This morning I posted a summary of the various drafts of George Tenet's July 11, 2003 statement taking some of the blame for the 16 Words in the SOTU. I suggested that Cheney was the one who was unsatisfied with the CIA draft (and so almost certainly the final statement). But I promised I'd come back and talk about what wasn't included. I think it's very telling that CIA would not put two specific things into the statement.
- More specific mention that OVP was not the source of the trip
- Specific mention of the January 24 document
OVP Not Source of Trip
Now, I'm guessing about the first bullet--that OVP would have wanted something more specific disavowing their role as a source of the trip. I think it's a fair guess, given that as early as June 11 (or sometime thereabouts), Libby was trying to get CIA to say that State and Defense had been interested in the Niger intelligence. Curiously, by the week of July 6, Cheney had dropped his efforts to make that claim (I think he dictated these talking points on July 8)--and I'm not sure if that story ever made it into any official statements save the SSCI report. So instead of saying, as he had tried to a month earlier, that State and Defense were also behind Wilsons trip, Tenet's statement said only that,
CIA’s counter-proliferation experts, on their own initiative, asked an individual with ties to the region to make a visit to see what he could learn.
I find this curious for two reasons. First--did CIA refute the argument that anyone at State and Defense (besides, perhaps, John Bolton and Dougie Feith) were interested in the claim? In which case OVP couldn't refute Wilson's claims using that approach. Instead, the statement says only that CP sent WIlson, without a discussion of why, of whose question they were trying to answer.
The January 24 Document
There has been no discussion, at least thus far, of why a specific disavowal of OVP's role didn't appear. But Cathie Martin was asked about something else--the January 24 document reiterating the claims from the NIE.
W It was your personal position that the Tenet statement didn't go far enough. There was more detail he could have put into it. How close in time they had told the WH that this was still good evidence.
W Were you referring ot the fact that on Jan 24 a doct had been giving to WH setting forth certain information. You thought that should have been referenced.
Some kind of discussion about this.
4:17
W During the period you were aware of the Jan 24, I'm going to show you what, there are a number of redactions, this is the one that has been declassified for purpose of trial. She looks unsure. Asks for something else. He gives her something. She smiles.
W You have seen this.
M I have.
Puts doc up. Huge redaction, most of it [sorry eriposte!].
W This document, where the cover sheet is dated Jan 24, 2003 shows the WH was told Iraq had 550 tons of yellowcake and low-enriched uranium at Tuwaitha which is inspected annually by IAEA. Iraq also started trying to vigurously procure uranium ore and yellowcake; procuring either would shorten the time to produce nuclear weapons. [The document also includes the"early 2001" intell and the Congo and one other Africa one.]
M Neither you nor Libby were succesful at getting Hadley to include it.
Then, Wells and Martin went over her notes on the Niger intelligence. This is one section of those notes.
January 24 Document
- We reiterated our statement in NIE that Iraq was vigorously pursuing
- That restates language used in October
W You and Libby were taking the position that he should include this.
In other words, Wells elicited Martin to say that she wanted Tenet to include mention of the January 24 document in his statement, but Tenet did not. (Elsewhere, Martin explained that she wanted Hadley to include mention of the same document in Condi's talking points for the Sunday shows.) As with the OVP reference, the absence of such a reference in Tenet's mea culpa seems significant, particularly given that Libby and Martin were pressing so hard for its inclusion. Why wouldn't Tenet mention the January 24 document?
The document, as we've long known, is basically a restatement of the Niger claims from the NIE. As such, the document itself is not all that interesting. But check out the cover letter to it.
It appears that this chunk (orignally 34 pages) of material was sent from Robert Walpole, the National Intelligence Officer on Strategic and Nuclear Programs, to the White House Situation Room on Friday, January 24, 2003 at 8:47 PM. He (or the staffer who sent it) noted "they" needed to receive it by Saturday morning, January 25. He calls their attention to pp. 2-3 (though it's not clear whether those pages are the same two pages still included here).
But now look at the "they" in question: we can see Steve Hadley and Scooter Libby listed as recipients. Then the list of recipients gets all mangled. But the third name appears to be Bob, which would presumably be Bob Joseph, not least because Bob Joseph was Walpole's effective counterpart at NSC. And there there may be a fourth name which is totally unreadable. (Could it be Alan Foley??) [update: viget says it's Will Tobey]
Now, understand three things about this document.
- Libby has always claimed to be uninvolved in the drafting of the SOTU, or at least the part relating to Niger intelligence; he has claimed he was busy with Colin Powell's UN speech.
- Libby has used this document to justify using the Niger claim in the SOTU.
- Robert (Bob) Joseph is the guy known to have inserted the 16 words into the SOTU. He is also the guy who negotiated its continued inclusion in the SOTU with Alan Foley, head of WINPAC, who tried to get it taken out.
In other words, this cover letter belies Libby's claim to have been uninvolved in the SOTU. Since the Niger claims were purportedly not included in Powell's speech, the only reason to have received this on January 24, 2003 is if he was intimately involved in the drafting of the SOTU.
Also consider--this document repeats verbatim the Niger claims made in the NIE. It was sent urgently just four days before the SOTU, in respose to a request from Stephen Hadley, at a time when they were already drafting the speech. And presumably, just before or after they received the NIO from Africa's warning that the Niger claims should not be used, and at about the same time as Alan Foley said the Niger claim should not be used. The inclusion of Libby, Hadley, and Joseph on the recipient list of this fax, and the urgency with which it was sent, supports a speculation that many of us have voiced: That the January 24 restatement of the Niger claims was an attempt to give backup to a claim that had already been dismissed.
Tenet did not include that document in his statement of July 11. Which suggests he didn't put much stock in the document at that date, either. (I need to go check whether Hadley submitted it to Condi for use on the Sunday shows, but I don't think so.) If this document was so solid, why were Tenet and Hadley unwilling to use it?
One more thing about this document. Going back to the last page of Martin's notes (they rehearsed this in the trial), you can see the timeline she understood wrt the Niger intelligence.
March 2002 Evidence Joe Wilson trip
September 02 Brit report
October 01 02 NIE
October 7 02 Cincinnati Speech [in different colored ink]
January 24 03 Document restates NIE
Jan 28 03 SOTU
Feb 5 Powell UN
This is--in Cathie Martin's own understanding--the lead-up to the inclusion of the Niger claim in the SOTU. It appears that she did not know about or include the Cincinnati speech (in which Hadley was told clearly not to use the Niger claims) until this notetaking process. But she did know that the January 24 document "reiterated our statement in the NIE that Iraq was vigorously pursuing uranium." Looked at from this perspective, as Martin learned that Hadley had been told in October not to use the Niger intelligence, it becomes clear what purpose that January 24, 2003 document served. It allowed those writing the SOTU to use a claim they knew had been debunked the previous October.
Side note: The pages have curious refax marks, from the WH Situation Room to someone else during leak week. But they weren't sent together. The cover leter was sent on July 11, at 10:23, as page 59 of a bunch of pages. Whereas the report itself was sent after midnight, on July 12, at 12:26 AM, as page 1 and 2 of a fax. Was this more prep for Condi for the Sunday shows?