President Bush has recently been claiming that the Iraqi elections which are tentatively scheduled to be held on the last day of January are the best possible policy outcome and a sign of great
progress. The idea is simple; an elected and legitimately chosen Iraqi government will be able to muster popular support that will drain the sea of quiet support or neutral apathy that guerillas and insurgents need in order to survive much less flourish. It is a good idea, but there is the question of legitimacy.
Right now, the question is will the entire Iraqi population or at least a large enough super majority of the Iraqi population consider the election legitimate because they were able to vote for whomever they wanted to vote for, trust that their ballots would be counted fairly and also have enough faith in the system that even if their candidates/positions were electoral losers that they could protect vital interests and have another chance at the polls in a reasonably predictable time frame to try again. I think that these conditions are unlikely to be met and therefore the elections are most likely not going to be the panacea that Bush believes it will be.
First,
Sec. Defense Rumsfeld has stated that it is extremely likely that the entire country will not be able to vote due to security concerns. The sections of the country that are currently no-go areas and are the least likely to be able to vote are the areas with the strongest insurgency problems, the Sunni cities along the Euphrates in Al-Anbar Province, Baghdad and areas to its north along with Sadr City in Baghdad, home to ~2 million Shi'ites who strongly support Sadr who is currently banned from the political process. These groups and areas are outside of the political process because they see themselves losing from the current arrangement with very small stakes in peace and stability as the other groups are looking for. If they are excluded from elections and the next Iraqi government, what is the incentive for them to stop their insurgency against an illegimate (in their eyes) central government that does not represent or take into account, their interests.
Secondly, as Kevin Drum points out, the infrastructure needed to run free and fair elections are lacking. There are no concrete plans for voter registration, few plans that are not fantasy for voter education, no ability for candidates to campaign and no polling precints established. These logistical issues are massive and time consuming to get right. Time is running out.
Finally, the question of future elections is a significant question. The six main parties are planning to create a super list in order to consolidate their power and create a well organized governing majority from a significant minority of the poltical spectrum (pro- or at least not too anti-US exiles and Kurds). They pulled this trick off this summer at the convention concerning the transitional law. This is one of Sistani's great fears that the Shi'ite majority will be permanently sidelined by a combination of rules and non-Shiite coalitions. Finally, there is no tradition of a government not trying to assume "emergency" powers as soon as it can find a situation to exploit. Hussein did that, and Allawi has done that also. There is a probability that January elections could be "one man, one vote, one time" and after that the security situation will dictate a strong leader or so the leader will claim. There is a possibility that elections will be held freely, fairly and predictably in the future also, but no institutional or civic guarantee that this is the case.
Phil Carter brings out a quote by Gen. Abizaid ""If I recall," he said, "looking back at our own election four years ago, it wasn't perfect either."
Gen. Abizaid should also note that within the United States, a country with a 135 year history of not having a civil war, saw that a significant and motivated minority that took part in the 2000 election did not, and some still do not see President Bush as a legitimately elected leader of the country. The difference between pissed off 20-30% of the country in the United States and the most likely disenfranchised 20%-30% of Iraq is that the minority in the United States has a very high degree of confidence that the institutions usually work well and that their voices can be heard and heeded even if they do not get everything that they want. There is no such institutional trust in Iraq, and this minority (Sunni-Arab and Sadrists) have already demonstrated that they can act as veto players in domestic Iraqi politics by using violence. An election that is not perceived as legitimate by all veto holding groups will not produce an end to the insurgency.
Crossposted at Fester's Place