To most of the people on this board, it is self evident that things are not going well enough in Iraq to justify staying the course. However, no alternative path is self-evident. There has been a lot talk about whether or not a complete American withdrawal, or something close to it, would really best serve international, regional, or American interests. Many have predicted that if we were to withdraw from Iraq too soon the nation would descend into civil, risking that the relevant state actors (Iran & Turkey in particular) will look out for their interests through the sight of a gun. This potential for civil war and intervention by regional actors after an American withdrawal has led many to the conclusion that America must have some level of involvement in Iraq for the foreseeable future.
My purpose in this essay (other than boring you to death) is to explore a potential path to, and the ramifications of, a state failure and subsequent intervention by neighboring nations supposing a complete, or near complete, American withdrawal from the nation.
Part I
For the People, By the People - For a Very Short Time
It is clear that an Iraqi state need not be predestined to fail. Saddam Hussein ruled Iraq for about twenty-three years and endured virtually no serious internal threats to his power. However, the condition of the nation is now very different from those that have existed since the British granted the region independence in 1932.
There are three major differences between the current Iraq and the one that Saddam Inherited in 1979 that will make state failure more likely for the current Iraqi government:
- Iraq is now a multi-party democracy
- The presence of factional armed non-governmental militia's
- A weak central military
- An even poorer economy
Armed non-governmental forces in Iraq easily outnumber the government's own military personnel. The Wikipedia cites 60,000 as a February estimate, while the total number of militiamen is probably somewhat less than 200,000 (1) depending on whose estimates of the insurgency strength you believe. Furthermore, the Iraqi military and police forces are by no means above fractionalization. Police car in Baghdad are often bedecked with a green ribbon showing loyalty to the Badr Organization or a picture of al-Sadr demonstrating their fealty to the Mahadi Army, two groups that have been known to fight.
The unfortunate reality is that the Iraqi military as it now exists is not strong enough to command the obedience of all the various factions that will choose to fight the government or each other. Since the Sunni led insurgency, the Badr Organization, and al-Sadr's Mahadi Army have already shown a willingness to do just those things I conjecture that Iraq's government, in order to maintain its grip on the nation, will have to turn to the forces of those militia's most closely aligned with its aims in order to augment its meager military power.
The endorsement of the forces, no matter how successful it is at maintaining democratic rule, (I make the case later that it will end democratic rule) would be a bad thing for the Iraqi democracy since it is a violation of the constitution. Generally the violation of the highest law of the land comes back to bite you later.
After the endorsement of the militant group as a peace keeper the government would be forced to rely progressively more and more upon the Badr Organization to pacify the Sunni insurgency and possibly other belligerent groups. I feel that this is the likely course because Iraqi and US administrators already rely upon the Badr organization and some of its offshoots such as the commando Wolf Brigade to maintain control. Furthermore, there is already institutionalized support for those organizations; the Iraqi interior minister for example was formerly a high ranked member of the Badr Brigade (the Badr Organization's former title).
At this point the Badr Organization, or whichever conglomeration of militant groups the Iraqi government turns to, can go either of two basic directions. They can drift towards full inclusion in the Iraqi Army. Alternatively, and I feel this is far more likely, they can slowly take over the vast majority of military responsibilities and resources as their centralized and unaccountable command structure proves more effective at dealing with the insurgency and other threats than the democratic Iraqi government.
This slow creep will be the end of the Iraqi Democracy
Part II
The Circle Comes around Before Blowing Up
First, a Short Educational Interlude:
Samuel Huntington has explored the dynamics of Civil-Military relations in developing Nations in his essay Reforming Civil - Military Relations. Although his essay dealt with the successful reform of the relations, it does outline the ideal state of the relationship.
- a high level of military professionalism and recognition by military officers of the limits of their professional competence;
- The effective subordination of the military to the civilian political leaders who make the basic decisions on foreign and military policy;
- The recognition and acceptance by that leadership of an area of professional competence and autonomy for the military; and
- As a result, the minimization of military intervention in politics and of political intervention in the military.
Now, Back to the Business at Hand:
Clearly, an Iraqi Military under the de facto command of the Badr Organization, or any other militia, would fail to exhibit its share of these characteristics. On point number one the Badr Organization already plays roles far beyond those which militaries generally are limited to. There is no reason to believe that it will cease to be an active member of the United Iraqi Alliance (the plurality coalition in the Iraqi National Assembly), or to give up its effective administrative control of Karbala and much of Southern Iraq.
As far as the second characteristic of good relations is concerned it would be wonderful if the Badr Organization, officially franchised by the Iraqi Government, began to take orders from the proper civilian authorities but I view that as extremely unlikely. The methods of the Organization and its subsidiaries are considered by many to be highly suspect, the Woolf Brigade has been accused of mistreating Palestinian refugees, killing six Sunni clerics, and using torture to extract confessions. The Badr Organization itself is widely thought to still be taking money and possibly orders from Iran, Lionel Beehner of cfr.org says, "Al-Malaf.net, a Jordanian news site, alleges the Badr Organization still receives a monthly stipend from Tehran of roughly $3 million."
Given the reality of the situation it hardly matters how much operational autonomy the Iraqi government gives their provisional military force, if the government tries to reign them in at any point (persecuting Sunnis or waging private wars against other militias would be probable causes) the likely outcome would a be a successful coup. (2) I am confident that the coup will be a success because of the state of the Iraqi economy, as Huntington pointed out in his article on civil - military relations,
There is a coup attempt ceiling and there is a coup success ceiling, both of which can be defined more or less in terms of per-capita GNP. Countries with per-capita GNPs of $1,000 or more do not have successful coups; countries with per-capita GNPs of $3,000 or more do not have coup attempts. The area between $1,000 and $3,000 per-capita GNP is where unsuccessful coups occur, while successful coups in Nigeria, Sudan, and Haiti were in countries with per-capita GNPs under $500.
As of 2003, the Iraqi Per Capita GDP (3) was at thought by the World Bank to be somewhat above the floor at which coup attempts are successful $750. The World health Organization estimated that the GDP was only slightly more in 2002, about $721. However, the CIA Fact Book puts the 2004 GDP at a whooping $2,100.
Clearly, the latest estimates suggest that any coup attempt would be unsuccessful but I believe that those numbers are inflated by the spending of the Coalition Provisional Authority and other groups. As soon as the withdrawal eliminates the needs for translators, drivers, and other Iraqi helper staff the, and as deteriorating security without US troops stifles what little foreign investment there has been I expect Per Capita GDP will drop precipitously.
Furthermore the World Bank, which I consider to be a somewhat more reliable observer, estimates the per capita GDP at around 1,000(4), from which I would still expect it to fall, putting it well within the range in which coups can be successful.
There are also further signs that an Iraqi coup would result in the overthrow of the current Iraqi government. For example, Iraqi expressions of a desire for greater security indicate that there would be the requisite public demand for a coup to increase the efficacy of counter insurgency efforts (an ABC poll said 64% of Iraqis place regaining security as first priority - The PDF file).
The coup could potentially leave Iraq in the hands of Latin American-esque militarist regime (a junta if you will), but I think that it is far more likely a personalist regime would spring up given the Iraqi militia's devotion to a central figure as their leader. So, after hundreds of billions of dollars we would end up trading one personalist regime for another.
Part III
Persians, Kurds, & Turks... Oh My!
Disclaimer:
Up until this point, I have done my best to base my scenarios on precedent, the theories and opinions of very smart political scientists, and established fact. In this upcoming section, there will be significantly less of all three of those things, though I will try to incorporate them as much as I can. Much of the information I have to go on is statements by concerned parties meant to distort people's opinions about exactly what I am trying to write about. However, I am not a Bush Administration CIA analyst so I do have some credibility.
A series of interrelated questions to consider about the regional & domestic ramifications of a Post Coup Iraq:
- Will Iran become involved in a post coup Iraq
- What would be the results of an involved Iran?
- Will the Kurds enforce a separation from Post Coup Iraq?
- Will a separation be sufficient to engender Turkish involvement?
- What would result from Turkish involvement in Iraq?
Kurdish independence is the 300-pound gorilla where Iraq's effects upon its neighbors are concerned. Syrian, Iranian, and most notably Turkish leaders have all spoken out about their concerns and opposition to an independent Kurdish state. Currently the Kurdish elites who represented the Kurdish interests at the National Assembly have taken the line that given similar autonomy to what they had during the last decade of Saddam's rule (which the approved constitution provides) they will remain a part of the Iraqi state.
It is surprising then that Kurd's who live in the autonomous region consistently sing a very different tune in interviews, "If not today, then tomorrow," Tahir said, smiling. "If not tomorrow, the day after." Organizations such as the Kurdish National Congress agitate constantly for full Kurdish independence, and for a sovereign Kurdish state in the region. This in itself does not mean that the Kurdish region will declare itself independent of the Baghdad government. However, in Post Coup Iraq there will be the addition of a major impetus for Kurdish independence - Iranian involvement.
I have already discussed the relationship of the Badr Organization and Iran in this essay and I feel that there is no reason to suspect that the Badr Organization would severe those ties if it found itself at the head of the Iraqi government. On the contrary an inability to take large and open donations from the Iranian government while acting as a supplement to the Iraqi military strikes me as another reason for the Badr organization to organize a coup. With the aid the battle against the Sunni insurgency would become that much easier to put down (see foot note two).
Iranian involvement would give Kurdish separatists added traction since the Iranian government is noted for its suppression of the ethnic Kurds within its borders. Especially in light of the recent Shivan Qaderi incident. Iranian involvement will allow agitators to secure a quick secession by the Kurdish northern part of the state. The agitators will exclaim that it is the last real chance for Kurds anywhere to be free of the Persian/Turkish/Arab oppressors they have been living under for so long. The Kurdish government will be forced to act and the 100,000 man Peshmerga will steel itself to enforce the sovereignty of what they consider only the southern most part of Kurdistan (5).
What are the odds that Turkey or Iran (I guess Syria is possible too but I doubt it and this is already getting too long) become involved (militarily) at this point? I consider it unlikely that Iran would become involved militarily in an overly overt way. The recent posturing of their president aside Iran is trying to negotiate a beneficial deal with the EU regarding their nuclear program and invading Iraq wouldn't show much good faith. I do project that even the slightest agitation on the part of the Kurds living in Iran would result in brutal suppression and vast segments of the Iranian army would undoubtedly be mobilized along the border of "Southern Kurdistan". That said it would be a volatile situation and a false step by any party could result in overt Iranian military involvement.
Turkey's response depends entirely on the temperament of on independent Southern Kurdistan's leadership. The relationship between the Turkish and Kurdish peoples in turkey has come a long way since the 90's and the motions by Turkey towards EU membership would serve to moderate Turkish unilateral action. That said the
Turkish military will have some institutional memory of their war with the PKK and if they feel that Southern Kurdistan will become a refuge for the organization I have no doubt that they will enforce the regions subordination to the Baghdad government by force.
Knowing what I know of Kurdish regional politics (not nearly enough) I shouldn't really conjecture whether an independent Southern Kurdistan will be of the militant PKK variety or much more live and let live. Given developments in the Kurdish population as a whole I would put my money on more moderated and restrained policies. The relative lack of strength of PKK associated parties in Turkey and the apparent willingness of the Kurdish elite to compromise on autonomy in an Iraqi democracy both seem to indicate movement away from the militancy of the eighties and early nineties.
That said if there were a powerful undercurrent of PKK style militancy among the masses of Southern Kurdistan I wouldn't know about it, and that could become the driving force behind policy as well. However, given that the economy of the region has been reported as better than the economy of Iraq as a whole, I am inclined to doubt that there is the kind of unrest in the region that results in active militancy.
I have no doubt though that Iran and Turkey would fund and facilitate any efforts by Baghdad to retake the region, and if this effort is broadly successful in damaging Southern Kurdistan that could be the catalyst that the PKK or similar organizations need to take off and become a controlling force in Southern Kurdistan's politics. Then, if Baghdad does not retake Southern Kurdistan entirely, Iran and Turkey would have created the monster the feared.
Part IV
Slick Willy's Worst Case Time Line
Yes, things get less and less predictable as it goes further down but this is just postulation and inference anyways so make up your own if you want.
- American Withdrawal
- Weak Military Powerful Insurgency & Militant Groups Forces Government Reliance
- on Badr Organization or other Militia
- Badr Organization Slowly Takes over Military & Other Responsibilities
- Iraqi Government Limits Militias Responsibilities
- Coup by Militias
- Iran Backs New Authoritarian Government Monetarily
- Kurds Declare Independence
- Turkey & Iran Back Baghdad's Campaign to Retake Southern Kurdistan
- Militant Organizations Take Hold of Policy in Southern Kurdistan
- Iran or Turkey Occupy Region
- Kurds across the Region Join Militant/Terrorist Organizations
- The World Takes One More Step Away From Peace
Part V
Conclusion
The one constant result one can foresee from this chain of events is the further destabilization of the Middle East power structure. A renewed Kurdish Militant movement, replete with its own terrorist organizations, could even involve the Israelis whose defense force is the target of rumors, which suggest that it has trained and funded the Peshmerga.
However irresponsible it would be for the American military to leave Iraq now from the perspective from the perspective of the destabilization of the region there is a lot of wiggle room in assuming that things will or wont happen that far out. What I feel is the most plausibly at risk is the Iraqi democracy.
I did not want to go into Iraq and is till wouldn't knowing what I know but now that we are there it seems that the sacrifices we have made should be result in an enduring Iraqi democracy. Deciding if that is possible could take up a diary twice this long, but I feel that it is if we are prepared to accept more American deaths a trade (a moral question and one I wont touch) we can create a powerful civilian controlled Iraqi military and a vibrant Iraqi economy, mitigating the affects of the insurgency and preventing a coup.
I think that that is exactly what Bush is trying to do; I don't think he is doing it right. He needs more troops, which means international forces, which means tactful diplomacy... obviously not the Bush Administration's strongest point. But this doesn't mean we should despair and call for withdrawal, it means we should be calling for Bush to begin doing things the right way.
Foot Notes:
1) I have taken rough numbers of the various major Iraqi Militias from across the web. Of course, there are dozens or even hundreds of militias, which have memberships in the hundreds, though often they owe allegiance to one of the large militias listed below. I have used the most recent numbers whenever possible, so although estimated in 2004 have counted Peshmerga at 50,000 I have used the more recent 100,000. I have also endeavored to count only those members who are armed:
Militia name - Represented Group - Armed Force #'s - Source - Date
The Mahdi Army - Shiite - Several Thousand - Council on Foreign Relations - 11/30/05
The Badr Organization - Shiite - ? 10,000 - Council on Foreign Relations - 11/30/05
The Wolf Brigade - Shiite - 2,000 - Council on Foreign Relations - 11/30/05
Peshmerga - Kurdish - 100,000 - Council on Foreign Relations - 7/09/05
The Insurgency - Sunni, Bathist - >20,000* - US Gov via Wikipedia - Feb. 2004
*The insurgency strength is widely believed to have been low-balled at the time it was released and now is thought, by many, to be very inaccurate, current estimates are being withheld even from congress: http://www.defenselink.mil/... Some estimates have placed the troop strength of the insurgency at more than 100,000 though I suspect those are inflated.
2) Barbara Geddes in her excellent paper on democratization provided a synthesis of research on the causes of coups attempted by countries' militaries. The research supports my assertion that Iraq will befall a military coup if (when) the civilian government tries to reign in questionable behavior of the military/militia following America's departure.
Geddes says that, "officers agree to join coup conspiracies only if they believe that the civilian government prevents the achievement of their main goals" and in the case of the Badr Organization and other militias there will be a wide list of goals that will bring the civilian government into opposition with the armed forces.
(3) There is a distinction between GDP and GNP, and I regret that the most recent information I can lay my hands on is all done in terms of GDP, GNP is what Huntington used in his research and it would be far more useful to have, but alas I don't have it.
(4) Here you have to do a little bit of math, Iraq's population (CIA Fact Book) is about 26 million, and the GDP (World Bank) is about 26 billion. Therefore, per capita GDP is about $1,000.
(5) Map Of Kurdish Area's
