A couple days ago, Chris Bowers of Mydd
came out against the concept of a War on Terrorism. This, of course, elicited a strong reaction from the members of this community. I was depressed to read that, in spite of the fact that the presence of this "war" has absolutely no benefit for the Democrats and the nation as a whole, there was still a very vocal group of individuals who still support the WoT, if for no other reason than they believe we cannot escape it (though some appear to fully support it).
What I would like to do in this essay is hopefully to bring some clarification to what the WoT means to the future of the Democrats and the country, and lay down a clear position on why it is important that we abandon the concept in favor of a more reality-based, less inflammatory manner of speaking about terrorism.
Breeds of WoT Supporters
As near as I can tell, there are two types of supporters of the WoT at Dailykos, right now: those who truly support the concept on the basis of the policies it suggests, and those that believe we are stuck with it and stuck working within its framework, and they therefore are willing to tolerate the options it allows.
This second group can also be broken into two groups. One group truly understands that by invoking the WoT, we are limiting ourselves as a nation in the manner in which we can deal with terrorism. However, they also truly believe that we have no choice because 9/11 has created scenario to which there is no possible why to rise above it.
Another group believes that we are stuck with the WoT, but falsely believes that we can enact liberal principles through this framework (a belief I hope to lay to rest here).
Problems With the WoT
The supporters of the concept of the WoT, are what you would sometimes refer to as liberal hawks. They believe, rightly, that America has in the past conducted justifiable, and even noble, military operations.
They favor military intervention for humanitarian reasons, a position that the second Iraq War has made very difficult for them to hold generally. But, since liberals tend to argue for sustainability, they may caveat their views by suggesting that America should intervene if it truly has the ability and resources to do so, and only with international backing.
For these individuals supporting an ongoing war against terrorism as broadly designated by the State Department is not too much of a stretch. However, I believe, in supporting this frame for acting in, they fail to consider the true nature of the situation we face, and therefore cannot adequately respond to it.
It is here that we must come to understand the nature of language, how because certain words have certain connotations, they tend to lead the reader down certain paths of the thought. Words like "war", for instance, tend to have very specific patterns for thought. And when the word "war" was chosen to describe the direction America was taking in dealing with terrorism, it was chosen very specifically with those patterns in mind.
The first problem with this way of approaching the problem is that, much like a war on drugs or crime or poverty or ignorance, you cannot physically attack an idea, nor can you ever be fully expected to defeat it. The second problem with approaching terrorism in this manner is that terrorism is not the real problem for us, but is more like the result of our real problems.
There actually are two problems that are the cause of our problem with Terrorism. The first is proliferation. If there wasn't a problem with maintaining responsible control of weapons of mass destruction, there would be no overly urgent threat posed by terrorist groups.
The second problem is the fact that America has a serious image problem throughout the world. It is these two problems which have interacted over quite a long period of time, creating the terrorist problem.
Now, notice that when we dissect the problem into its more fundamental components, starkly different solutions tend to present themselves. When George Bush or John Kerry says things like, "We're going to kill all the terrorists", they are very specifically invoking military options, for they are speaking of real enemies. However, if they were to speak to the problems that bring the terrorists into existence--proliferation and antiamericanism--they would likely tend to use less militant language, and arrive at more sophisticated and appropriate conclusions.
Soft Power
An easy way of understanding this issue is to think in terms of the Hard Power/Soft Power dichotomy Joseph Nye suggested a few years back. In conducting international relations, countries can employ both Hard Power and Soft Power. Hard Power would include options like military force or its threat, economic sanctions, etc. Soft Power has less to do with forcing other countries to do as you wish and more to do with making them want to do as you wish. It concerns the attractiveness of the nation's ideas and culture.
The problem with the WoT concept is that it fails to properly invoke the right kind of application of power. By referring to the options we use in dealing with terrorists as a "war", we cannot help but tend toward an application of power emphasizing hard power. However, when we really get to the root of the terrorism problem, we see that our application of power should probably at least slightly favor soft power.
Commenting on Peter Beinart's recent "A Fighting Faith" piece, Eric Alterman had this to say:
Beinart falsely accuses MoveOn of opposing military retaliation against Al Qaeda because its organizers argued on behalf of a strategy that spared population centers from bombing attacks. He apparently cannot conceive of an effective military response that does not include the killing of thousands of innocents. In fact, just as the liberal realists of the 1950s whom Beinart so admires opposed the excesses of conservative US foreign policy--including CIA-sponsored coups in Iran and Guatemala--so too did liberal realists argue in 2001 that the US government was not availing itself of the best approaches to fighting Al Qaeda. New Yorker reporter Nicholas Lemann surveyed a group of them and came away with a remarkably consistent--and painfully prescient--set of analyses. "Military power is not necessary to wiping out Al Qaeda," Stephen Walt of the Kennedy School at Harvard told Lemann. "It's a crude instrument, and it almost always has effects you can't anticipate.... This is ultimately a battle for the hearts and minds of people around the world. When your village just got leveled by an American mistake, the conclusions you draw will be rather different from what we'd want them to be." Stephen Van Evera of MIT concurred: "A broad war on terror was a tremendous mistake.... you make enemies of the people you need against Al Qaeda."
Indeed, the bombing campaign in Afghanistan, while supported elsewhere, did feed anti-American sentiment in the Muslim world. In a February 2002 Gallup poll of nine Muslim countries, 77 percent of respondents judged US actions in Afghanistan to be unjustifiable; only 9 percent expressed support. Even in moderate Turkey, opinion ran 3 to 1 against, and in Pakistan the ratio was 20 to 1. Needless to say, neither did the military campaign succeed in capturing its avowed target, Osama bin Laden. (I point all this out as someone who supported the attack on Afghanistan, although I would have preferred a more thoughtful response.)
As to proliferation, some would argue that this is a primary area of hard power application, and they are certain right to an extent. But it is also even more so a soft power area. To stop the trafficking of WMD will require treaties, intelligence sharing, and above all trust. Indeed, I personally believe that America should move to the right on proliferation, but that the only way that is conceivably possible is if America has the backing to global community.
Put simply, when you are trying to defend your country against international networks of individuals who have legitimate problems with your culture and policies who are seeking elicit weapons of mass destruction, bombing their population centers and alienating the rest of the world is unlikely to be a very productive path to take.
WoT as a Neoconservative Power-Grab
Another major problem with the WoT is that it will always be wrapped up in the trappings of neoconservatism. The idea of spreading democracy as a tool of Realist foreign policy, is fundamentally a neoconservative idea. However, the unfounded belief in democracy as a cure all for terrorism is an idea that flies in the face of the history of terrorist activity.
Foreign Policy magazine recently did an interesting piece on this subject:
This view is rooted in a simplistic assumption: Stagnant, repressive Arab regimes create positive conditions for the growth of radical Islamist groups, which turn their sights on the United States because it embodies the liberal sociopolitical values that radical Islamists oppose. More democracy, therefore, equals less extremism.
History tells a different story. Modern militant Islam developed with the founding of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in the 1920s, during the most democratic period in that country's history. Radical political Islam gains followers not only among repressed Saudis but also among some Muslims in Western democracies, especially in Europe. The emergence of radical Islamist groups determined to wreak violence on the United States is thus not only the consequence of Arab autocracy. It is a complex phenomenon with diverse roots, which include U.S. sponsorship of the mujahideen in Afghanistan in the 1980s (which only empowered Islamist militants); the Saudi government's promotion of radical Islamic educational programs worldwide; and anger at various U.S. policies, such as the country's stance on the Arab-Israeli conflict and the basing of military forces in the region.
Indeed, if history is any indicator, the solution to terrorism is found in just the opposite type of system.
Moreover, democracy is not a cure-all for terrorism. Like it or not, the most successful efforts to control radical Islamist political groups have been antidemocratic, repressive campaigns, such as those waged in Tunisia, Egypt, and Algeria in the 1990s. The notion that Arab governments would necessarily be more effective in fighting extremists is wishful thinking, no matter how valuable democratization might be for other reasons.
Are We Really Stuck with This Frame?
Now, let me briefly touch on the ideas of those that think that we are essentially stuck with the WoT frame. As to the group of people who believe we have to work within the framework of the ideas the WoT suggests, I can only refer you the above material to understand that the approach it suggests is useless. This isn't a matter of personal preference. Continuing down the road the rhetoric of the WoT suggests is utterly useless and will never move us in a productive direction toward security.
As for the group who would seek to bring about liberal objectives through the Republican created WoT framework, there are two reasons why this is an inappropriate rationale, one of them ethical and one political.
Politically speaking, maintaining the WoT rhetoric will never be productive for the Democrats and most likely will always be counterproductive. The WoT was a Republican construct, developed to invoke to old Orwellian Cold War mentality of always maintaining an enemy which personified pure evil to the electorate in order to make them pliable to the ideological objectives of the party in control. This method of creating worldviews from thin air is not the Democrat's strong suit.
Yet, because the narrative the Cold War/WoT mentality does not match with reality (i.e. Arabs are not evil, but actually have pretty good reason for resenting America) that is the game they will always be forced to play. They must depart with the neoconservative idea of spreading Democracy to defeat terrorism, not just because it does not work, but also because accepting it will keep it always on the table as an option and will allow the Republicans to take at least a limited amount of credit for whatever steps Iraq or other Middle Eastern countries take toward Democratization.
Democrats are better when they are not forced into ideological boxes. Rather, they need to position themselves as the party of clarity, insight, and vision--one that eschews ideology and is more focused on what works. In this way, they can ignore the WoT rhetoric, since openly attacking it, at least in the near future, will probably not be viable. Nevertheless, for the good of the party, and especially the good of the nation, they must develop their own framework outside of the WoT.
And this brings us to the ethical argument against supporting the WoT simply because there doesn't appear to be any other option readily available. There are higher causes than achieving electoral dominance. If the Republicans are unwilling to recognize the realities of dealing with the threats posed by terrorism for no other reason than consolidating their own power, than the Democrats have a moral obligation to do so, even if it costs them politically (though, as I've said, I think it benefits them politically).
By acting as a true opposition party and questioning the very basis of the party in power's right to rule, the Democrats will be serving a higher purpose than maintaining political viability, and will be helping to secure their people's peace and security.
MoralQuestionsBlog.com