Russian forces conducted unspecified offensive operations in the direction of Slovyansk but did not make any confirmed advances on May 20.[ii] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian troops are attempting to erect a pontoon bridge over the Severskyi Donets River in the vicinity of Yaremivka, about 25 kilometers southeast of Izyum in the direction of Slovyansk.[iii] Russian forces additionally conducted artillery strikes on Dovhenke and Dolyna, both southeast of Izyum heading towards Slovyansk.[iv]
Russian forces reportedly intensified efforts to break through Ukrainian defenses around Popasna in order to push towards Severodonetsk from the south on May 20. Pro-Russian news sources reported that Russian forces made advances through Ukrainian lines of defense in three directions. Russian Airborne (VDV) forces reportedly took control of Volodymirivka and Lypove, and broke through Ukrainian defenses in Komyshuvakha, all north of Popasna.[v] Troops of the Russian ”Wagner” Private Military Company reportedly took control of Trypillya and Vyskrivka to the west of Popasna.[vi] Ukrainian sources noted that offensive operations are on-going in Vyskrivka.[vii] Russian forces additionally reportedly took control of Troitske, south of Popasna.[viii] Such reports are consistent with Ukrainian General Staff statements that the Russian grouping around Popasna is trying to take new frontiers in the area.[ix] NASA’s Fire Information for Resource Management (FIRMS) data, however, does not show a concentration of fires in this area, which may suggest that the Russian sources are exaggerating the scale or significance of the attacks, although the absence of evidence is not evidence of absence in this case.[x] The purported encirclement of the Popasna area may be an effort to break through Ukrainian defenses in order to provide support for the on-going battle for Severodonetsk, where Russian troops are making marginal gains and reportedly took control of Shchedryshcheve and Syrotne, just north of Severodonetsk.[xi]
“The use of Su-57 aircraft in Ukraine began two to three weeks after the start of the special operation,” an unnamed "defense industry source" told the state-run TASS news agency. “The aircraft operate outside the zone of active destruction by enemy air defense systems, using missile weapons,” they added.
[...]
The fact that the claim states that the Felons have been flying outside the range of Ukrainian air defenses is itself interesting. It points to the very real threat that ground-based air defenses pose to Russian aircraft, as well as the Russians’ continued inability to gain more than localized air superiority against the Ukrainian Air Force.
On the other hand, these tactics would also fit in with what we do know about the activities of Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) counter-air fighters during the war so far. Accounts from the Ukrainian Air Force indicate that not only are the Russian fighters generally unwilling to engage in aerial combat unless they enjoy significant numerical superiority, but also that they frequently operate close to the border, if not actually outside Ukrainian airspace.
Any loss of aircraft to Ukrainian defenses will be keenly felt by the VKS, which has already been hit hard in the war, as well as being a significant propaganda win for the Ukrainian side. With that in mind, Russia may be especially hesitant to commit Su-57s to Ukrainian airspace, where a potential loss would not only provide Ukraine with a huge PR gain but also again bring into question the supposed stealth characteristics of the Felon. Even losing a Su-57 over Ukraine to a technical malfunction or mechanical issue would be particularly embarrassing.
www.thedrive.com/...
According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies "Military Balance", Russia has 2,800 tanks and 13,000 other armoured vehicles (reconnaissance and infantry fighting vehicles) in current use with another 10,000 tanks and 8,500 armoured vehicles in storage. /2
Stored vehicles can be mobilised and put on trains for transportation to wherever is needed. In the months leading up to the war in Ukraine, trains carrying tanks and other armoured vehicles were a frequent and highly visible sight across Russia. /3
However, the Russians have had major problems. @TrentTelenko highlighted evidence of tires bleeding oil because of poor maintenance, causing the abandonment of many Russian vehicles in the field and their capture by the Ukrainians. /4
There appear to have been many other breakdowns plaguing Russia's ability to fight. A recent video shows a BMP crew desperately trying to fire their jammed main gun in the midst of a Ukrainian attack which has already destroyed another Russian BMP. /5
Mechanical problems also plagued the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008. Repair crews had to be stationed every 15 mi (25 km) along the invasion route to deal with the volume of breakdowns. So this isn't a new problem. The Russians don't seem to have solved it yet. /6
Facing huge losses of equipment in Ukraine, Russia has mobilised stored vehicles. But here, too, the situation appears to be bad: according to Ukraine's military intelligence service, Russia's 4th Tank Division found that only 1 in 10 tanks mobilised from storage was usable. /7
Russia keeps its unused tanks in Bases for Storage and Repair of Weapons and Military Equipment (BHiRVT) and Central Tank Storage Bases (TsTRB). There were hundreds of such bases around Russia, but it aims to reduce the number to 24 large transshipment and logistics complexes. /8
Let's look at one of these large sites. This is the 227th military storage base in Ulan-Ude, Buryatiya (51.895771°N 107.528414°E). It's located alongside a railway line to enable easy transshipment of vehicles by rail. Many tanks now in Ukraine likely came from here. /9
Large numbers of vehicles are visible standing in the open air, in front of a number of storage sheds and workshops, which likely contain more vehicles and maintenance facilities. There's also an apparent tank graveyard. Russia grades storage facilities in four categories: /10
* light - stored in a heated space
* medium - stored in a closed unheated space
* hard - stored in the open under a canopy
* very hard - stored in the open in all climatic zones and under a canopy in industrial or maritime areas (where pollution and sea area is a problem). /11
Note that many of these vehicles are very old. Remember that figure of 10,000 tanks? It includes at least 2,800 T-55s, 2,500 T-62s, and 2,000 T-64s - all of which are obsolete. Some many be 60 or more years old and would stand no chance in a Ukraine-style conflict. /13
Remarkably, some WW2 T-34s are still stockpiled for use in Victory Day parades. Russia used T-62s in conflict as recently as Georgia in 2008, and in exercises as recently as 2018. Some T-62s are said to have gone to Syria to replace the Syrian government's war losses. /14
It's worth noting that the Russian climate is very unforgiving for mechanical equipment of all kinds. Recorded temperatures have ranged from 45C in summer to -71C in winter. Most regions get varying but usually significant amounts of precipitation year-round. /15
Let's compare this briefly to how the US does it. The biggest US tank storage depot is the Sierra Army Depot (SIAD) in Northern California, sited on 36,000 acres of desert 4,000 ft (1.2 km) above sea level. Its arid climate makes it ideal for long-term storage. /16
SIAD stores around 29,000 items of equipment, including some 2,000 M1A1 Abrams tanks - many of which are now likely to go to central and eastern Europe to replace Soviet-era equipment. The high desert climate helps to preserve the vehicles despite exposure to the open air. /17
Russia, like the US, has detailed manuals for vehicle maintenance. But it's a safe bet that sound maintenance practices have been neglected. In particular, it's likely that no maintenance at all was done for years in the aftermath of the Soviet collapse in the early 1990s. /18
The T-72s and T-80s currently in service are likely the product of decades of cannibalisation of parts from stored equipment. But maintenance also requires a steady supply of new parts, like batteries, which brings us to the biggest problem: rampant kleptocracy. /19
Military maintenance and supply contracts are prime targets for corruption everywhere. The US had its own massive scandal a few years ago with the "Fat Leonard" case, when contractor Leonard Francis bilked the US Navy of tens of millions of dollars. /20
Russia has an all-pervasive culture of theft and corruption. In January 2022, Col Evgeny Pustovoy, head of the procurement department for armoured vehicles, was accused of stealing $13m through fake contracts for batteries. He is currently awaiting trial. /21
In March 2022, Ukraine reported that stored tanks transported to a Russian maintenance base near the Ukrainian border arrived in an unusable condition, stripped of valuable optics and electronics containing high-value metals. Some did not even have engines. /22
Such looting is very likely rife in isolated, poorly-supervised storage bases which are often located in poor regions and inadequately guarded against thieves. Other forms of corner-cutting are highly likely too, particularly if money can be skimmed in the process. /23
For instance, if stored tanks are only needed for a few weeks a year to participate in highly scripted exercises, why spend time and money maintaining them for the other 11 months? It's not like they'll be needed to fight a war! ... Oops. /24
This sheds a sobering light on Russia's war losses. According to Ukraine, Russia has lost 1,254 tanks since 24 Feb. Now consider that the IISS reports that Russia has 2,800 tanks in service. Where are the replacements to come from? /25
I think it's likely that the vast majority of the 10,000 tanks in storage are either unusable or so obsolete that they would be (even more of) death traps in Ukraine. If the Ukrainian and IISS figures are correct, Russia may have lost nearly 45% of its usable tank force. /26
There may well be scope for further cannibalisation of stored tanks and mobilisation of more older tanks. The nature of Russia's losses seem to be changing, perhaps reflecting this. Its losses in the first weeks of the war were concentrated among its most modern tanks. /27
For instance, modernised T-72B3-Obr2016 made up about 20% of Russia's active fleet but reportedly accounted for about 35% of its tank losses in the first weeks. Recently reported losses have reportedly been concentrated among much older models. /28
In short, Russia's tank capabilities are likely significantly degraded already. Its gigantic tank losses are likely to become a critical problem by the late summer if high loss rates persist (and I can't see why they shouldn't). /29
And because Russia can't build new tanks fast enough and its remaining stored tanks are likely mostly useless, a crunch point is coming. How much longer can it continue to throw tanks at the Ukrainians? /end
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- Putin’s winning coalition consists of a handful of FSB/SBU officers and top military officials—people that helped him rise to power, and who he repaid with keeping/giving them top positions within his government.
- NATO may not think they are fighting Russia—because there are no NATO troops in Ukraine—but Russia definitely thinks that it is fighting NATO.
- The bottom line is that the threat of nuclear escalation is low, no matter how this war ends for Russia.
- Putin is NOT cornered. He does NOT need an offramp to save face. He is NOT going to lash out and nuke the world—even if Ukrainian forces kick his troops all the way out of Ukraine, including Donbas and Crimea.
- And this is because the war in Ukraine is NOT his do-or-die moment, it’s NOT the rope he will hang on, and it will NOT lead to his removal from power, no matter what happens. To understand this, you have to understand the inner workings of the Putin regime and some IR theory.
- Every leader stays in power as long as they maintain the support of their winning coalition. In democracies, this coalition is the minimum number of voters that guarantees an election win. In autocracies, the voters don’t matter, and the winning coalition consists of top elites.
- Putin will stay in power for as long as he can maintain the support of this group of people. He maintains this support by providing a mix of private rents and policies they support. So how does the outcome of this war affect Putin’s support? It doesn’t.
- His inner circle is behind this war 100%--this group of people are politically conservative, anti-West, and anti-democracy. They are using the war to reign in the last of the independent media and political opposition.
- They are unconcerned with sanctions and the economy. In their view, Russia will only benefit from becoming more self-reliant. A new iron curtain is their dream come true.
- What happens to the support of this group if Russia loses the war? Nothing. No matter what happens, the outcome will be viewed as an honorable draw in a fight with NATO.
- What would Putin do in case of a catastrophic defeat in Ukraine? Let’s see, we actually have historical precedent. The 1st Chechen War was a fiasco: Russian forces suffered tremendous losses and a decisive defeat in the battle of Grozny against an outnumbered & outgunned opponent
- What happened to Yeltsin who was President at the time? He won his re-election (Did he win it fair and square? No, but Putin is no stranger to voter suppression, media control, and arresting his political opposition either).
- The point is that Putin does not need to win, or even do reasonably well, in this war to stay in power. To him, this war is not even a real war—it is a side mission, a “special operation,” a real-life game of risk he is playing for entertainment.
- The stakes are not real to him—he places no value on human life. To him, casualties are simply fewer mouths to feed.
- Had the stakes been real, he would have modernized his military. Instead, he fired Serdyukov, who was actually trying to modernize the military, and replaced him with Shoigu, a push-over whose only talent is to divvy up rents.
- Had Putin’s own fate been on the line, he would have put real generals in charge (rather than micro-managing the battles himself down to the rank of brigade commander).
- Now, does he want you to think that he might use nukes if case of a defeat? Of course, he does. It’s a bargaining strategy. He thrives on the mass hysteria in the West, he laughs at NYT op-eds that pedal his talking points for him.
- Bluffing is the name of the game in international bargaining. He is not going to start a nuclear Armageddon. Not over sanctions. Not over offensive weapons. Not over planes.
- But there is no cost to him to keep threatening: he counts on mass hysteria in the West to help him extract some sweet concessions, like a bigger chunk of the Black Sea coast in exchange for a ceasefire.
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⚠️The UN has been warned that global wheat inventories have fallen to their lowest level since 2008 as food supplies are rocked by a “one-in-a-generation occurrence”
Official government estimates put world wheat inventories at 33% of annual consumption.
📉But stocks may have slumped to as low as 20%, according to agricultural data firm Gro Intelligence
🌾It estimates that there are only 10 weeks of global wheat supply left in stockpiles
➡️Russia and Ukraine account for around a quarter of the world’s wheat exports.
The West fears Putin is trying to weaponise food supplies
🇷🇺Russia is on track for a strong wheat harvest this year, cementing Putin’s control over the staple grain as bad weather spoils production in Europe and the US
⚠️Gro Intelligence chief executive Sara Menker warned global food supplies are being hit by a number of “extraordinary” challenges...
...including fertiliser shortages, climate disruptions and record low inventories of cooking oils and grains
🗣️She told the UN’s Security Council: “Without substantial immediate and aggressive coordinated global actions, we stand the risk of an extraordinary amount of both human suffering and economic damage"
🗣️“This isn’t cyclical, this is seismic. It’s a once-in-a-generation occurrence that can dramatically reshape the geopolitical era.”
Read the full story 👇
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