Russian disinformation claims that Ukraine continues to present the West with new ultimatums. Unconditional Western support has corrupted the already brazen and unscrupulous #Kievregime to such a degree that it is openly losing touch with reality.
Yet
“The destruction of knowledge and erasure of memory has always been a war aim for those who seek to impose their own version of history on the next generation,”
The Russian military command is likely attempting to convince Putin to turn to defensive operations as well—but may be unable to bluntly deliver this message to Putin. Some ultranationalist figures argued that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) signaled efforts to recruit 400,000 contract servicemen to ensure that Russia has enough military personnel to defend existing frontlines and to efficiently freeze the current frontlines in Ukraine.[12] The Russian military command is also reportedly transferring conscripts to hold Russian lines in Crimea and may be planning to prepare other resources to ensure that Russia can retain some lines once the potential Ukrainian counteroffensive culminates.[13]
Putin’s continued insistence on Russian offensive operations in eastern Ukraine suggests that the group that wants to freeze the war along the current front lines has not fully persuaded Putin. Russian forces are continuing attritional offensives to capture Bakhmut, Avdiivka, and Marinka in Donetsk Oblast as well as limited offensive operations in Luhansk and western Donetsk Oblast, despite increasing Russian fears about the threat of a potential imminent Ukrainian counteroffensive.[21] The Russian winter offensive failed to achieve the Kremlin’s ambitious goals of seizing the Donetsk and Luhansk oblast administrative borders by March 31, but it appears that Russian forces have not subsequently deemphasized their operational focus on tactical gains, no matter how marginal and costly those gains are.[22] Russian forces suffered significant manpower and equipment losses during the winter offensive campaign that are currently constraining their abilities to maintain offensive operations along more than one axis and that will likely limit the Russian military’s ability to respond to possible Ukrainian counteroffensive operations.[23]
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This report is based on a number of assumptions about Ukrainian capabilities that ISW does not, as a matter of policy, attempt to assess or report on. It assumes, in particular, that Ukraine will be able to conduct a coordinated multi-brigade mechanized offensive operation making full use of the reported nine brigades being prepared for that operation. That task is daunting and larger than any offensive effort Ukraine has hitherto attempted (four Ukrainian brigades were reportedly used in the Kharkiv counter-offensive, for example). It also assumes that Ukraine will have integrated enough tanks and armored personnel carriers of various sorts into its units to support extended mechanized maneuver, that Ukrainian mechanized units will have sufficient ammunition of all sorts including artillery, and that Ukraine will be able to conduct long-range precision strikes with HIMARS and other similar systems integrated with and supporting maneuver operations as it has done before. It further assumes that Ukrainian forces will have the mine-clearing and bridging capabilities needed to move relatively rapidly through prepared defensive positions. ISW sees no reason to question any of these assumptions given the intensity with which Ukraine has reportedly been preparing for this operation and the time it has taken to do so, as well as the equipment reportedly delivered to Ukrainian forces by Western countries. If any significant number of these assumptions prove invalid, however, then some of the assessments and observations below will also be invalid, and the Russians’ prospects for holding their lines will be better than presented below.
Putin may be hesitant to commit to a ceasefire due to the influence of select unknown pro-war figures or out of concern for the implications for his regime’s stability. The insistence on tactical gains suggests that the pro-war camp advocating for maintaining offensives at any cost is likely still influencing Putin’s decision-making for the war. A possible shift to preparing for defensive operations ahead of a potential Ukrainian counteroffensive would likely indicate that Putin had finally rejected the pro-war camp’s views in favor of the more pragmatic group’s. The possible success of the upcoming Ukrainian counteroffensive could determine the outcome of this struggle for influence over Putin’s decisions.
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- Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin claimed that he ordered Wagner Group personnel not to capture Ukrainian prisoners of war (POWs) but instead only kill Ukrainian personnel on the battlefield.[169]
- The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces did not conduct offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on April 23.[170] Ukrainian Severodonetsk Raion Administration Head Roman Vlasenko reported that Russian forces are building fortifications around Severdonetsk and other large cities in Luhansk Oblast.[171]
- The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian servicemen and Wagner personnel engaged in a shootout in Stanytsia Luhanska, Luhansk Oblast following a dispute about responsibility for tactical miscalculations and losses.[172]
- Russian forces continue to conduct ground attacks in and around Bakhmut and along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City front.[173] Ukrainian Joint Press Center of the Tavriisk Defense Forces Spokesperson Colonel Oleksiy Dmytrashkivskyi reported on April 23 that Russian forces concentrated most of their efforts in the Avdiivka direction and conducted 28 assaults in the Donetsk direction.[174]
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Geolocated footage published on April 23 indicates that Ukrainian forces are operating in areas northwest of Oleshky on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast.[175] Kherson Oblast Occupation Administration Head Vladimir Saldo denied that Ukrainian forces have established a bridgehead on the east (left) bank as of April 23.[176]
- The Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on April 23 that Russian forces are planning to mobilize migrants from Central Asia by threating to deport migrants and revoke their Russian citizenship if they do not fight in the war.[177]
- Ukrainian Kherson Oblast Administration Advisor Serhiy Khlan stated on April 22 that Wagner Group fighters are helping Russian occupation officials assert control over the civilian population on the east (left) bank of the Dnipro River in Kherson Oblast.[178]
- A Belarusian military news outlet claimed that Belarusian forces plan to deploy Russian tactical nuclear weapons to bases where mobile launch complexes were previously located before the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Belarus from 1993 to 1996.[179]
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Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on April 22. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian ground attacks near Lyman Pershyi (12km northeast of Kupyansk) and Bilohorivka (12km south of Kreminna).[33] Russian milbloggers claimed that elements of the Russian 98th Guards Airborne (VDV) Division advanced in the forest area near Kreminna.[34] Milbloggers claimed that Russian forces conducted ground attacks towards Terny (16km west of Kreminna) and Nevske (19km northwest of Kreminna), and near Kuzymivka (13km northwest of Svatove) and Bilohorivka.[35]
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The current Russian pattern of commitment around Bakhmut suggests that the Russian military leadership is increasingly prioritizing the completion of the capture of the city before the start of the Ukrainian counteroffensive if possible. The Wagner Group continues to take heavy losses. It may well be able to complete the seizure of the city at some point. Sustaining Wagner’s advance beyond its culmination required the Russian MoD to commit VDV formations to allow Wagner to concentrate almost entirely on the urban fight. Wagner financier and chief Yevgeny Prigozhin ceded the northern and southwestern flanks to the Russian MoD and confirmed that VDV elements are supporting the Wagner main effort in Bakhmut in this way. VDV support in this area will likely enable Wagner to make more gains within the city and may persuade Ukrainian forces to withdraw. VDV units near Bakhmut are likely further removed from direct, highly attritional urban combat than Wagner elements, and will thus likely emerge from the battle for Bakhmut in substantially better shape than Wagner.
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Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian forces continued to advance around Bakhmut on April 22, although Russian forces have not completed a turning movement around the city. Geolocated footage published on April 21 indicates that Russian forces have advanced up to a section of the O0506 highway northwest of Khromove (immediately west of Bakhmut).[39] Russian milbloggers claimed that Wagner Group fighters are conducting assaults along the road in the area but reiterated that Russian forces have not encircled Bakhmut as of April 22.[40] Russian and social media sources claimed that Ukrainian forces have not been using the O0506 highway for some time because Russian forces have been heavily interdicting the road.[41] Russian and social media sources claimed that Ukrainian forces rely on roads that pass through Ivanivske and on numerous field roads in the area to supply the Ukrainian grouping in Bakhmut.[42] One Russian milblogger claimed that heavy rains washed out Ukrainian controlled dirt roads into Bakhmut making withdrawals from the city impossible.[43] Another Russian milblogger continued to claim that heavy rains are preventing wheeled vehicles from using field roads but asserted that Ukrainian forces are able to use tracked vehicles along these roads into Bakhmut.[44] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Wagner assault detachments captured three blocks in western Bakhmut.[45] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced in southern and central Bakhmut as well as closer to the Olympic reserve school in western Bakhmut, although ISW has not yet observed visual confirmation of further Russian advances within the city.[46] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Hryhorivka (9km northwest of Bakhmut), Bohdanivka (6km northwest of Bakhmut), Khromove, and Ivanivske (6km west of Bakhmut).[47]
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Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)
Russian authorities have made headway in their attempts to compel international recognition of Russian ownership over the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP). International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director-General Rafael Grossi stated on April 21 that maintenance at the ZNPP has suffered under occupation and noted that Rosenergoatom, the Russian state nuclear company that occupies the ZNPP, may undertake measures to perform maintenance tasks.[57] Grossi also stated that Ukraine has not repaired a ZNPP power line in Ukraine-held territory damaged in early March, while Russia is working to restore three powerlines connecting the ZNPP to Russian-held territory. The IAEA’s messaging resists formally acknowledging Russian ownership over the ZNPP while carving out space to acknowledge without complaint that Russian authorities are performing essential work for the ZNPP, work that Ukrainian authorities are unable to perform while Russia continues to occupy the plant. Grossi also noted damage to windows in the turbine hall of Reactor No. 4 at the ZNPP that is inconsistent with prior reports of landmine explosions.[58] Russian authorities used Grossi’s statements about the damage to claim on April 22 that a Ukrainian UAV attack damaged the turbine hall, implying that Russia is the only safe operator of the ZNPP.[59]
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