Diplomats from the seven nations that negotiated the multilateral 2015 Iran nuclear deal got together last week in Vienna for what may very well be the final time to discuss possible changes in the agreement. Views regarding the probable outcome of those talks are mixed.
In short, the deal is an exchange. Iran submits to regular international inspections of its nuclear facilities and greatly limits its enrichment of uranium. It also shut down a reactor capable of producing plutonium. For their part of the exchange, other nations, including the United States, have ended their nuclear-related economic sanctions.
But the U.S. did not take those sanctions off the books. Instead, periodically, as mandated by Congress, the president waives the sanctions in order to meet U.S. obligations under the nuclear deal as long as Iran is in compliance. So far, the international inspectors have repeatedly said Iran is complying. And so far, the waivers have been issued. But by the time the next deadline comes up on May 12, Republican Sen. Bob Corker, chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations and a foe of the deal, predicts that Trump will withdraw from it.
As Trump sees it, the Iran deal is “terrible,” “the worst deal ever.” Since his campaign in 2016, he has said he wants it renegotiated in a way that not only permanently bars Iran from nuclear-related processing, but also prohibits certain other activities. The desired changes include even more intrusive inspections, particularly at military bases, and constraints on Iran’s regional interactions, some of which the United States labels terrorist.
If Iran refuses to accept whatever changes are demanded, then harsh sanctions would again be imposed. In the midst of these demands for a re-engineered deal over Iran’s nuclear program, Trump is strongly considering assisting Saudi Arabia to build 16 nuclear reactors. Critics, including Israel, argue that the Saudis would thus put themselves in a position to build their own nuclear weapons. Israel secretly built its own arsenal of nukes, obtaining fissile material from what was supposedly a research reactor. Gardiner Harris reports:
Representatives for the United States and Europe have mostly agreed on a set of penalties they would impose if Iran develops an intercontinental ballistic missile — a weapon that the Western negotiators agree is useful only to carry nuclear payloads.
But they remain far apart on how to deal with provisions in the accord that currently allow Iran to resume some civil nuclear activities in 2025 and 2030. Washington wants to shut down those activities permanently; the Europeans believe this would renege the terms of the deal. Bridging this disagreement — over what is known as the deal’s sunset provisions — is [the top goal of Brian H. Hook, the chief American representative to the talks].
An adviser to the Trump regime, Mark Dubowitz, the CEO of the right-wing Foundation for Defense of Democracies, said there is no wiggle room on these provisions. “On sunsets,” he said, “I think there can be no compromise. They have to be eliminated.”
That is out of the question for Iran. In fact, President Hassan Rouhani has said no to any revisiting of the terms of the deal. He has also warned that Iran might restart its uranium enrichment program if the other nations in the deal try to impose changes. And even if the Europeans and Americans agree to changes, two nations involved in the original negotiations for the deal—Russia and China—likely would not.
It seems highly unlikely that the Iran agreement will be modified anywhere nearly as much as Trump and its other foes would like to see. It’s not only the Iranians, Russians, and Chinese who would refuse to go along with the full range of changes he wants, but also the Europeans.
There’s another element to this situation. Trump and North Korean Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un are preparing to meet soon, possibly right around the time of the May 12 deadline on a waiver of sanctions on Iran. Philip Gordon writes that this could harm any hope of progress on the matter of North Korea’s nukes.
Unilaterally killing the Iran deal would not only signal to Kim that he cannot count on any agreement with the international community — even one endorsed unanimously by the U.N. Security Council and certified repeatedly by the International Atomic Energy Agency — but it would in effect be telling Pyongyang that an Iran-like compromise is not good enough for Trump. Think about that: The current Iran nuclear deal requires intrusive inspections throughout the country permanently; the elimination of plutonium production and reprocessing for at least 15 years; strict limits on the amount and quality of enriched uranium for 15 years; and a permanent ban on any efforts to seek, acquire, or work on nuclear weapons, all while most U.S. economic sanctions remain in place. Why would Trump want to convey a message to Kim that such a deal is simply not good enough? And that to get a deal Pyongyang must also change its regional behavior, halt its ballistic missile program, accept continued U.S. economic sanctions, and allow U.N. inspectors access to North Korean military bases and Kim family residences? Does anybody calling for Trump to kill the Iran nuclear deal really imagine Kim going for this? Or that he would consider doing so even if Iran somehow agreed to all of Trump’s demands?
Bad enough that Trump is causing grave damage to domestic programs. Abroad, the Trump Doctrine seems to be built on know-noithingism and reckless stupidity.