OF the many striking things in the long NYTimes article on Bush's Iraq failures, this one struck me the most:
American military officers have also wondered if the Shiite-dominated Iraqi government and the Americans share the same vision. Were the Iraqis not pulling their weight because they did not have the capability to provide security and proceed with reconstruction? Or did the Iraqi authorities have a sectarian agenda?
Did the Iraqi authorities have a sectarian agenda? Can you believe they are wondering this? The other striking thing in the article was the complete lack of discussion of the most glaring political flaw of the Bush Iraq policy - the rush to elections before a political agreement had been reached by the different Iraqi groups. More
In April 2006, I wrote a post I titled The Best and The Brightest, where I discussed a Foreign Affairs article that argued:
Rapid democratization, meanwhile, could be positively harmful in Iraq. In a Maoist people's war, empowering the population via the ballot box undermines the insurgents' case that the regime is illegitimate and facilitates nonviolent resolution of the inequalities that fuel the conflict. In a communal civil war, however, rapid democratization can further polarize already antagonistic sectarian groups. In an immature polity with little history of compromise, demonizing traditional enemies is an easy -- and dangerous -- way to mobilize support from frightened voters. And as the political scientists Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder have shown, although mature democracies rarely go to war with other democracies, emerging democracies are unusually bellicose. Political reform is critical to resolving communal wars, but only if it comes at the right time, after some sort of stable communal compromise has begun to take root.
Of course by April 2006, this advice was too late. I wrote:
No kidding, Mr. Biddle. But um, you do know the horse is out of the barn already don't you? That Bremer "turned over" authority to Allawi in the summer of 2004? That elections were held in January 2005? That an Iraqi Constitution was rammed through the "Iraq assembly" in the Fall of 2005? That elections were just held "ratifying" that Constitution?
About the Iraq constitution, I wrote:
The BEST result would have been a Sunni rejection of the Constitution that would have taken Iraq back to the drawing board. That result would have demonstrated to the Sunni that they indeed DO have a stake in the political process and some power to exert in that process.
THIS result demonstrates the exact opposite. Indeed, I expect that that the passage of the Constitution will make the "basic security problem in Iraq" worse -- what can Sunnis who argue for participation in the political process and abandonment of the insurgency have to offer in the way of evidence that Sunnis will have any power in that political process? Nothing. On the other hand, had the Sunni been able to reject the Constitution, they would have had a powerful argument for political participation and abandonment of the insurgency.
The result of the constitutional vote was the worst possible outcome - overwhelming Sunni rejection of the Constitution to no political effect. The divide can only worsen now.
Mr. Biddle, to write what you write in March 2006, is rather absurd. Your point would have been worthy in 2004 and 2005. But in 2006? Puhleeaze.
The worst political move of Bush's Iraq policy was to have elections in Iraq and to form a Shiite dominated government. But the love affair with Purple Fingers began in January 2005. I was pilloried for writing then:
. . . This Election is simply, in my estimation, an exercise in pretty pictures. Why? Because Elections are to choose governments, not to celebrate the day. Are the people elected capable of governing Iraq at this time? Without 150,000 U.S. soldiers? Or even with them? I have been accused of gloating by people right HERE because of my focus on the continuing violence. But my focus has been on the realities of governing a land in chaos, in the midst of civil war, with 150,000 U.S. soldiers the only force with the ability to provide security. And this is 2 years after the invasion.
And here we are in 2007 wondering if the Shiite Iraqi government has a sectarian agenda?
None of the Iraqi officials were able to explain why Mr. Maliki had been unwilling to allow the execution to wait. Nor would any explain why those who conducted it had allowed it to deteriorate into a sectarian free-for-all that had the effect, on the video recordings, of making Mr. Hussein, a mass murderer, appear dignified and restrained, and his executioners, representing Shiites who were his principal victims, seem like bullying street thugs.
Do you need an explanation? Do you really? So here is where we are:
Mr. Bush still insists on talking about victory, even if his own advisers differ about how to define it. "It’s a word the American people understand," he told members of the Iraq Study Group who came to see him at the White House in November, according to two commission members who attended. "And if I start to change it, it will look like I’m beginning to change my policy."
Yes my friends, where we are is fucked.