While most coverage of the Shiite rebellion has focused on Viceroy Bremer's decision to close Al-Sadr newspaper two earlier actions were far more damaging.
The first was an announcement on March 26th.
American officials say they believe they have found legal basis for American troops to continue their military control over security situation in Iraq after Iraq resumes its sovereignty in June... L. Paul Bremer 3rd, the chief of the occupation authority, issued an executive order this week specifying that the newly formed Iraqi armed forces be placed under the operational control of the U.S. commander, Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, who has been named to lead U.S. and allied forces after the transfer of political authority to the Iraqis.
Bremer followed this up on April 4th, the day the Sadr rebellion began,
With less than three months remaining before the United States hands political power over to Iraqis, the U.S.-led coalition announced on Sunday the appointment of an Iraqi defense minister and chief of national intelligence.
These two actions made clear that the U.S. intends to maintain military and security control over Iraq regardless of any wishes of the Iraqi people. This was the last straw for Iraq's Shiite leadership and confirmed that the June 30th transfer of sovereignty was meaningless, except as a PR stunt for US domestic consumption.
It is unlikely that Sadr would have moved without tacit support of the Shiites' most powerful leader Ayatollah Al-Sistani. Al-Sistani remained silent for the first several days before issuing a statement that urged calm from Sadr while criticizing US actions. Most accounts interpret this statement as an indication that Sistani is reluctant to criticize Sadr for fear of alienating the many Shiite's who have rallied to Sadr's cause.
A more likely interpretation is that Sistani is signaling the CPA and the Bush Administration that he is willing to increase resistance to US occupation unless he sees signs that the Shiite majority will be able to take power through a genuine democratic process. Look at Sistani's record with regard to the CPA's plans for transition and the pattern is clear and consistent.
Sistani first revealed his ability to control events when he demanded direct elections and torpedoed Bremer's plan for a US controlled caucus system to select the transitional government.
Iraq's top Shiite Muslim leader now says that American plans for a caucus-based political system are illegitimate because the idea for them came from another illegitimate body: the U.S.-appointed Governing Council.
The harder line reflects the widespread Iraqi view that the council has been an abject failure, without legitimacy beyond the American compound where its members work. Many in Iraq see the Governing Council as a lesson in what will happen without direct elections: rule over Iraq by outsiders who do not have the country's best interest at heart. To complicate matters, many on the council are angling to have the body continue as a nonelected senate, a scenario almost certain to trigger widespread unrest.
Sistani moved again when the interim constitution was finished. First he blocked its approval and then he indicated that it would need to be changed before any elections. Our old friend Tom Friedman tells us that the Kurdish minority drove the constitution. Of the Kurd's he writes
They have a democratic soul. But in the debate in the Governing Council over Iraq's interim constitution they overreached, and the Bush team made a big mistake in letting them overreach, by giving the Kurds effective veto power over Iraq's final constitution. I believe the Kurds need and are entitled to some form of protection. I would support any U.S. guarantees for them. But too many moderate Shiites, led by Ayatollah Sistani, are feeling that the Iraqi interim constitution tilts so far in favor of minority rights that it unfairly limits majority (read Shiite) rights. If the interim constitution has any hope of surviving this fighting, and being accepted by the moderate Shiite majority, it needs to be recalibrated -- through a dialogue among Iraq's factional leaders and with us. Otherwise, a stable transfer of power is impossible (if it isn't already).
In this context, Bremer's moves to control the security apparatus were certain to provoke a strong response. Now as the Shiite rebellion eases, Bremer and Bushco are on notice that it is Sistani who has ultimate control over when and how the transfer of sovereignty will take place.