The State of the War
Eastern Ukraine: (Eastern Kharkiv Oblast-Western Luhansk Oblast)
Russian forces continued limited ground attacks to regain lost positions along the Svatove-Kreminna line on February 1. Luhansk Oblast Head Serhiy Haidai stated on February 1 that Ukrainian and Russian forces engaged in heavy fighting near Kreminna and Svatove. Haidai added that Russian forces have not yet formed an assault group in the Svatove-Kreminna direction but are continuing to accumulate manpower and military equipment in the area.[14] A Russian milblogger claimed on January 31 that the 144th Motorized Rifle Division of the 20th Combined Arms Army of the Western Military District continued offensive operations on the Svatove-Kreminna line, with the 488th Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment reportedly advancing 800 meters into Ukrainian positions.[15] The milblogger added that elements of the 254th Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment of the 144th Motorized Rifle Division are continuing to carry out counterbattery fire against Ukrainian forces on unspecified segments of the frontline. A Russian milblogger claimed on February 1 that the 144th Motorized Rifle Division also repelled Ukrainian efforts to advance into Kreminna, targeted Ukrainian supply routes in the area, and advanced into the forests west of Kreminna.[16] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on February 1 that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults near Yampolivka (16km west of Kreminna) in Donetsk Oblast.[17]
www.understandingwar.org/...
Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian forces continued ground attacks around Bakhmut on February 1. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian troops repelled Russian attacks on Bakhmut itself; northeast of Bakhmut near Spirne (25km northeast), Rozdolivka (15km northeast), Blahodatne (5km north), Krasna Hora (5km north, and Paraskoviivka (6km north); and southwest of Bakhmut near Klishchiivka (7km southwest).[18] Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin stated that as of February 1, Russian forces still have not taken Bakhmut into an operational encirclement and denied January 31 claims from a Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) source that Russian forces took control of Sacco i Vanzetti village (17km north of Bakhmut).[19] Geolocated combat footage shows that Russian forces have made slight advances northeast of Bakhmut near Krasna Hora and on the northeastern and eastern outskirts of Bakhmut, as well as south of Bakhmut near Opytne and on Bakhmut’s southern outskirts.[20] A Russian milblogger posted video footage of a Wagner Group fighter in Blahodatne who claimed that Wagner has pushed Ukrainian forces three to four kilometers away from Blahodatne.[21] Russian milbloggers additionally claimed that Wagner has advanced along certain streets on the northern and eastern outskirts of Bakhmut itself.[22] Russian sources continued to claim that Wagner Group forces are pushing northwest of the Klishchiivka area towards Ivanivske and Bakhmut’s southwestern outskirts in order to cut the T0504 Kostyantynivka-Chasiv Yar-Bakhmut highway.[23]
www.understandingwar.org/...
Supporting Effort—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)
Russian forces are continuing to carry out disruption missions on islands in the Dnipro River delta in Kherson Oblast in an effort to prevent Ukrainian forces from gaining ground on the islands. Head of the Ukrainian Joint Coordination Press Center of the Southern Forces Nataliya Humenyuk stated on February 1 that Russian forces are increasing the number of reconnaissance and sabotage attempts in the area of the Dnipro River delta likely in an effort to simulate the threat of an escalation south of Kherson City.[31] Geolocated footage published on January 30 also likely showed the aftermath of Ukrainian artillery fire on Russian forces conducting a raid on one of the islands in the delta.[32] Humenyuk noted that Russian force composition, weather conditions, terrain, and the use of civilian boats are not sufficient to force the Dnipro River, however. Humenyuk added that there are no concentrations of the Russian special purpose forces or forces with high combat readiness that could threaten the west (right) bank Kherson Oblast. Russian forces did not have the capacity to hold western Kherson Oblast with an abundance of ammunition and elite forces due to disrupted logistics in fall 2022 and are unlikely to be able to restore lost positions in the region. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), in turn, claimed that Russian forces destroyed two motorboats and eliminated up to 10 Ukrainian servicemen near Kruhle Lake, about 5km south of Kherson City.[33]
www.understandingwar.org/...
Flashpoint’s new report on the role of open-source intelligence (OSINT) in the Russia-Ukraine war has now been released.
As Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine approaches the one-year mark, Flashpoint has released its report of ten real-life examples detailing how OSINT has helped organisations across the public and private sectors understand a hybrid war that spans cyber, physical, and informational domains.
“It has become a near imperative for just about every organisation in the world, from governments to enterprises, to be able to acknowledge and calculate their risk profiles in relation to the war,” said Andras Toth-Czifra, Senior Intelligence Analyst at Flashpoint. “And because we will likely still see changes in how this war is fought—by what means and at which targets—the importance of obtaining accurate, timely, and actionable intelligence remains essential.”
Report highlights include:
- Recruitment on the frontlines: Where the convergence of cyber and physical intelligence identifies how internet-driven communication and funding influence and enable kinetic movement and warfare.
- Cryptocurrency and illicit financing
- Destructive malware wipers
- Killnet: Russia’s favourite DDoS hacktivist collective has conducted distributed denial-of-service attacks on entities it deems to be supportive of Ukraine. Despite Killnet’s loud claims of being an ideologically motivated collective, the group still accepts commercial orders. All of those mentions of Killnet in the world’s top publications have likely brought new DDoS customers to the table.
- Battle for the Russian-Language darknet. One of the ongoing processes that Russia’s February invasion has accelerated is the fragmentation of the Russian-speaking cyber underground. This includes a rivalry that emerged over the summer between two leading competitors, RuTor/OMGOMG and WayAWay/Kraken.
- Documenting violence: For the duration of the war, eyewitnesses, military bloggers, correspondents, soldiers, and mercenaries alike have shared both textual information and visual media on Telegram and other platforms. These have been used as material for open-source investigations of the placement, activities, and identities of invading troops, as well as the atrocities committed by them. In future court proceedings on war crimes, this data could be crucial evidence.
- Iranian unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) bring strength to Russian military
- Mobilisation protests in Russia.
- Disinformation, conspiracy theories, and justification narratives:
2/ It is very likely, in the coming weeks and months, that both Ukrainian and Russian military forces will commence offensive campaigns in different areas of
#Ukraine.
3/ As I wrote in a recent article exploring the coming campaigns: "Over winter both sides will have been preparing and shaping the environment for these offensives."
4/ Further: "They will have been training soldiers, deploying units, conducting reconnaissance while seeking weaknesses to exploit in the offensives to come."
5/ Perhaps one of the most important endeavours of both sides since their major campaigns in 2022 will have been their programs to examine the key lessons from operations in 2022, and then turn them into force-wide adaptations for their 2023 campaigns.
6/ Both sides have adapted during the war. Russia, expecting to undertake a coup de main in the first days of the war, had to adapt from around D+3 to conduct combat operations. It had to reorient the mindset of its troops and adjust its logistics to do this.
7/ Ukraine has adapted its battlefield tactics, and its long range targeting and strike activities. More adaptation will occur if Ukraine receives the 150km range GLSDB.
8/ So, a vital undertaking for both sides in the lead up to their 2023 campaigns will have been to assess where they can quickly improve tactics, recon and intel collection & dissemination, force structure, C2, and fire / logistic support.
9/ Some of this learning is done away from the battlefield - particularly the operational analysis and dissemination of lessons through new training, techniques and doctrine.
10/ But ultimately, the most important 'classroom' in this war is combat. Whether it is close combat in urban environments or trench warfare, or long range combat through artillery duels and aerial combat, combat is the great teacher of soldiers.
11/ And therein lies the importance of this
@BBCNews article. It gets to the heart of the importance of learning, and of adapting more quickly (and at a higher quality) than the enemy.
12/ A Ukrainian soldier quoted in the piece states: "We understand that Russia is learning every day and changing their strategy. And I think we need to learn faster."
13/ He has described a key battlefield advantage that both sides will want to build and sustain in the lead up to, and during, the 2023 offensives: the ability to learn, to share lessons and adapt at the tactical, operational and strategic levels, and do it faster than the enemy.
14/ As Barno & Bensahel write: “preparing to adapt in the next war is just as important as preparing to fight itself.” So while tanks and munitions are vital, winning the adaptation battle, built on tactical & institutional learning, is a core part of war. End.
• • •
Norwegian academics, rights campaigners, bestselling authors and a former minister have urged Oslo to increase its support for Ukraine, saying the government must do more to help after earning billions in extra oil and gas revenue from Russia’s war.
In a letter published in the VG tabloid, signatories including the former foreign minister Knut Vollebæk, the anthropologist Erika Fatland and Henrik Urdal of the Oslo Peace Research Institute said Norway was “the only country in Europe” to be profiting from the war.
The wealthy Scandinavian country’s oil and gas revenues have soared to record levels over the past 12 months as energy prices tripled after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and Norway replaced Russia as Europe’s largest supplier of natural gas.
Norway’s prime minister, Jonas Gahr Støre, has dismissed any suggestion that the country was profiteering from the war. “It’s a notion I flatly refuse”, Støre told AFP on Tuesday, adding that a major “multi-year support package” would be announced in the coming days.
The letter acknowledged more humanitarian and military support would be coming and the value of arms supplies, in particular, was hard to calculate, but said: “Either way, Norway can afford to contribute more to Ukraine than we are doing. Far more.”
www.theguardian.com/...