For those of you who haven't seen
Paul Rosenberg's fine diaries
The ID Fraud and
Evolution As Theory AND Fact--Intro To Talk Origins, please check them out. Inspired by his example, my humble task here is to elaborate a bit on one of the kookier aspects of ID that is typically soft-pedaled in discussions: the element of religious dogmatism.
A lot of the discussion of ID focuses, rightly, on its spurious criticisms of evolutionary theory--chiefly, on its claim that evolutionary theory can't explain the complexity of certain biochemical systems. My sense is that ID's criticisms have been refuted almost ad nauseam; but let's pretend otherwise. What then?
In short, we're to believe in miracles.
The ID argument is simplicity itself:
- Some biochemical systems are too complex to have evolved.
- If (1), then some biochemical systems were intelligently designed.
- Therefore, some biochemical systems were intelligently designed.
Understandably, the critical literature on ID focuses on the first premise, because it's that premise that directly contradicts evolutionary theory. I'm no biologist--I'm a philosopher by training--so while I can read, I can do no more than point people to what biologists have to say about the first premise. (As noted above, see Paul Rosenberg's diaries for more information on this line of discussion.) Accordingly, my focus is on the second premise: what does it mean?
There are two ways of understanding this premise:
- (a) If (1), then a natural phenomenon intelligently designed some biochemical systems.
- (b) If (1), then a supernatural phenomenon intelligently designed some biochemical systems.
We can safely reject interpretation (a), for two reasons. First, while on this interpretation evolutionary theory is false, some other empirical theory might account for the complexity, and this defeats ID's purpose. Second, the only people competent to offer alternative empirical theories explaining this complexity are the very people whose views IDers are criticizing, so their unwillingness to offer alternative theories is powerful evidence against (1).
This leaves us with interpretation (b): the existence of a supernatural designer. This puts IDers in an uncomfortable position: there is no such thing as a supernatural explanation of phenomena, so ID cannot be an empirical hypothesis to be confirmed or disconfirmed by evidence. Supernatural phenomena are by definition miraculous, that is, insusceptible to explanation by any reasonable standard.
So let's pretend for a moment that Behe, Dembski, and the rest are right about premise (1). Their conclusion is not the conclusion of a scientist (i.e., that some other as yet unposited empirical hypothesis explains the complexity of some biochemical systems), but the conclusion of a dogmatist (i.e., that the only acceptable conclusion is the one they themselves believed beforehand). Furthermore, their conclusion is at odds not only with evolutionary theory, but also with the most basic principles of scientific reasoning.
That is, ID, as stated, can't be an empirical theory of natural phenomena. And as there's no such thing as a non-empirical theory of natural phenomena, ID isn't any kind of theory. It's simply a demand that we believe in miracles.
One of the big problems in the debate over ID and evolution is that IDers have cleverly managed to frame the debate in terms of the plausibility of evolutionary theory. They've done this by soft-pedaling premise (2), and shouting out premise (1) to the roofbeams. Critics of ID, being mainly scientists, have taken the bait, and find themselves in the position of arguing with clever people who don't accept some of the basic principles of good reasoning, before an audience that's by and large not competent to decide which side is right. What I want to suggest here is that this may be the wrong tack. Instead, we might want to focus more on premise (2), because that's the premise we find most objectionable, because it forces IDers to defend it, and because their defense of it is easily shown to be an attack on reason itself.