Welcome back! It was a very busy week at the Court, with many decisions coming down on Monday and Thursday as we near the end of the '04-'05 term. Needless to say, the biggest of the week (and probably the biggest of the term) was
Kelo v. New London. I'll start with that one.
But first, an apology. Not all of last week cases are included here -- but I promise that I'll summarize the rest of last week's cases in a supplement to this Roundup sometime soon. I love dKos, but I think I would have gotten my butt kicked if I was summarizing the remainder of the Supreme Court opinions rather than helping with and attending my sister's wedding this weekend...
So, without further ado, here we go.
Kelo v. New London (5-4, Kennedy concurring; O'Connor dissenting; Thomas dissenting)
[Topic: Fifth Amendment/Takings]
Background and Opinion:
I'm willing to bet most of the people reading this may have heard something about Kelo -- just a random guess. I encourage all interested to read the full decision, because there are sure to be many subtleties in the text that will have import as time goes on.
The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, among other things, states that the government shall not take property for public use without just compensation. New London, in an attempt to revitalize its flagging economy, approved an economic development plan that required a good deal of land currently occupied by private landowners. The development plan contained a waterfront area with recreational/commercial uses, including a waterfront hotel, a museum, and an office building for the Pfizer Corporation. Most landowners agreed to sell their property to the government, but after a few of the owners refused to sell at any price, the government opted to use their eminent domain power (or, at least, what the city claimed was their eminent domain power) to acquire the remainder of the property.
Suzanne Kelo owned a house located in the proposed development area. There was no evidence that the house was blighted - it simply was in the development area. Kelo refused to sell her property to the government, and she brought suit after the city proceeded to seize her property, giving her the just compensation required by the Fifth Amendment. The question was whether the city's taking of Kelo's land for economic development was consistent with the Fifth Amendment requirement that a taking be for the "public use."
The Court, Justice Stevens writing, said that this taking qualified as "public use." He first noted that two things about previous Court precedent are clear - first, that the government cannot simply take private property for the sole benefit of another private entity (even with just compensation), and second, that the government can transfer property from one private person to another if the purpose is for future "use of the public." (An example of the latter would be the taking of private land to be given to a railroad company, which has been long allowed). The Court conceded that the land involved in New London was not all "for the use of the public", but noted that the economic development did serve a "public purpose." Those public purposes, according to the Court, included but was not limited to the creation of new jobs and increased tax revenue.
In reaching the conclusion that takings for economic development were takings for "public use", the Court stressed that takings purely for the sole benefit of other private parties are still strictly disallowed after this decision. Protections against abuse (say, claiming that such a private-private transfer was really for some pretextual "public purpose") could be supplied by a case-by-case review of the particular circumstances in a takings case (i.e. placing the onus on state courts), or by state legislatures writing stricter standards for local takings into their state law.
Other Opinions:
Justice Kennedy had an important concurrence in which he joined the majority opinion in the full, but wrote separately to express the importance for courts to strike down takings that, "by a clear showing", are intended to favor a particular private party. He argued (basically) for a "rational basis with teeth" standard of review in takings cases, where the government would get the benefit of the doubt, but courts would be required to conduct a careful and extensive inquiry into the purposes of the taking to ensure that it was not taken for a merely pretextual public purpose.
O'Connor (joined by Scalia, Thomas, and the Chief) dissented in strong terms. She argued that as the result of this decision, virtually all private property may be taken simply if the government decided that the land will be "upgraded." This nebulous concept, according to O'Connor, presents too strong a likelihood it will be abused by government and property will be taken for the good other private parties - something that will have a disproportionate negative impact on citizens with less political influence.
Thomas also wrote a separate dissent in which he argued that Kelo was only the latest in a string of cases by the Court rendering the "public use" clause of the Fifth Amendment a "virtual nullity" in contradiction to the clause's "original meaning."
Impact:
Do I really want to go here? The case generated a lot of interest on dKos (and elsewhere in the Blogsphere), as you can see from my diary yesterday (my diary entry doesn't have much content itself, but I would encourage you to read the many interesting comments to get the feeling about the debate).
Actually, there wasn't much of a debate at all on the Blogsphere - about 99% of conservatives and liberals alike agreed that this was a terrible decision. Interestingly, part of my diary was quoted on several conservative blogs implying that my pro-Kelo take is Marxist, while I got the impression that many Kossacks believed this decision can be defended only pro extreme pro-corporate types. Not bad for a day's work! Nevertheless, this "pro-business Marxist" stands by the opinion that the Court's opinion was not only correct, but largely necessary given the realities of land planning and local economic development. I am well aware, however, that my position is the minority view, to say the least.
In any case, we'll wait and see whether Kelo means the end of property rights, as conservative Professor Bainbridge states unpersuasively here, or whether this decision combined with new and existing state statutory and judicial safeguards against egregious takings make planning boards' slightly broadened power a workable tool to substantially improve communities, as I believe. Time will tell.
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs. Inc. (5-4; Stevens dissenting; Ginsburg dissenting)
[Topic: Civil Procedure]
Background and Opinion:
Current law provides that in order for a plaintiff(s) to bring claims in federal court, there needs to be either a federal question involved or "complete diversity" between the defendants, meaning that all the defendants are citizens of different states. Further, to have a claim in federal court based on diversity among the defendants, the matter in controversy must exceed $75,000 (to limit minor disputes, which should be settled in state court). A 1973 case, Zahn v. International Paper, held that all plaintiffs in a multi-plaintiff suit must satisfy this requirement.
Congress passed a statute some years later, however, which allowed federal courts to hear many claims they would not otherwise have jurisdiction over, as long as those claims were related to the same "case or controversy" as the jurisdictionally-appropriate claims. After many Exxon dealers filed a class action suit against Exxon Corp. for alleged fuel-overcharging, the question soon became: did this statute overrule Zahn?
The Court, with Justice Kennedy writing, held that it did. In short, his analysis was based upon a broad reading of the statute, noting that the Court has never required Congress to "speak with extraordinary clarity" concerning federal-jurisdiction rules. Further, Kennedy made clear his belief that the Court's role was not to examine legislative history in making its decision - interpreting the plain text of the statute is all that is allowed of the Court.
Other Opinions:
Stevens (with Breyer) wrote one of the two dissents. Stevens' main point was that the statute, contrary to the majority's claim, WAS ambiguous, and an examination into the legislative history of the statute is therefore necessary. Stevens then concluded that such an examination reveals that Congress did not intend to overrule Zahn by passing the statute.
Ginsburg (with Stevens, O'Connor, and Breyer) likewise dissented, arguing that though the majority's reading of the statute was "plausible", the "less disruptive" course was to read it narrowly, and take from the statute's silence on the "amount in controversy" issue Congress' intent to let Zahn stand.
Impact:
Federal courts may now hear cases in multi-plaintiff class-action suits even when not all of the plaintiffs meet the $75,000 "amount in controversy" requirement. All it takes is one of the plaintiffs to meet the requirement. Like the recent changes to jurisdiction recently passed by Congress, requiring class-action suits exceeding (in aggregate) $5 million to be brought in federal court, Exxon will mean more class action plaintiffs in federal court - where judges are more defendant-friendly. So, it's a victory for corporations and other class-action defendants.
Halbert v. Michigan (6-3; Thomas dissenting)
[Topic: Equal Protection/Rights of the Accused]
Background and Opinion:
Michigan's state constitution provides that after an accused person pleads guilty or "no contest", an appeal is only by leave of the appeals court - in other words, there is no guaranteed appeal. Antonio Halbert, an indigent defendant, was accused of sexual misconduct. Representing himself in a Michigan trial court, he pled "no contest." Soon after, he sought to have a public defender appointed to help prepare his leave for appeal - but this request was rejected by both the trial court and the Michigan Supreme Court. Halbert then appealed to the US Supreme Court on the basis of Due Process and Equal Protection
The Court held that Michigan's denial of counsel to help Halbert prepare his leave of appeal was unconstitutional. Justice Ginsburg, writing for the majority, noted that while the US Constitution does not require states to mandate appellate review of criminal convictions, once they decided to allow appeals they cannot "bolt the door to equal justice" to poor defendants. The court rejected Michigan's contention that because the appeals court could simply reject Halbert's appeal anyway, it had no obligation to provide him with counsel. While true, the Court noted, Halbert does have the right to file for an appeal (whether accepted or not), and thus must be provided with counsel, particularly since "navigating the appellate process without a lawyer's assistance is a perilous endeavor for a layperson." Thus, the situation Michigan created - where poor people would not have a lawyer whereas wealthier people could afford their own - is unconstitutional.
Other Opinions:
Thomas (with Scalia and Rehnquist) dissented, arguing that the majority based their decision neither upon past precedent nor any particular provision of the Constitution. Since past Court precedent makes clear that poor defendants do not have the right to counsel in discretionary appeals, and Michigan's appeal was discretionary, Halbert had no right to an attorney to help file leave for that appeal. Thomas' dissent was pretty strongly worded, including the accusation that the majority was simply replacing their own "policy preferences" with that of Michigan's voters.
Impact:
An important decision that demonstrates the current Court's uneasiness with requiring poor defendants defend themselves when they have a right to challenge the accusations (either at the trial court level, where they are required to be, or when state law grants them the right to file leave for an appeal). Note that this decision, however, does not change the Court's judgment that it is constitutional to deny counsel to poor defendants when the appeal is discretionary.
Mid-Con Freight Systems v. Michigan Pub. Serv. Commiss'n (6-3; Kennedy dissenting)
[Topic: Statutory Construction]
Background and Opinion:
Federal law requires most truckers traveling across state lines to obtain a permit reflecting compliance with certain federal requirements, initially authorizing states to require proof of the permit but later allowing truckers to fill out just one set of forms (rather than for each state). The law creating this scheme, the Single State Registration System (SSRS), prohibited states from imposing any additional "state registration requirement." At the same time, Michigan required truckers to pay a $100 fee for each Michigan-plated truck operating in interstate commerce. A group of interstate trucking companies brought suit, arguing that the federal statute preempted Michigan's fee, since the fee was an additional "state registration requirement."
The majority disagreed, holding that the words "state registration requirement" apply only to those state requirements that specifically concern the federal SSRS. No language in the statute states that suggests that those words apply to any type of requirement that could apply to interstate carriers, and such a reading would be far too broad and contrary to the statute's text. Because the $100 fee does not concern the SSRS, it is not preempted by the federal statute.
Other Opinions:
Kennedy's dissent (joined by Rehnquist and O'Connor) argues that Michigan's fee is a "registration requirement" and that the words "state registration requirement" apply to all registration requirements, not just those concerning the SSRS. The dissent also expressed concern that the majority's opinion would allow the state to easily convert a registration fee (which would be preempted) into a "regulatory fee" (which would not be preempted).
Impact:
Not much (though truckers might disagree). This case turned upon interpretation of a particular (relatively minor) statute, so it won't have a broad impact.
Dodd v. United States (5-4; Stevens and Ginsburg dissenting)
[Topic: Statutory Construction]
Background and Opinion:
Federal prisoners convicted for "engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise" have one year after sentencing to file a motion setting aside the sentence (according to a federal statute). Michael Dodd had been convicted on the "criminal enterprise" charge. However, some time after Dodd's conviction, the Supreme Court decided Richardson v. United States, which held that a jury must unanimously agree on the defendant's guilt on all the underlying charges making up the "criminal enterprise." An 11th Circuit case made Richardson retroactive to previously convicted persons. Dodd then asked to have his sentence overturned in light on the Court ruling (because the jury hadn't been unanimous on the charges making up the "criminal enterprise" charge in his case).
After losing in lower courts because the one year limitations period had run out, Dodd brought his case to the Court. This question presented was: based upon the text of the federal limitations statute, when exactly does the one year limitation run out - one year after Richardson, or one year after the 11th Circuit made Richardson retroactive?
The Court opted for the first interpretation, based upon a "plain reading" of the text (I won't go deep into the whole analysis - it had to do with how "ifs" and commas should be interpreted). Thus, the Court denied Dodd's claim because it had been filed more than a year after Richardson.
Other Opinions:
Stevens (with Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer) wrote a dissent in which he admits that the most natural reading of the statute would dictate the result adopted by the majority. Nevertheless, this natural reading produces a "perverse result" that makes convicts' right to challenge their sentencing meaningless - simply because they will very rarely, if ever, be able to take advantage of a new Court case within one year when (in order to use it) another case would need to be decided making the case retroactive. According to Stevens, Congress could not have intended this result, and should have considered a second, more logically plausible interpretation.
Ginsburg (with Breyer) wrote a separate dissent explaining how her dissent makes sense given her joining in the majority in the Graham County case I'll summarize soon.
Impact:
A clear difference of opinion between the justices regarding statutory interpretation - with the majority sticking to the "plain reading" of the statute's text, and the dissenters aiming for the "most logical" intent of Congress where the statute (they claim) is "ambiguous". Other than displaying yet again the clear difference of Justices' opinions regarding the interpretation of statutes, the case appears to have little import generally (because of the uncommon situation presented in the case).
Orff v. United States (9-0)
[Topic: Statutory Construction/Sovereign Immunity]
Background and Opinion:
The US Bureau of Reclamation signed a contract in 1963 with the Westland Water District (in California) in which the Bureau would distribute water to the District. In the `90s, however, Congress placed new environmental obligations on the Bureau, and because of the regulations the Bureau cut down the amount of water it was supplying to the District. Several farmers, all of whom buy water from the District, brought suit against the US contending that though they were not directly parties to the contract, they could enforce the US' breach of its contract with the District since the reduction in water affected them.
Justice Thomas wrote for the unanimous majority rejecting these claims. The problem, noted the Court, is that any contractual suit against the government first requires the government to waive its sovereign immunity to such claims. While the US did waive its immunity from suits when it is brought into a suit as a necessary party, its waiver says nothing about when it is sued directly, as the farmers did here. Because waivers of sovereign immunity are strictly construed in favor of the sovereign (i.e. the US here), the farmers' claim was barred.
Impact:
Nothing too surprising - if the Court had gone the other way, it would have made it easier for third-parties indirectly affected by federal contracts to sue the government, thus providing a disincentive for the government to pass the sort of environmental (and other) regulations at issue in this case. So, a victory of sorts for environmentalists, as far as the facts of this case goes, at least.
Gonzalez v. Crosby (7-2; Breyer concurring; Stevens dissenting)
[Topic: Civil Procedure/Rights of the Accused]
Background and Opinion:
Aurelio Gonzalez pleaded guilty in Florida of robbery with a firearm. After 12 years of serving his 99-year sentence, he filed a federal habeas corpus petition alleging that his guilty plea had not been entered knowingly and voluntarily. After a federal court rejected his petition on the basis that it was filed after the statute of limitations had run out, Gonzalez challenged the court's ruling on the basis of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), which allows courts to relieve a party from the effect of a final judgment and allows the party to request a reopening of his case. The 1996 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act places certain limits on second or successive habeas petitions (to reduce frivolous petitions), however, so the question became whether Gonzalez's 60(b) action was a (more limited) "second habeas petition." If it was, Gonzalez's motion would be summarily dismissed. If it was not, however, Gonzalez could proceed.
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, said it was not a "second petition." While a 60(b) motion is (for all intents and purposes) a "second habeas petition" when the motion attacks the actual substance of a court's decision, it is not when it questions merely procedural defects (such as the statute of limitations in this case). Thus, contrary to the 11th Circuit's ruling below, the Court allowed Gonzalez to proceed with his 60(b) motion.
Nevertheless, the Court upheld the 11th Circuit's denial of Gonzalez's 60(b) motion, since Gonzalez did not provide the required showing of "extraordinary circumstances" to have his case reopened.
Other Opinions:
Breyer provided a short concurrence, and Stevens (with Souter) dissented. Stevens' dissent was limited only in that he would not have summarily denied Gonzalez's 60(b) motion because, he argued, Gonzalez did make a showing of "extraordinary circumstances."
Impact:
Gonzalez rejected a potentially broad reading of the antiterrorism statute in favor of one that limits its reach and offers convicted individuals more ability to challenge court holdings against them.