It’s always economic in the last instance. Russia and its oligarchs are motivated by money and resources. Global capitalism ultimately will allow them to take Ukraine, the only variable is time, moral turpitude be damned.
Fossil fuel profits and seizing Ukraine’s resources must be the calculation being made as a worthy tradeoff against crippling sanctions like removing them from SWIFT, the strategic international financial messaging service. Toppling a weak government seems easier when MSM is already talking about Zelensky fleeing into exile in Poland. OTOH Michael McFaul thinks this is the end of Putin and Putinism.
Unfortunately MSM now assumes that degrading the Ukrainian military will happen quickly, especially with the aid of the Belarus military. As Afghanistan proved, winning hearts and minds was more difficult. Current reporting now has armored vehicles crossing the Ukrainian border from Belarus.
There will be an insurgency, casualties and carnage will result, and to some experts may last as long as 90 days or more. There won’t be a Vichy version of Ukraine’s government, as Putin wants that renewed, greater Russia to gain power and influence for its ruling elite.
It is the second largest country by area in Europe by area and has a population of over 40 million - more than Poland.
Ukraine ranks:
1st in Europe in proven recoverable reserves of uranium ores;
2nd place in Europe and 10th place in the world in terms of titanium ore reserves;
2nd place in the world in terms of explored reserves of manganese ores (2.3 billion tons, or 12% of the world's reserves);
2nd largest iron ore reserves in the world (30 billion tons);
2nd place in Europe in terms of mercury ore reserves;
3rd place in Europe (13th place in the world) in shale gas reserves (22 trillion cubic meters)
4th in the world by the total value of natural resources;
7th place in the world in coal reserves (33.9 billion tons)
Ukraine is an important agricultural country:
1st in Europe in terms of arable land area;
3rd place in the world by the area of black soil (25% of world's volume);
1st place in the world in exports of sunflower and sunflower oil;
2nd place in the world in barley production and 4th place in barley exports;
3rd largest producer and 4th largest exporter of corn in the world;
4th largest producer of potatoes in the world;
5th largest rye producer in the world;
5th place in the world in bee production (75,000 tons);
8th place in the world in wheat exports;
9th place in the world in the production of chicken eggs;
16th place in the world in cheese exports.
Ukraine can meet the food needs of 600 million people.
Ukraine is an important industrialised country:
1st in Europe in ammonia production;
Europe's 2nd’s and the world’s 4th largest natural gas pipeline system;
3rd largest in Europe and 8th largest in the world in terms of installed capacity of nuclear power plants;
3rd place in Europe and 11th in the world in terms of rail network length (21,700 km);
3rd place in the world (after the U.S. and France) in production of locators and locating equipment;
3rd largest iron exporter in the world
4th largest exporter of turbines for nuclear power plants in the world;
4th world's largest manufacturer of rocket launchers;
4th place in the world in clay exports
4th place in the world in titanium exports
8th place in the world in exports of ores and concentrates;
9th place in the world in exports of defence industry;
10th largest steel producer in the world (32.4 million tons).
Ukraine matters. That is why its independence is important to the rest of the world.
~End
Call me a nerd but I found this very interesting.
• • •
What happens to Russian autocracy after Putin, however, is more uncertain. The current regime is deeply tied to Putin personally. Strikingly, Putin has failed at building an effective political party; United Russia bears little resemblance to the CPSU or the Chinese Communist Party today. Those leading the “power” ministries—the so-called siloviki—will try to sustain Putinism after Putin. But we should not overestimate their capacities, since Putin does not maintain power only through repression, and repression is all that these ministries know.
Russian economic elites are divided. Those enriched by Putin’s rule want him to stay in the Kremlin. Those who acquired their fortunes before Putin, as well as those in the real private sector who became wealthy by navigating cautiously around his regime, have little enthusiasm for the current political order. Companies reliant on international markets and capital for expansion are especially impatient with Russia’s current isolation and Western sanctions resulting from Putin’s belligerent foreign policies. Amazingly, new political movements offering an alternative future have survived the truly treacherous late Putin years, demonstrating the appeal of their ideas, the resilience of their convictions, and the strength of their political, organizational, and media skills. There is a reason Navalny sits in prison today; Putin fears him. Those empowered or enriched by Putin will fear Navalny and others like him even more in a world without Putin.
Finally, Russian society is one of the world’s richest and most highly educated that is still ruled by dictatorship. How long will Russia buck the centuries-long trend of modernization fostering democratization? In most of Europe, earlier waves of democratic failure planted seeds for subsequent success. Russia is a European country. Even the cultural pull of joining—or more precisely, returning to—Europe might foster democratic change in the long run, as long as illiberal populist movements across the continent do not derail democracy in the short run.
Russians are shaped but not trapped forever by historical legacies, immutable cultural norms, or static institutions. If some Russians in the past took decisions that produced autocracy, others in the future might make choices that engender democracy. It happened before and can again. In addition, specific structural factors—such as education levels, GDP per capita, the emergence of a middle class not dependent on the state, or even urbanization—might pressure the regime in the future.
Modernization theories, however, are bad at point predictions. Agency theories also deliver little predictive power about the specific moments of regime change since chance, fortuna, mistakes, or unexpected exogenous shocks (such as economic meltdown, war, or the death of a leader) always seem to play a major role in these models. 19 Both structural and agency theoretical traditions shed only faint light on current regime stability or guidance about future change.
But which is the more radical prediction—that Putinism will survive another two decades or that a new system, possibly a democratic one, will replace it? The former seems much more unlikely than the latter.
www.journalofdemocracy.org/...