Researcher Dan Lund has
written a fascinating look into the social breakdown of Mexico's 2006 voters in El Universal.
...we are finding that voters' identity goes beyond the blue [conservative] and yellow [liberal] map of regional divisions...In general terms, we see that presidential candidates Felipe Calderón [conservative] and Andrés Manuel López Obrador [left-liberal] split the rural vote cleanly. In the upper segments of society, Calderón did very well, and in the heart of the working and urban marginalized classes, López Obrador did very well...The surprise, however, is how they split the "social mobility" vote -- the large segments of the lower middle class and the top of the working class...López Obrador had a strong position among these middle sector voters up through February of 2006. With the [Dick Morris-advised conservative] negative media campaigns...the two strong candidates divided this demographic sector...in nearly equal terms.
"Let the Votes Speak, Not the Tanks"
- Also below the fold how the return of "populism" to Latin America is more than US pundits' crude stereotypes.
A bit more from Lund on the demographics of who voted for whom -- and especially the dynamics of "hope and fear", in part thanks to Dick Morris who helped sculpt the PAN's fear campaign comparing Lopez Obrador to the imminent takeover of Mexico by Hugo Chavez.
The surprise, however, is how they [Calderon & Lopez Obrador] split the "social mobility" vote -- the large segments of the lower middle class and the top of the working class. This group represented the classic vote of fear and hope, as well as the newly defined vote of independents.
But these segments and the actual voting pattern need more examination. It seemed that López Obrador had a strong position among these middle sector voters up through February of 2006. With the negative media campaigns, the situation became more fluid and eventually the two strong candidates divided this demographic sector, again in nearly equal terms.
Today, the how and why of that dynamic are perhaps the critically important features of the election.
SOCIAL MOBILITY
In a society of dramatic income disparity and visible social differences such as Mexico, the hope for social mobility is the glue that holds things together. Those at the top of the pyramid don't want to lose their positions or privileges; they are concerned about social mobility if at all as a pragmatic or moral question for others in the society. Those at the bottom feel crushed, and often think of social mobility as a dream, or only a fantasy.
For those who are almost "there" or who feel like they or their children could get "there" (i.e. the middle class with its opportunities and privileges), social mobility is an organizing principle. It is a defining factor that plays into areas as different as living standards, lifestyle, education, career, residence, migration, emigration, savings, and political preference.
The lower middle class (called C- in market studies) and upper working class (known as D+ in market studies) produce the overwhelming number of newly defined "independents," who played a critical role in preferences and preference shifts in the context of political campaigns and advertising.
We know from qualitative work [this means in-depth interviews and observation, not just quick surveys] that these two groups are the most open to the dynamics of fear and hope as projected in campaigns. Sometimes, fear and hope are a nearly inseparable mix in perception.
Just how big are these segments in terms of population percentage?
Percentages of Segments
[Note: Chart below from the highest social classes A/B to lowest social classes E. Chiapas is a southern state bordering Guatemala with a large indigenous and rural population, heavy in oil and agricultural exports. Columnar formatting below mine.]
Group....National.....Chiapas
A/B........3.80%........0.5%
C..........8.30%........2.6%
C-........10.70%........1.9%
D+........26.30%........8.2%
D.........18.20%.......37.8%
E.........32.70%.......49.0%
* In the Congressional elections of 2003, unconvinced by Fox, many of these voters returned to the PRI and were attracted to the PRD. However, the number of independents continued to grow within these segments.
* The C-/D+ grouping was split nearly down the middle for Calderón and for López Obrador in 2006. The PAN could not hold their strong presence there, either by fear or hope, as Calderón came in 7 percent below Fox. Not surprisingly, the segment did not return to the PRI. Somewhat surprisingly, the PRD made significant advances with these segments (though López Obrador was stronger among the C-/D+ categories before the negative campaigns of March and April, 2006).
Who are these folks most concerned with social mobility?
The C- [lower middle class] market category or lower middle class, includes many families who have secured new credits in the recent period, for consumption, for a car and for a house. They are hopeful about staying in the middle class but fearful of falling... The D+ [upper working class] market category or top of the working class, includes many families who have experienced some downward mobility in the past decade, as well as others who have held on to favored working class incomes and hope for upward mobility.
Meanwhile, check out Council on Hemispheric Affairs' Senior Research Fellow Dr. John W. Green's overview of the return of Latin American populism.
In the U.S. pundit system (and among many prominent liberals) Latin American "populists" in the mold of Venezuela's Hugo Chavez or, in the view of some, Mexico's Lopez Obrador, are crude manipulators of people, those who are looking back to primitivism - instead of the brave "modernizers" who do very little for the poorest of their people but who do make very happy the editors of the powerful U.S. newspapers and are welcomed in business clubs far & wide.
Note: The term "Neoliberal" in discussing Latin America has little to do with current U.S. terms such as "Liberal" or "NeoConservative." It has to do with a rigid commitment to 'free' market orthodoxies and slashing government-supported programs, in this case using the term "Liberal" in its economic 19th century sense where private business is allowed to operate free of regulation or taxation, i.e., "laissez faire."
COHA Report: The Rebirth of Populism in Latin America Poses A Powerful Challenge to the Neoliberal Order
COHA Senior Research Fellow Dr. W. John Green
History may never repeat itself, but some patterns have a tenacious staying power. Latin America's populist political movements, as today's genera represented by Hugo Chávez in Venezuela would exemplify, display a recurring vigor which is not all that mysterious. On the one hand, powerful elites continue to dominate the region's economic and political structures. In the context of more than two decades of recent neoliberal economic initiatives, the rich have become much richer, and everyone else has tended to fall steadily behind. Social justice throughout the region is at best spotty, and often tends to be little more than an elusive fantasy or the prospected gift of blowhards. On the other hand, Latin America's less-favored inhabitants remain decidedly unsatisfied with the status quo, and indeed, see it as a noxious growth that must be cut at the root. The above are textbook conditions for the rise of populism...
...The failures of neoliberal policy in Latin America have now acquired a critical political mass. Especially telling was its catastrophic breakdown in Argentina between 1999 and 2002. Along with Chile, Argentina had been upheld as a poster student for the successful implementation of a neoliberal regime. The implosion of Argentina's economy, and the resulting political chaos, finally brought to the surface many of the criticisms that had been gaining strength.
The sins of neoliberal policy also came home to roost in the recent Mexican presidential election. Commentators there pointed out that the good life is clearly not trickling down to the blue collar worker and campesinos. Neoliberal measures first instituted by the PRI and then continued after 2000 by the PAN, have concentrated income and assets to the point that 17 percent of the Mexican population control 80 percent of the country's wealth. Job creation in the "formal" economy has rapidly lost ground to precarious forms of marginal "informal" employment. The countryside has been ignored and continues to generate high rates of internal migration to over-crowded urban centers, while the cost of financing the Mexican debt dramatically outstrips the amount spent on education and health care. Even though PAN's neoliberal true believer Felipe Calderón seems to have edged out the PRD's populist neoliberal critic Andrés Manuel López Obrador by the most razor thin of margins, the election demonstrated that such market-access policies are being rejected in Mexico's urban streets and gritty villages.
Over the last twenty years, Latin America's economic growth as a whole has lagged far behind other parts of the developing world, particularly China and India, but even places like Poland. And what growth there has been has largely benefited the upper classes. Therefore, it is hardly a surprise today's leftward tilt of Latin American politics has taken a populist character. Yet this time around, there are reasons to expect less resilient cults of personality. Populist movements may mature more quickly, and move beyond the ken of their leaders. We should consider that what gives these movements their dynamism is their powerful critique of social and economic injustice, which in combination with a firmly established taste for democratic structures, is not to be denied. Populist politics can certainly be messy and darkly amusing, and it is true that many of its practitioners can be given to authoritarian practices. A jocose Chávez could be seen as an example of the old populist mold- a leader who duplicates many of the stranger and more peculiar populist elements. But he also reflects the source of its moral power, espousing "distributive" justice, democracy, progress, and nationalism. And at their worst, populists really cannot be compared, nor should they be, with the military governments that replaced an earlier generation's golden age. Populism, at its root, is democratic in nature, even if many populist leaders (once they reach power) may not be democratically inclined.
Read the linked article for a fuller view. May I just add that for this reason I tend not to look at the post-election actions in Mexico as "Lopez Obrador" or "PRD leadership," but as the millions of people who have turned out or acted locally. These people aren't just blind minions, and I foresee it possible that this energy may have an ongoing role in Mexican politics.