Russia tries to spin the latest call between Biden and Putin, perhaps because defensive strike weapons are already deployed in Ukraine.
@PressSec says President Biden "urged Russia to de-escalate tensions with Ukraine. He made clear that the United States and its allies and partners will respond decisively if #Russia further invades #Ukraine."
In short, Moscow appears to be setting the stage for launching a major conventional assault on Ukraine, even though the United States and NATO have shown a willingness to sit down and discuss Kremlin concerns.
- We believe the United States should, in closest consultation with its NATO allies and with Ukraine, take immediate steps to affect the Kremlin’s cost-benefit calculations before the Russian leadership opts for further military escalation. This means raising the costs that would ensue should the Russian military launch a new assault on Ukraine, building on the excellent set of measures the Biden administration has already laid out: enacting punishing sanctions on Moscow, sending major military supplies to Ukraine, and strengthening NATO’s force posture on its eastern flank.
- The administration should continue its good work with the European Union and other partners to ensure agreement on the elements of a response to any Russian assault on Ukraine, regardless of the extent or form of Russia’s escalation. Such a response would include a package of major and painful sanctions that would be applied immediately if Russia assaults Ukraine. Ideally, the outline of these sanctions would be communicated now to Moscow, so that the Kremlin has a clear understanding of the magnitude of the economic hit it will face. In particular, Washington should consult with Berlin and secure German agreement that it would prevent Nord Stream 2 from going into operation in the event of a Russian attack, making clear that otherwise the administration will not again waive sanctions on the pipeline.
- The most important thing that the West can do now is to enhance the deterrent strength of Ukraine’s armed forces by providing military assistance and equipment on an expedited basis. For the Kremlin, a large invasion of Ukraine works only if Russian forces are able to seize and hold Ukrainian territory without sustaining significant and constant casualties. Western countries should act now to equip Ukraine’s military and territorial defense units with additional capabilities that can impose such costs.
- Western military officials should consult urgently with their Ukrainian counterparts as to what assistance and equipment the Ukrainian military needs and could most quickly integrate into its operations to bolster its defensive strength. Such assistance might include additional Javelin anti-armor missiles and Q36 counter-battery radar systems as well as Stinger and other anti-aircraft missiles. The Biden administration should also encourage NATO allies to do more to enhance Ukraine’s defensive capabilities, making clear that the entire NATO Alliance stands together in opposing Russian aggression.
- We believe that NATO should act now to begin bolstering its military presence on its eastern flank and communicating to Moscow that Russia’s escalation would bring a substantial number of US and Allied forces and a permanent presence in the Baltic states and Black Sea region. NATO should also signal to Moscow that any additional deployments could be reconsidered if/when the current crisis abates.
- The West should also widen its political counteroffensive to retake the initiative from Moscow as it tries to use the threat of force to intimidate Ukraine, Europe, and the United States into acquiescing to its demands, many of which are plainly unjustified and unacceptable. The Biden administration should seek a Group of Seven (G7) statement at the head of state level condemning Moscow’s threat of wider war against Ukraine and work with allies and partners to use other fora, including the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and possibly the United Nations, to highlight the unacceptability of Russian military action and coercive threats.
www.atlanticcouncil.org/...
- Ukraine is a national security threat that pins down much of the Russian Ground Forces needed to defend the Donbas. Either Russia will try to force changes to Ukraine's constitution/political orientation or force NATO to stop strengthening its military to "solve" that threat. 2/
- A Russian military operation would be much more costly if Ukraine has cruise and ballistic missiles that could target important Russian bases and cities, and future Russian coercion efforts would be weaker if Ukraine had those kind of capabilities. 3/
- I think Moscow believes that Kyiv won't make any concessions unless they are forced to by Washington or by Russian military force. Putin is currently trying with the former (and not attempting negotiations with Kyiv) and will likely attempt the latter if it fails. 4/
- Russia has broader security concerns with NATO and is using this as an opportunity to try to solve some of those with the threat of force against Ukraine. But the events in Ukraine are the more pressing concern for Moscow (and NATO membership isn't the proximate cause). 5/
- Russia's current actions are not routine. They have given:
- 1) specific demands
- 2) tied to a short timeline
- 3) promising a "military and military-technical" response
- 4) with substantial military capabilities capable of an escalation including an invasion on short notice. 6/
- They are deliberately backing themselves into a corner where their credibility will be questioned if they don't achieve concessions or use military force. These are classic elements of a compellence strategy, which usually requires force if the target doesn't change its behavior.
- There are different tiers of force that can be used as part of compellence, so a large-scale invasion isn't the only possible option. Russia could shoot down TB2, target Ukrainian artillery/MLRS used in the Donbas, or unleash its long-range fires on the Ukrainian military. 8/
- The key questions:
- -how ambitious are Russia's objectives?
- -how much force does Moscow believe it has to use to force Kyiv to make those concessions?
- I'm not sure, but Russia is making it clear it considers the current events unacceptable and worthy of using force to stop them.
- The spring buildup failed to achieves Russia's aims at deterring these steps, and the HMS Defender incident, Ukrainian TB2 strike in the Donbas (the footage was released publicly), and NATO bomber flights over Ukraine/Black Sea, etc. are public embarrassments for Moscow. 10/
- I think there are restraints for Moscow about what kind of military force is possible (i.e. I think killing civilians or damaging Ukrainian cities would be very unpopular among Russians), but Russia can inflict serious pain on the Ukrainian military without a larger invasion. 11/
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So when we try to assess Moscow's cost-benefit analysis of using force against Ukraine we need to not just assess the costs of an escalation for Russia, but also their perceived costs of *not* "solving" this issue now, which they likely think is greater.
- We shouldn't forget about the Karabakh example for Moscow and Kyiv. Azerbaijan was determined to retake those regions, spent decades of heavy defense spending and arms imports to prepare, and then attacked when the balance of power shifted with the support of a NATO member. 12/
- I don't know what Putin is thinking, but Russia's rhetoric and actions are in line with an attempt at compellence and there will be a credibility cost if they don't act or achieve concessions. Since the latter is unlikely, I think a military escalation is more likely than not.13/
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