crossposted from
unbossed
DHS? Don't Hit Steve? DooHickey Stereo? Doodle Hoodle Schnoodle? Might as well be. Makes more sense than and it's more descriptive than Department of Homeland Security. Sez who? Sez the Government Accountability Office, only they say it very politely.
Border Insecurity
Agents successfully entered the United States using fictitious driver's licenses and other bogus documentation through nine land ports of entry on the northern and southern borders. CBP officers never questioned the authenticity of the counterfeit documents presented at any of the nine crossings. On three occasions--in California, Texas, and Arizona--agents crossed the border on foot. At two of these locations--Texas and Arizona--CBP allowed the agents entry into the United States without asking for or inspecting any identification documents. After completing our investigation, we briefed officials from CBP on June 9, 2006. CBP agreed that its officers are not able to identify all forms of counterfeit identification presented at land border crossings and fully supports a new initiative that will require all travelers to present a passport before entering the United States. We did not assess whether this initiative would be effective in preventing terrorists from entering the United States or whether it would fully address the vulnerabilites shown by our work.
Border Security: Continued Weaknesses in Screening Entrants into the United States, GAO-06-976T (August 2, 2006)
And in Developments Abroad
If keeping evil doers out is important, being able to talk with, understand, and persuade foes and friends abroad also matters. To do this, you not only have to walk the walk, you have to talk the talk. In other words, you need US officials abroad who can talk to people in their own language. Post-9-11 it was so clear. Especially when we learned that scarcely a dent had been made in translating information.
So how are things going at State?
In 2002, the Department of State tried to deal with the problem of communication through its Diplomatic Readiness Initiative (DRI). GAO finds that while State has made progress, there are vacancies in posts critical to the WoT (War on Terrorism). State tried to meet shortfalls by offering incentives to attract mid-level officers to critical locations.
So how are they doing?
First, they have failed to evaluate the effectiveness of the incentives. Second, the incentives do not appear to be working.
Mid-level positions at many posts are staffed by junior officers who lack experience, have minimal guidance, and are not as well-equipped to handle crises as more seasoned officers. This experience gap can severely compromise the department's readiness to carry out foreign policy objectives and execute critical post-level duties.
. . . Almost one third of the staff in these positions do not meet the language requirements. The percentage is much higher at certain critical posts -- for example, 60 percent in Sana'a, Yemen. Several factors -- including the perception that spending too much time in one region may hinder officers' and specialists' promotion potential -- may discourage employees from bidding on positions where they could enhance and maintain their language skills over time and limit State's ability to take advantage of those skills and the investment it makes in training. Gaps in language proficiency can adversely impact State's ability to communicate with foreign audiences and execute critical duties.
Department of State: Staffing and Foreign Language Shortfalls Persist Despite Initiatives to Address Gaps GAO-06-894 (August 4, 2006)
Part I may be found here.