That's a startling thought, isn't it? Besides being two presidents for whom everyone knows their middle initial, what could these two men possibly have in common?
The pair share little in philosophy, demeanor, or number of functioning brain cells. But they do have a point of commonality: they both made huge, godawfully bad decisions.
And they did it for the same reason.
Let me apologize for the paucity of links in this diary. This all started from a trip to the Washington University library and a reading of a book by Yale social psychologist, Irving Janis. Janis' book, Victims of Groupthink, was published in 1972 and so far as I can tell, is out of print. But being out of print doesn't mean the book isn't brilliant (says the man who has a few dozen of his own works out of print).
It's fun to think of George Bush as an idiot. A moron. A stuttering buffoon who can't eat a pretzel without it becoming a life or death struggle. It's fun to think that his cabinet isn't much better, a bunch of blow-hard braggarts who can't go a paragraph without spitting some self-contradictory philosophy.
But you couldn't say the same thing for John. Old JFK was eloquent, thoughtful, and a respected thinker with a fine non-fiction book behind him before he ever put hand to Bible. Likewise, Kennedy's cabinet included several well known intellects -- including brother Bobby, who was generally considered the brightest light of the political family.
So what in holy hell makes Bush like Kennedy? Here's what.
In his study of the phenomena he named "groupthink," Irving Janis studied several decisions and the groups who made them. Among the decisions, was a little incident called The Bay of Pigs Invasion.
Looking back from where we are today, Kennedy seems like a knowledgeable, forceful leader. But when he entered the White House in 1961, he was one of the youngest men ever to assume the presidency. He felt more than a little uncomfortable in an office that had been home to revered figures. And there was another matter that made Kennedy uncomfortable -- a close election. The election with Nixon had been so close, that only a few votes in the Midwestern state of Illinois had tipped the balance to the Democrats. As Kennedy moved in that cold January, many papers and pundits thought his presidency would be crippled by a feeling of illegitimacy.
Waiting on the new president's desk was a plan that had been dreamed up by the man he just beat at the polls - Richard Nixon. Nixon had long been a pit bull of the anti-communist movement, and reversing the recent communist takeover in Cuba was one of Dick's obsessions. He was convinced that Castro had a weak army and a nonexistent air force. With the help of the CIA, Nixon had drawn up a plan that called for the creation of a Cuban refugees counter-revolutionary force. This force would be trained in Nicaragua, then inserted into Cuba with U.S. help. Once there, the 1,400 man force would establish a beachhead on the island, foment unrest, and eventually defeat the communist forces.
Nixon got the plan started, but was gone before it could come to fruition. Instead, the plan landed on the new president's desk with the backing of the CIA and the military. At best, they explained, we could get rid of Castro. At worst, the invaders could scatter into the hills and fight a guerilla action for years. And in any case, no one would be able to tie this irregular force to the United States.
Kennedy approved the action. Days later, 1,200 men out of the original 1,400 man force surrendered to the Cubans in the middle of the stinking swamp where they had been stranded without air support or a real plan. The other 200 men were dead.
Why? Why did an intelligent man like Kennedy agree to a plan that, in retrospect, is so chock full of holes?
Janis tied it down to these factors:
- Groupthink occurs when groups are highly cohesive. That is, a group composed of friends and people who respect each other are more prone to accept the assertions of one member without challenge. In this sort of group, everyone wants to feel "part of the family" and not risk being excluded.
- Pressure to make a quality decision causes Groupthink. The more you're trying not just to do a good thing, but to do the best thing, the more likely a group is to enter groupthink. This is especially true when a group is under a time constraint.
- A feeling of being under attack from the outside, or of lacking the respect of others, leads to groupthink. Groups in this position are out to prove themselves, to do something not only right, but big. This feeling is made worse when there are many members who are new to their positions in the group.
In these circumstances, groups tend to a few specific behaviors when making decisions.
- They examine few alternatives.
- They don't criticize ideas that come from inside the group.
- They don't consult outside experts.
- They throw out information that doesn't fit the group's ideas.
- They don't make plans for failure.
In the case of the Bay of Pigs, there was another groupthink at work. All groups, no matter who they are, tend to think of themselves as "the good guys." Assumptions were made about the behavior of Cubans because: Casto was a communist, all communist are bad guys, the people must hate being ruled by a bad guy, so they'll rally to forces sent by us -- the good guys.
It's extremely easy to see how all these ideas apply even more strongly to GWB than they did to JFK. Bush entered office under the stigma of an election in which he didn't win the popular vote and was elevated to office by action of the Supreme Court. His administration walked into the White House knowing that more than half the country thought they shouldn't be there. His inner circle was made up of men he'd known for decades, men that represented a very small cross section of ideas. Furthermore, they were regarded as light weights, gathered around a man who was commonly compared to a chimp. Despite the braggadocio that issued from the White House during the first few months of the administration, there's little doubt these men felt besieged by a public that didn't like them and didn't appreciate with them.
Hit by the pressure of 9/11 to take some action, the Bush administration took the action that rose straight from their own ideas. They ignored any factor that would mediate against their plan, dismissed any expert who bought up objections, and ignored any option but complete and immediate success. They thought we were the good guys, everyone else was bad guys, and everything would work because it had to work. They went to Iraq.
And because Saddam was a bad guy, and we were the good guys, they were certain that the Iraqi people would rise up to join us. There would be flowers raining down from windows. Dancing in the streets.
In the history of bad decisions, there are very few that rate with the American occupation of Iraq. To date, something on the order of 140,000 people have died, the great majority of them civilians. Fifteen hundred American soldiers have been served up to terrorists on a plate, while thousands more have been wounded for their efforts. The dollar cost has been enormous -- $280 billion and still rising -- but the cost to America's moral position has been even higher. Nothing has so wounded our relationship with the rest of the world as the stubborn, blind way in which we moved on Iraq.
Why Bush is not another Kennedy
If there are great similarities in the decision processes behind the Bay of Pigs and the invasion of Iraq, there are vast, inestimable difference between how George W. Bush and John F. Kennedy behaved after these horrible mistakes.
Kennedy was quick to own up to his mistake, calling it a "colossal failure" and wondering "how could I have ever been so stupid?" He publicly admitted his error and asked the forgiveness of not just the American public, but the world.
Even more importantly, John Kennedy seemed to have a firm grasp on why he had made such a bad decision. He made immediate moves to restructure the way decisions were made in his administration. There was a deliberate effort to bring outsiders into the discussions, and to change the structure of the group regularly. One of the members of the administration was designated to be a skeptic, a kind of "devil's advocate" on any issue, attacking the ideas of the others.
When the next crises came, in the form of missiles in Cuba, this new decision making process kicked into action. The Kennedy administration proved remarkably agile. They were able to quickly integrate new ideas and new facts into their thinking. They reversed their own direction several times as they looked for the right answers. At every stage, they planned for failure. At every stage, they assumed that the opposition was just as smart and determined as they were. At every stage they considered not just the practical implications of their acts, but the moral outcome.
And they won. They took what could have been a horrible disaster, and through force of will and astounding crisis management, turned it into a victory for America that paved the way for the end of the Cold War.
In how he was willing to critically examine his own thought processes and change everything about the way he made decisions, John F. Kennedy proved he was more than an ordinary man. Or even an ordinary president. This was one of the most extraordinary events of our history, and one of history's most extraordinary men.
In contrast, George W. Bush has not only failed to admit his mistakes, he has hugged them to his chest like treasures. Instead of opening up his administration to new ideas, he has exiled those few who had minor disagreements with his core group and solidified -- more like petrified -- the philosophy by which he operates.
No only has he made horrible decisions, he's been even worse at evaluating how those decisions were made. When pressure to act comes again, and it will, there is every reason to believe that Bush and his administration will generate an even bigger disaster than Iraq.
And by how he's handled his mistakes, history will show that in the end, George W. Bush was nothing at all like John F. Kennedy.