—
It’s what you don’t see — going on below the surface — that we ought to be wary of.
Mustering the requisite “urgency” can be a very tricky thing ...
by Sean D. Carberry, fcw.com, The Business of Federal Technology — Oct 20, 2016
On March 8, 2018, the center [Brennan Center for Justice] released an update to that report and found that not much has changed.
Jurisdictions in 41 states are using voting systems at least a decade out of date going into the 2018 elections, barely an improvement from the 2015 study, when 44 states reported long-obsolete voting tech. [...]
The report cites the increasing role of federal agencies like the Department of Homeland Security and the Election Assistance Commission as positive post-election developments. [...]
"There are a lot easier targets in the election system, whether it's registration system, election night reporting or tally servers…attacks against those systems are actually probably a lot easier," he said [Lawrence Norden, deputy director of the Brennan Center's Democracy Program].
Every time I hear some talking head say, “The Russians may have hacked into our state Voting Systems in 2016, but that did not effect the result of the Election” — every time I hear that, I cringe. How do they know that? Did they conduct surveys of how many Voters were prevented from voting due to Voter Registration problems in each state? Did the conduct “tally audits” at every step of the process, to be sure no Votes were added mysteriously? … that no Votes were flipped?
The Senate was challenged by some of these same Questions, in expert testimony, last June. Yet the invincibility myth persists — “Russia may have hacked our Voting Systems — but they just looked and did not touch.” That’s because they are ‘very polite hackers’.
—
from June 21, 2017
The Senate hearing on Russian Interference in U.S. Elections
Computer Security Researcher, J. Alex Halderman opening statement:
[...]
Fortunately there is a broad consensus among cyber security experts about measures that would make America's election infrastructure much harder to attack. I have cosigned a letter that I entered into the record from over 100 leading computer scientists, security experts, and election officials, that recommends three essential steps:
• First, we need to upgrade obsolete and vulnerable machines and replace them with optical scanners that count paper ballots. This is a technology that 36 states already use. Paper provides a physical record of the vote that simply can't be hacked. President Trump made this point well on Fox News the morning of the election. He said, “There is something really nice about the old paper ballot system. You don't worry about hacking.”
• Second, we need to use the paper to make sure the computer results are right. This is a common sense quality control. It should be routine. Using what’s known as a risk-limiting audit, officials can check a small random sample of the ballots, to quickly and affordably provide high assurance that the election outcome was correct. Only two states, Colorado and New Mexico, currently conduct audits that are robust enough, to reliably detect cyber attacks.
• Lastly, we need to harden our systems against sabotage and raise the bar for attacks of all sorts, by conducting comprehensive threat assessments and applying cyber security best practices to the design of voting equipment and to the management of elections.
These are affordable fixes. Replacing insecure paperless voting machines nationwide, would cost $130 million to $400 million dollars. Running risk-limiting audits nationally for Federal elections would cost less than $20 million a year. These amounts are vanishingly small compared to the national security improvement they buy.
For the Video clip of the above: www.c-span.org/…
And Americans need to start demanding:
• Hard-copy Paper Ballots for your Votes,
• that your State conduct verifiable “Audit Trails” tallies, as QC for your Votes,
• that States use cyber-security “Best Practice” to protect our Votes.
Here are some of those Voting “Best Practices” ... from VerifiedVoting.org:
Verified Voting Foundation: Principles for New Voting Systems
From the Election Assistance Commission (EAC), circa 2007:
Voluntary Voting System Guidelines 2.0
If you have other guidelines or standards, please add them in the comments.
— —
Just because you don’t always see the termite-hackers-icebergs, just below the surface,
— doesn’t mean they aren’t there, doing real damage … while we were napping.
Because that’s where the Bad-Actors thrive — just below the surface, where no one can see them.
—
The next time some Russian-hacking Apologist says: “Yeah but, No Votes were changed.”
Be sure to ask: “Yes but, how would you know, if they were?”
Unless your state conducts systematic Audit Trail checks, every step of the way (only 2 states do.)
Unless your state has a verifiable Paper Trail … (does your state?)
—
If one Voter is denied the right to Vote, or has their Vote canceled or flip — it DOES “effect the result of the Election” — it taints it. It poisons the well of democracy.
Even more so, if a mere 100 Voters, in certain Swing Precincts — are denied their quintessentially-American right to Vote.
Because we have been warned:
[...] it’s not a Republican thing or a Democratic thing. It really is an American thing,” Comey said. “They’re going to come for whatever party they choose to try and work on behalf of, and they’re not devoted to either, in my experience. They’re just about their own advantage and they will be back.”
In other words ... “Iceberg -- Dead Ahead!”
(Time to take evasive actions, is NOW. Perhaps even 2 years ago.)
Yet far too many are captured by the “spectacle of it all” …
Amazed that we are still getting the “Government we deserve” … after all these years.
—