This diary points to information related to the NYPD-US government information sharing, including discussions with Congressional Staffs, and DOJ-NYPD MOUs.
The diary outlines how current information relates to the White House, State Department, DHS, DOJ and DoD.
These disclosures complement previous revelations within Wikileaks re NYPD.
For reference, some of the links below are from NY Mag. Also, some links were originally posted in this Diary, Sept 2011.
NYPD-FBI Information Sharing
This snippet points to the "complementary" relationship between the FBI and NYPD, related to information sharing, resource augmentation:
NY Mag: "This is a very big city," says Donovan, "and we just don't have the resources to collect all the information. We don't have 40,000 eyes and ears on patrol like the NYPD. We have 1,100 agents in this office. And no one knows the streets here like the local officers. They know what to look for at two in the morning. They know what's out of place, what doesn't seem right. What Ray Kelly is doing makes perfect sense and is complementary to what we do. No city is better prepared right now than New York."
There should be evidence that the US government has a broader relationship with local law enforcement units. The CIA IG would not necessarily have access to these records.
Record: DOJ-NYPD MOU [See, Records: Federal Rules of Evidence]
Despite Arar, NYPD has overseas connections with the Canadians:
NY Mag: "Michael John Hamdani, the Pakistani document forger under arrest in Toronto, told the NYPD detective who interrogated him about the men."
Comment: Wikileaks has information about NYPD involvement with interrogations. This disclosure complements the information within wikileaks related to NYPD involvement with Arar's interrogation, and information re NYPD activity at Guantanamo.
Diary discussion NYPD activity at Guantanamo, found in Wikileaks. [Sample, 2002-era document; another re non-NYPD local law enforcement, Arizona.]
Significance: This information [re Pakistani interrogation (Hamdani)] expands the interrogation window between when NYPD was first reported at Guantanamo, and re Arar; to include another more recent interrogation. This broadens the discovery of Congressional staffer memos and emails both forward into 2001, and until 2012. Shows this is an ongoing matter of public interest.
It is unlikely NYPD was conducting an overseas interrogation without the FBI/DOJ or other US government agencies involved, aware, or allowed to access interrogator's memos. Rather, this information points to a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between DOJ and NYPD.
The foreign connection would trigger White House-level communications through the National Security Council (NSC) re (a) State Department message traffic and (b) DOJ OLC legal memos into the White House.
CIA IG does not necessarily have access to DOJ-NYPD MOUs; nor with the DOJ-foreign intelligence information sharing agreements.
Implied NYPD Budget Discussions With Congress
When someone talks funding, they need to talk to Congress. Here are the travel preparations references, which should include names of Congressional staffers were involved with the meetings:
NY Mag: "Despite several trips to Washington, Kelly has so far made no progress."
CIA IG would not necessarily have access to Congressional staff discussions with local law enforcement, regardless their direct or indirect connection with the CIA.
Legality of Options
There's a curious similarity between (a) how the FISA-related violations were justified and (b) the NYPD-US government activity.
NY Mag quoting Kelly: "And we have done everything we can reasonably do to prevent another attack."
The issue is less whether a subsequent event would or wouldn't occur; but if there is an event, were all methods -- lawful and unlawful -- discussed, considered, and used?
CIA IG would not necessarily review whether the DOJ OLC legal memoranda was or wasn't consistent with the Constitution, or local or state government legal requirements upon law enforcement, contractors, or others in the intelligence community.
Conclusion
There is a striking similarity between the legal compliance programs re FISA and the NYPD-federal government oversight. Both justified questionable activity for a larger objective, but without any assurance the activity would absolutely prevent an attack. Franklin discussed giving up freedoms, while not getting absolute security, "He who sacrifices freedom for security deserves neither."
There need to be assurances and oversight of information provided to the US and local law enforcement/intelligence agencies from foreign powers. Otherwise, false or inaccurate information provided by overseas persons, contained within US intelligence/law enforcement data bases will continue to trigger US and local law enforcement confrontations with innocent US citizens.
There are legal questions of agency, inter alia:
A. Has the US government created a "agency" relationship by sponsoring, advising, or cooperating with local law enforcement; and was this cooperation done outside the restrictions on the US government; and
B. Has the US government bypassed Congressional restrictions by using local law enforcement to collect information using methods prohibited on the federal government?
The disclosures point to further gaps within the CIA IG report. These investigation gaps raise questions about the broader reviews required to assess the legality of local law enforcement unit operations, not just NYPD, of conducting intelligence operations on behalf of the federal government.
One issue is whether there is adequate legal oversight, not just of the federal operations and data retention programs, but whether local officials have adequate power, information, and experience to monitor local law enforcement activity.
It's incorrect to conclude, based on the CIA IG report re CIA-NYPD cooperation, that all NYPD-federal communications/operations were reviewed for lawfulness, appropriateness under the AUMF following 9-11.
Once information is shared from NYPD to the US government, unlikely that information is stovepiped within one Federal agency. Other local (non-NYPD) law enforcement units likely had access to federal-contractor-local analysts' conclusions.
Additional evidence related to local level law enforcement intelligence activity -- not just NYPD, but related to legal discussions, reviews, and oversight -- appears to be within the White House, Congressional committees, State Department, DoD, DOJ OLC, DHS, and the other federal level intelligence agencies.