely directed a media outlet closely affiliated with Moscow to criticize the Governor of St. Petersburg Alexander Beglov for failing to incentivize recruitment to volunteer battalions within the city.
- Russian occupation authorities continued efforts to facilitate the integration of the education system in occupied territories in Ukraine according to Russian standards.
www.understandingwar.org/...
Supporting Effort #1—Kharkiv City (Russian objective: Defend ground lines of communication (GLOCs) to Izyum and prevent Ukrainian forces from reaching the Russian border)
Russian forces conducted a limited ground attack north of Kharkiv City on August 28. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces unsuccessfully attempted to improve their tactical positions near Svitlynchne, approximately 42km north of Kharkiv City, but were unsuccessful and withdrew.[32] Russian forces conducted an airstrike on Rubizhne, approximately 52km northeast of Kharkiv City, and continued using tanks, and tube and rocket artillery to shell Kharkiv City and settlements to the north and northeast.[33]
www.understandingwar.org/...
Subordinate Main Effort—Southern Kharkiv, Donetsk, Luhansk Oblasts (Russian objective: Encircle Ukrainian forces in Eastern Ukraine and capture the entirety of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks along the Kharkiv-Donetsk Oblast border on August 28. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian troops conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Dovhenke (20km south of Izyum, 24km northwest of Slovyansk) and Bohorodychne (25km southeast of Izyum, 18km northwest of Slovyansk).[14] Geolocated footage from Bohorodychne posted on August 22 shows a Ukrainian UAV destroying a Russian Auriga-1.2V portable satellite communications station, suggesting that control of the settlement remains contested.[15] Geolocated footage from Yarova (30km southeast of Izyum, 22km northeast of Slovyansk) posted on August 24 shows Ukrainian forces firing on Russian positions, affirming ISW’s previous assessments that Russian forces have been unable to conduct a river crossing of the Siverskyi Donets and move on Slovyansk from the north.[16] ISW has previously assessed that such limited Russian ground attacks south of Izyum are likely spoiling attacks intended to disrupt Ukrainian forces rather than efforts intended to take territory along an axis of advance.[17] Russian forces conducted an airstrike on Husarivka (40km northwest of Izyum, 80km southeast of Kharkiv City) and continued to target settlements along the Kharkiv-Donetsk border with artillery.[18]
Russian forces did not conduct any confirmed ground attacks toward Siversk on August 28 and continued routine shelling of Siversk and surrounding settlements.[19] Russian artillery also struck railway and civilian infrastructure in Kramatorsk.[20]
Russian forces continued ground attacks southeast of Bakhmut on August 28. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian offensives in the direction of Kodema, Vershyna, and Zaitseve and near Vesele Dolyna and Semihirya (all within 15km southeast of Bakhmut).[21] A Russian milblogger shared footage of Wagner Group forces reportedly posing in Kodema, and Deputy LNR Interior Minister Vitaly Kiselev tentatively amplified claims from social media users that Russian-led forces have taken control of Kodema.[22] ISW has previously noted the presence of proxy and Wagner Group forces near Bakhmut, but ISW cannot independently confirm the validity of claimed Russian control of Kodema at this time.[23]
Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks west and southwest of Donetsk City on August 28. The Ukrainian General Staff stated that Russian forces withdrew following failed attempts to advance in the Pervomaiske area (10km northwest of Donetsk City) and near Pavlivka (40km southwest of Donetsk City)[24]. Russian sources have made contradictory claims regarding the status of Pavlivka, alternately asserting both Ukrainian control and Russian control of the settlement.[25] Deputy LNR Interior Minister Vitaly Kiselev claimed that Russian forces advanced a couple of hundred meters in the Opytne direction (5km north of Donetsk City) on August 28. Such limited reported gains are likely discouraging for Russian-led forces already struggling with low morale, though Kiselev added that this alleged progress is “slow, but better than nothing.”[26] Russian sources reported and shared footage showing high levels of artillery activity in the Vuhledar direction (3km southwest of Pavlivka) and suggested that Marinka (15km west of Donetsk City) as a possible direction for further advances in the coming days.[27] Russian forces continued shelling west of Donetsk City and conducted an airstrike on Pervomaiske on August 28.[28]
www.understandingwar.org/...
Supporting Effort #2—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Defend Kherson and Zaporizhzhia Oblasts against Ukrainian counterattacks)
No Russian offensive operations in Kherson or Zaporizhzhia Oblasts were reported on August 28. Ukrainian military officials reported that Russian forces continued to launch airstrikes near the Ukrainian bridgehead over the Inhulets River in northwestern Kherson Oblast and northwest of Kherson City.[34] The Ukrainian Southern Operational Command reported that Russian forces launched high precision air-to-surface Kh-59 missile at a public bathroom in Novovorontsovka on the Kherson-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border.[35] The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) had previously reported that Russian forces only have 45% of missiles remaining from the pre-war arsenal, but Russian forces are reportedly continuing to use their limited stockpile of such weapons to strike civilian infrastructure in Ukraine.[36] The Ukrainian Center of Countering Disinformation reported that Russian forces in Kherson Oblast are maneuvering equipment to create the illusion of reinforcements in the region.[37]
Ukrainian forces continued to target Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs), command posts, and ammunition depots. The Ukrainian Southern Operational Command reported that Ukrainian missile units struck a Russian command post in Darivka (approximately 15km northeast of Kherson City) and that Ukrainian forces disrupted Russian GLOCs over the Inhulets River via the Darivka Bridge with missile strikes.[38] Ukrainian officials noted that Ukrainian forces struck the command post of the Russian 35th Combined Arms Army at the Sokil Plant in Nova Kakhovka.[39] Ukrainian forces also struck a Russian command post and an ammunition depot in Kherson City, and a concentration of manpower and equipment in Lyubymivka (approximately 18km east of Nova Kakhovka.)[40] Ukrainian aviation struck Russian strongholds in Soldatske and Oleksandrivka (both northwest of Kherson City), and an area of troop and equipment concentration in Vysokopillya on the Kherson-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border.[41] Ukrainian missile units also struck Russian ammunition depots in Dudchany (about 58km northeast of Nova Kakhovka) and Davydiv Brid, on the eastern bank of the Inhulets River, and a field ammunition supply point in Voskresenske (approximately 120km southeast of Kherson City).[42] Russian and Ukrainian sources published footage of smoke reportedly after the Ukrainian strikes on a bridge over the Kinka River in Oleshky, approximately 9km southeast of Kherson City.[43] Ukrainian forces have yet to confirm the strike on Russian GLOCs over Kinka River as of the time of this publication.
Russian forces continued to undertake measures to restore Russian GLOCs in Kherson Oblast. Social media footage shows that Russian forces are attempting to construct a pontoon crossing over the Dnipro River, near the damaged Antonivsky Bridge.[44] Satellite imagery published on August 27 also shows Russian forces operating two pontoon ferries near Lvove, approximately 13km southeast of Nova Kakhovka.[45] Russian milbloggers amplified footage that showed some movement on the Antonivsky Bridge on an unspecified date, claiming that Russian forces are still able to move some equipment across the bridge.[46] The footage is grainy, and it is unclear if any military equipment is moving on the bridge. The footage also shows Russian forces pulling a barge.
Russian forces continued to strike Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhia Oblasts with missiles and MLRS rockets. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian Mi-24 helicopters struck unspecified infrastructure in Nikopol with unguided missiles, and that Russian forces launched S-300 missiles and fired Grad MLRS rockets at the settlement throughout the night.[47] Russian forces also fired Uragan MLRS rockets at the Zelenodolsk Hromada (territorial community) in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[48] Zaporizhzhia City officials reported that Russian forces launched unspecified missile strikes at Zaporizhzhia City, destroying civilian infrastructure, while the Russian Defense Ministry claimed that Russian forces struck the Motor Sich production plant in the city.[49]
The British Royal Navy official newspaper NavalNews reported on August 28 that the Russian cargo ship Sparta II with S-300 air-defense systems previously withdrawn from Syria passed through the Bosphorus Strait on August 27. NavalNews indicated that the ship’s destination is Novorossiysk, just southeast of the Russian Kerch Strait Bridge to Crimea. Russian forces will likely use the S-300s to strengthen the air defense over Crimea.[50]
Social media footage reportedly showed the activation of Russian air defense systems in Cape Fiolent and near the Alupka-Simeiz area in Crimea on August 28. Russian-appointed Sevastopol Governor Mikhail Razvozhayev claimed that Russian forces shot down an unspecified drone over the sea near Cape Fiolent.[51] Russian Telegram channels also reported an explosion near Alupka which they claimed was the result of Russian air defense activation.[52]
www.understandingwar.org/…