The outbreak of World War I is a case study showing that the offensive approach to terrorism is not always the correct response. In 1900, the Austria-Hungarian Empire was a flawed, but generally successful, model for a multi-cultural state in a region of poisonous ethnic rivalries with a rich history of conflict and oppression dating back for centuries. Twenty years later, it was no more, dead from overreaction to its terrorist enemies. Its former citizens faced a poorer and less secure life of unstable governments, political upheaval, greater repression and economic disruption.
Background
The government of the Dual Monarchy was an anomalous mixture - for many purposes it was in essence two distinct countries, with two Parliaments and two cabinets, but some governmental functions remained unitary. From an economic standpoint it was much like the common market - Austria and Hungary could be considered two national economies for some purposes, yet were an economic union for others. Austria, which included Croatia and Slovenia, had a parliament elected by universal manhood suffrage, but because its numerous parties were splintered by both political orientation was often unable to form a government with a majority in Parliament. Therefore, Austrian ministers selected by the King often ruled by decree. Hungary dealt with its ethnic problems by restricting the vote to the 40% of the population which was Hungarian. Education in other languages was forbidden. Finally, Austria ran a military administration of two nominally Turkish provinces - Bosnia and Herzegovina and a military occupation of parts of Macedonia. Austria-Hungary was allied with the great power of Europe, Germany, and its southern neighbor, Italy, and dominated the government of Serbia.
In sum, Austria-Hungary was an imperfect state, with varying levels of ethnic discrimination sometimes edging into oppression, rising prosperity and expectations, and discontented minorities mostly prepared to work within the system. A country deeply uneasy about its place in a newly nationalistic Europe. It was, however, far better than what would follow.
Crisis begins
In 1903, the Empire's security was shattered by the assassination of the Serbian royal family by a conspiratorial underground of expansionist Serbian nationalists and the placement of a new royal family sympathetic to their aims on the throne. The new government immediately allied with Russia, the great competitor and enemy of Austria-Hungary. The new revolutionary government immediately became a source of support of subversives among all the "South Slavs:" Slovenia, Croatia, but most particularly the Empire-administered Turkish provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In 1904-5, Russia was defeated in the Russo-Japanese war and wracked by revolution. Also in 1905, the Empire became sufficiently alarmed to respond with economic sanctions against Serbia, the "Pig War." The great bulk of the Serbian economy was oriented towards the Empire, by sanctioning their trade, the Empire would bring the revolutionary government to its knees. Unfortunately for the Empire, the economic warfare strengthened, rather than weakened the Serbian nationalists. Patriotic reaction consolidated the position of the new regime, new markets were opened, and the economy appeared to flourish resulting in a great triumph for national pride. By 1908, the Austrian defeat in the "Pig War" was clear to all.
Escalation
On October 6, 1908, Austria annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina, making their clear statement that they would not tolerate the expansion of a hostile Serbian state. Russia, still weakened from defeat, acquiesced, but on October 8, 1908, Serbian ministers, officials, generals, regicides and revolutionaries met in City Hall of Belgrade to form a semi-secret society, Narodna Odbrana to recruit and train partisans to fight the Austrians, mainly in the newly annexed provinces. They also undertook propaganda, trained saboteurs and spies with satellite groups in Slovenia and Istria. For some months, an effective guerilla campaign ensued until Austria sent a message to Serbia and Russia: cease or face war. Russia was still too weakened by defeat to face war and forced a Serbian backdown. Narodna Odbrana was to become a cultural and political organization within Serbia promoting Serbian nationalism and cease supporting subversion, sabotage and guerrilla warfare against Austria. Austria also withdrew from its occupation of part of Turkish-controlled Macedonia, Serbia's other target for expansion.
Pause and recoupment
For the next two years, direct action ebbed. But from the standpoint of Serbia and Russia, this was a pause for rebuilding and renewal. During the period from 1909-1912, Russia stimulated the formation of a Balkan alliance of Serbia, Montenegro, Bulgaria, and Greece preparatory to the expulsion of Turkey from Europe and the division of European Turkey among the victor. Russia also financed and supported the transformation of Bulgarian and Serbian armies from light infantry forces to balanced forces with logistical capacity and heavy artillery. European Turkey was itself a brew of nationalities: Macedonians, Serbs, Bulgars, Greeks, Muslims of different ethnicities, including Muslim Albanians. Serbia, Bulgaria and Greece all considered Macedonia as within their national homeland, Greeks and Serbs considered Albania theirs by rights, most Macedonians and Albanians desired independence, although Muslims tended to support remaining under Turkish rule.
In the context of this greater support from Russia, nationalist elements of the Serbian government took the opportunity to recreate an organization to conduct terrorism or "asymmetric warfare" (depending upon one's view of the wisdom of "Greater Serbian" nationalism) against Austria. The "Black Hand," officially known as "Unification or Death," was created under the leadership of Col. Dragutin Dimitrijevic ("Apis"), one of the leaders of the 1903 Serbian coup and the Chief of Intelligence for the Serbian General Staff. Numerous serving military officers became members and many other high-ranking officers had less formal ties. Prince Alexander, the heir to the Serbian throne, was an important financial backer. The exact ties of the Black Hand to the Serbian government were unknown to the Austrian government and much only became clear after the opening of government archives following the death of Tito and the breakup of Yugoslavia, but Austria certainly believed the organization to be sponsored by the Serbian state.
Yet as with Hezbollah and Iran today, it is probably too simplistic to view the Black Hand as an organ of the Serbian government. To all appearances, the dominant Radical party and the Prime Minister and civilian government did not approve of the Black Hand and were hostile and disapproving of its efforts. Given the recent history of Serbia, any such hostility must be muted - too direct an opposition to its efforts (such as attempts to suppress the organization) would undoubtedly result in the responsible minister being assassinated Indeed, the situation is murky enough that some still argue today that all the Prime Minster wanted was plausible deniability, although the majority view is that he understood the dangers of their program to his people and was trying to do the little he could safely do to thwart them. (Remind anyone of Pakistani President Musharraf and the apparent ties of elements of his intelligent service to the Talibant?) The organization grew to about 2500 organized in a cell structure, mainly junior army officers, but including lawyers, journalists, university professors, and students with branches in Bosnia, Macedonia, and Croatia.
Meanwhile, on the international front, the Balkan alliance successfully engaged Turkey and drove her mostly out of Europe and then fought a successor battle over the spoils from the fall of 1912 to the summer of 1913. Serbia was a big winner in the two wars, securing control of Macedonia, but being thwarted in seizing Albania by the intervention of Austria. This expansion of a neighboring country bent on the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary was a major strategic threat to her. The leadership of the Empire came to the conclusion that a major strategic error had been made in not suppressing Serbia entirely in 1908-1909 when the opportunity presented and a resolution was made to "finish the job" at the next opportunity. The Chief of the Austrian Staff, Conrad was a brilliant idiot, confident in his ability to make short work of the Serbian Army, and, in the event of a wider was with Germany against Russia and France, also confident of defeating Serbia and Russia simultaneously. Meanwhile Apis also eagerly sought war, confident in the ability of the Serbian Army to hold out until the "Russian Colossus" mobilized its vast manpower and steamrollered Austria-Hungary off the map.
The End of the Gilded Age
Within the Empire, Archduke Ferdinand, a personally abrasive figure, was the espouser of fundamental reform to bring the position of Slavic minorities to a position of full equality in the Empire. He advocated the creation of a third Slavic state within the Empire alongside Austria and Hungary. As such he was perceived as a threat to the plans of Apis and other "Greater Serbian" nationalists. It appears to this author, however, that this was a secondary consideration. Apis had previously unsuccessfully planned the assassination of the Emperor and the military governor of Bosnia; it appears that his primary desire was to ignite the powder keg. In June Apis received word of Archduke Ferdinand and dispatched three agents to assassinate the Archduke.
The events immediately preceding the assassination are involved and somewhat murky. The plot came at a time of constitutional crisis in Serbia. The civilian government was attempting to establish its control of the military and the military was resisting such control and disobeying orders from civilians. The prime minister, Pasic, had been forced to resign and had then returned to form a caretaker government. The government became aware of the plot and attempted a couple of half-measures to thwart it. A direction was sent, after some delay, outside of regular channels to pick up the agents but, in the event, the agents crossed with the direct support and aide of the border patrol. Since it had already been made clear that the government did not control the military, this lack of success was predictable - a successful attempt to stop the assassination would have required the direct intervention of the King, This was not attempted and it is not clear what the attitude of the King would have been had he been asked to intervene. The prime minister also conveyed an oblique warning to the Austrian ambassador, but did not pass on the details known to the government, including the name of one of the agents. Historians argue whether Pasic was doing all he do without granting Austria evidence of complicity of Serbia in the plot or causing his assassination or whether he was content to have the plot go forward and merely sought plausible deniability, but given his prior clashes with military nationalism, the author inclines towards the former view.
On June 28, the anniversity of the Battle of Kosovo, the Archduke and his pregnant young wife were assassinated. The initial reaction of all of Europe was horror with the act. The German government, in particular, issued the famous "green light" to Austria, promising support for whatever measures Austria deemed necessary for its defense. The Austrians after a brief investigation were satisfied that the Serbian government was behind the plot and correctly identified Col. Dragutin Dimitrijevic ("Apis"), the Serbian Chief of Intelligence, and two other serving officers as the architects of the plot. They sent a harsh ultimatum to the Serbian government, confident that the terms were such that no sovereign government could accept.
At this point the international political consensus of horror splintered. Russia was eager for a war, convinced that the defeat by the Japanese and the diplomatic defeat of 1908 needed to be reversed to stop the advance of revolutionary sentiment and to restore Russia as a Great Power. In the West (France and the United Kingdom), no distinctions were seen between Serbs, Bosnians (or Muslim Serbs), Macedonians, Croats, and Slovenes - as with the Russians, the general tenets of South-Slav, or Greater Serbian nationalism were accepted without thought. Thus current events were perceived through a prism of Austrian-Hungarian oppression of ethnic minorities and their legitimate civil rights or nationalist grievances. Thus, they were inclined to look askance at the assertions of Austrian intelligence, which was generally a little shoddy anyway. Finally, France was concerned that if it did not support the Russians at this time, their alliance, the bedrock of French security, would be in danger. Thus, all waited with bated breath the response of the Serbian government.
The Serbians responded with a masterpiece of propaganda, making a great show of complying with bulk of Austria's demands. Historians still argue today over whether they offered real concessions, meeting all they could of Austria's demands, or just the first step of a program of delay and evade. The issue is moot, however, because Austria was determined upon war and Germany had delegated the decision on peace or war.
The Aftermath
Most readers will be familiar with the result. Military Dead: 1.8 million Germans, 1.7 million Russians, 1.4 million French, 1.2 million Austro-Hungarians, .9 million British. The destruction of Austria-Hungary and the Russian Empire. In contrast, the Serbs, who provoked the war, were initial victors suffering only 45,000 military deaths (but unknown civilian losses) and realizing their dream of creating Yugoslavia. They were able to bury evidence of their complicity by rounding up the Black Hand leadership and executing the leaders after secret military trials. They have paid for that victory since, however, beginning with 20 years of military dictatorship and ethnic strife, and about one million dead in World War II and ending only with the defeat of Greater Serbian nationalism in the 1990's. Indeed, the only victors of World War I were the United States and Japan, bystanders to the decisions of 1914.
Lessons
Superior moral claims are not always sufficient to win the unbounded support of uninvolved powers. Austrian leaders in 1914 had no clear path to address the legitimate grievances of their ethnic minorities without triggering the destruction of their state. The creation of a Yugoslav state was clearly not an improvement in the existing situation, but that was not clear to people then, particularly to those who were not admirers of the Empire. The tactics of assassination were repellent, but only close allies were inclined to view terrorism as giving Austria an unbounded right of preventive warfare. The fact that Austrian intelligence "knew" that Serbia was behind the attack cut no ice except with her friends
There are many parallels to the situation of Isreal today. The fact that Isreal is the victim of repellent terrorist attack and that it appears to have no practical way forward to ameliorate the conditions of the Palestinians does not make the life of Palestinians more endurable; instead, the horrible life of Palestine today ensures that people in the world outside the United States will continue to have strict limits in their support for Isreali counter-measures.
Similarly, the story of the Balkans before World War I shows that the best answer to terrorism is not always offensive. Clearly, an unsatisfactory settlement in 1914 would have been better for Austria than a attempt at clear decision. The recent UN settlement in Lebanon for Isreal was very unsatisfactory; it may have simply been the best one obtainable, except for the equally unsatisfactory one that could have been reached a week earlier.
Finally, however justified Austrian anger was at the terrorist assassination of their future monarch and his young, pregnant wife, it was an abdication of responsibility for the leaders to react to that outrage by turning over their future to the leaders of another state by offering a "green light" and unlimited support. In the real world, extremism in the pursuit of one's personal view of justice and liberty can be a vice when one cannot convince others of the justice of one's course, and paying any price is often not wise.
Applied to the situation in the middle east, such analysis calls for avoiding strategic commitments beyond our grasp, limiting our active enemies rather than expanding them, and seeking to explore the contradictions among the goals of our enemies rather than driving them together. And, horror, sometimes standing on the defensive, letting the situation develop, and postponing dramatic confrontations.
The Political Discourse
Unfortunately, these insights, even if accepted, are not very useful in campaign political discourse. The American way of war has always, with the exception of the Revolution, taken the offensive. Every American "knows" that a good offense is the best defense, always and everywhere, and that you can't let the enemy have the initiative. People who otherwise know nothing about military affairs take these principles as matters of faith.
It is not, frankly, the responsibility of our political leaders to educate the public on such nuances; anyone who attempted to do so in clear terms would have a very short career and be labeled a naive idiot. It is our responsibility to educate ourselves and create a more rational environment for talking about our strategic choices.
This is my first diary. I have no idea whether there is any interest in such topics so far removed from electioneering. Let me know.