There is a lot of talk about how there are these three artificially joined groups in Iraq: Sunni, Shia, and Kurds. About how peace will not come until they have been separated, either into three federal districts or into independent countries. But today I started thinking about what actually may unite them. The initial question was whether we might not be focusing too much on the negative forces at play there. What if there are strong positive, uniting forces that could help bring stability and security? Perhaps at least this could be a foundation for thinking about the problem.
This was also triggered by my reading of Woodward's State of Denial, in which he falls fairly consistently into discussing things in terms of Sunni, Shia and Kurd. I don't think that that is an accurate charactization of the situation, and in fact, it may be contributing to the problem. So, I decided to write this diary about it.
As I see it, there are really two main religious groups in Iraq, the Sunni Muslims and the Shiite Muslims; there are two main ethnic groups, the Arabs and the Kurds. The Kurds are Sunni Muslims. In terms of alliances, all three groups are united to each other by their nationality as Iraqis, including their interest in Iraqi oil resources. The Kurds are united with the Sunni Arabs, possibly more strongly than most assume, by their shared religious identity; the Sunni Arabs are united with the Shiite Arabs by their shared ethnic and linguistic identity. In other words, the Sunni Arabs are the linchpin of the Iraqi triangle, because there is little that unites the Shiite Arab with the Kurd other than Iraqi nationality, except of course for their shared hatred of Saddam and his Sunni Arab backers.
Now, Iraq is floating in a largely Arab, largely Sunni Muslim sea, and therefore, it is the Sunni Arabs who have the greatest affinity with Iraq's neighbors. Yet, paradoxically, this affinity doesn't translate into any strong force, because in that region, being a Sunni Arab is really part of the background. Only in Iran, which has a large Shiite Arab population (along with the majority Shiite Persions), and in Turkish Kurdistan, are there strong affinities with outside groups. Because being a Shiite or being a Kurd is marked and even persecuted in that part of the world, those affinities translate into powerful forces inside of Iraq. Kurds feel a strong pull toward non-Iraqi Kurds, and want to build an independent Kurdish homeland. Shiite Arabs feel a strong pull toward Shiite Iran, where their religious practices are not considered strange and heretical.
So again, the picture is of Sunni Arabs as a pin holding the Sunni Kurds and and Shiite Arabs together, against the pull of Kurdish and Shiite identity.
Now, no one questions the fact that all Iraqis, regardless of religion or ethnicity, deserve a fair share of Iraqi oil wealth and all that that can bring. In fact, Saddam didn't do a terrible job of using that wealth effectively until the last decade or so of his reign when the whole world was against him. But he didn't do a wonderful job, either. He failed to fulfill the potential of his role as national linchpin, and he favored his fellow Sunni Arabs to the detriment of Shiites and Kurds. Even so, I think that the Sunni Arabs have an important role to play in continuing to couple together the country, and I also think that the key to this is for Sunni Arabs to dedicate themselves to sharing the benefits of Iraqi oil with all Iraqis.
If a plan were proposed in which Sunni Arabs were allowed to embrace their natural role at the center of the Iraqi process, but where their role was defined in large part to guarantee that all Iraqis had a fair and equitable piece of the oil pie, then I think that such a plan could be made acceptable to all. Sunni Arabs would accept it, even if they received no disproportionate economic benefit, since it would give them a reason for pride in their identity (Sunni insurgents are motivated to a large degree by the perception that they have been cheated out of their rightful place in the Iraqi nation). Shiite Arabs and Kurds would accept it if they received an equitable share of power within the system, and of the benefits of the oil production.
I also think that since one of the great divisions in Iraq is ethnic, and the other is religious, that the plan must be affirmative action on speed: there must be absolutely rock-solid, structural guarantees that one's ethnicity and one's religion can have no impact, neither favoritism or discrimination, on one's place in the Iraqi nation. In fact, this kind of structure is essential because there is no other way that the Kurds and the Shiite Arabs will be able to trust the Sunni Arabs to not fall back into Saddam's operating mode. In particular, Kurds and Shiites must be given control over certain aspects of local government that they see as central to those identities, for example, things like language of instruction in schools and the freedom of religious practice and protection of culturally and religiously important sites.
Of course, all of this assumes that we non-Iraqis all get out of there, because we make it far too easy for the insurgency to continue to grow, and without security, nothing is going to work.
Greg Shenaut