The vast majority of the media's attention of the explosive allegations regarding Trump focus on the “personal embarrassments” in the document. Frankly, who can blame them? PissGate is such a hilariously absurd story, it’s hard to tear your eyes away from it. But we should. Why? Well, for one, the story is a little TOO perfect, and while I desperately want it to be true (schadenfreude is the best freude, after all) I won’t deny some small part of my bullshit detector started to go when I read it. In my experience, when a story reads like an urban legend, it should often be taken with a grain of salt the size of Lot’s wife. More importantly, even if true, there’s nothing really there. Sure, it’s embarrassing. But it’s not illegal to pay people to piss on you. Not very presidential, one might say, but neither is anything else Mr. Trump does. The media should get away from this and focus on the second part of the document: The Trump campaign's direct collusion with the Kremlin. If true, this has the potential to be the biggest scandal in American political history and almost certainly should lead to jailtime for several insiders, if not Mr. Trump himself.
As big as Watergate was, the crux of it was that Nixon likely had knowledge of his campaigns burglary of the DNC office. That is exactly what happened here, x 10, except this time the burglary happened in direct collusion with a foreign hostile power, and included a quid pro quo using American foreign policy as a bargaining chip (direct involvement to weaken NATO was explicitly agreed to, according to the report). If these stories are proven, several Trump campaign insiders, if not Trump himself, should be guilty of aiding and abetting at best, and treason/espionage at worst. As Uncle Joe might say: this is a big f’ing deal.
In addition, while PissGate is likely never to be fully verified, the Trump collusion allegations seems eminently provable. According to the document, the collusion conspiracy involved at least several Trump insiders, and it’s hard to believe Trump himself was kept out of the loop. Trumps insiders don’t strike me as a particularly loyal bunch (side note to Mr. Trump: if you plan on engaging in a high stakes conspiracy with hostile foreign powers involving several people, hiring rank opportunists and raw power brokers probably isn’t the best way to go). The FBI (Assuming they’re serious about getting to the bottom of this) needs to immediately interview the four individuals who were the target of their wiretap warrant and apply hard, relentless pressure, Glengarry-Glenross style. “First one to squeal gets a deal. Second? Set of steak knives. Third? 20 years”. My guess is you’d have at least two confessions by lunchtime.
Probably the most fascinating part of this document is the inside look at Putin’s inner power circle. Many foreign policy laypersons probably assume that Putin’s hold on power in Russia is absolute. Nothing can be further from the truth. Like all dictators, Mr. Putin relies on the support of his inner circle. And the intel in the report reveals some very specific examples of a rift within his circle regarding the DNC hacks. By July 2016, for example, the document reports “extreme nervousness” about the increased attention the hacks are starting to get in the US media, and that leaders within the Kremlin were getting anxious about political blowback and that things were “starting to spiral out of control” (and if they thought that in July 2016, just imagine how they’re feeling at this very moment). The head of the Russian presidential administration (PA) Sergei Ivanov was angry at the hacks, saying Putin’s team had “gone too far” and called the black ops team “bull in a china shop” tactics. Dmitry Peskov, the presidential spokesman - an early supporter of the hacks - was said to be “scared shitless” that he would be scapegoated by Putin if things went south (side note to Mr. Peskov: things are going south. quickly). Dmitry Medvedev, current premier of Russia (and former president), was reportedly furious, suggesting he wanted good relations with the US regardless of who was president and wanted specifically to “be able to travel there, either personally or officially”. That brings up another crucial dynamic: Russian power brokers hate sanctions. Like most oligarchs, they often keep the vast majority of their wealth outside the country. To become an international pariah, unable to travel to the countries they want to go (mostly Western nations) or not be able to access their vast fortunes (mostly parked in Western nations) is simply unacceptable to them in the long term.
All in all, the picture this paints is one of a Vladimir Putin who could find himself the victim of one of the all time geopolitical backfires, severely weakened by the actions of his own hand.
Putin needs the support of his elites to stay in power, and the sanctions from 2014 have been personally unacceptable to them.. It doesn’t take a huge leap from there to the assumption that at least part of the purpose of installing a Kremlin friendly president is to eliminate or weaken sanctions. Given the recent developments, even if no more major breaks in the story happen, it seems like increased sanctions is becoming the more likely outcome, and easing sanctions is fast becoming, politically, out of the question. Given all that, and given that we know Russian elites were angry about the hacks as early as July, the question is: how must they be feeling right now? And how will this affect Putin’s grip on power? We know from the documents that private dissent is alive and well in the Kremlin and Putin does not enjoy unlimited deference. If sanctions harden, or increase, does that dissent migrate to the public square?
Whatever the result, it seems likely that Mr. Putin is not feeling quite as pleased with himself as he was as recently as a few days ago.