The Wall Street Journal has a very long opinion piece about Thomas Schelling, last year's economics Nobel Prize, written by another Nobelist (and Schelling student), Michael Spense, which beyond being a nice portrait of a truly interesting man (I'll admit to my own bias here as his work definitely inspired my own PhD dissertation), brings out some truly subversive ideas about Iran having nukes:
Tom Schelling expects Iran to get nuclear weapons. "Once a country becomes the owner of nuclear weapons, it is imperative that they learn to deal with them responsibly." He pointed out that it took the U.S. 15 years after World War II to learn to think seriously about the security of its weapons. (...)
The one error that is done most of the time when talking about Iran going nuclear is the expectation that they would not want to be, or could not be, responsible in their handling of their weapons.
The "would not want to be" part is hogwash. When you have such a potent weapon in your hands, you're certainly not going to give it away to uncontrollable outsiders, let alone terrorists (especially when such a weapon can with absolute certainty be traced back to you). And, as all other nuclear powersd learned (read the article to see how it was an error-prone process even in the USA), that requires specific controls and specific methods.
The issue of learning to be a responsible owner of these weapons goes beyond security and codes. (...) Who has control, are they trustworthy, are they put under control of the military, do we trust them? (...)
What is more interesting, and addresses the "could not" part, is that these processes and methods can be learned from others, and can be shared, including between enemies.
"These issues were addressed collectively and quietly by the nuclear powers during the Cold War. There was, for much of the Cold War, a surprising, effective, direct and entirely unofficial conversation involving policy makers and 'military' intellectuals from all the nuclear powers, including enemies, whose purpose was to learn and disseminate knowledge in this arena." This took placed because of the recognition on the part of all nuclear powers that there was a shared interest in elevating the level of competence in the nuclear club. "India and Pakistan and China were all involved in these conversations and have deep knowledge of the issues and best practices. Iran should probably be the next member of the group with North Korea to follow. Perhaps China, a highly competent and experienced owner of weapons, could start the process by organizing a conference that included others with experience, India, Pakistan, and then Iran and North Korea."
Thus Schelling's unexpected suggestion - to help Iran manage its nuclear weapons properly. And the reason for that is a lesson for today's occupier of the White House:
"Except for the end of World War II and the devices exploded over Hiroshima and Nagasaki, nuclear devices have not been used, and we have come to understand that they are useful for deterrence and not really for anything else. Part of the learning process is learning to be deterred." Iran and North Korea probably think they need nuclear weapons to prevent being attacked by us or others hostile to them. They need to learn that success in this limited objective consists of never using them.
Safety comes from accepting your vulnerability - and understanding that your vulnerability, by making your adversary able to attack you, makes him less in need of doing so. If you know you're strong enough to strike back and destroy an adversary that attacks you, you have much less reason to attack preemptively. Thus, if you let yourself be vulnerable, you give reasons to your adversary not to attack.
Denying that line of reasoning is predicated on worrying about your adversary not being rational, and doing something crazy. Well, the thing is, that worry also goes both ways, and the best way to ensure that your adversary is indeed going to behave rationally is to talk to him, show him that you yourself are rational, and that you expect the same from it.
That's what happened during the Cold War, and it worked, including with Pakistan, as Schelling, who was heavily involved in that process, confirms in the article.
Conversely, refusal to negotiate, demonization of the enemy, use of preemptive strikes, and the magical belief that you can "win" a nuclear war (thanks to "Star Wars" shields) are profoundly destabilizing, and dangerous to all.
Terrorists, Tom insists, "also need to understand that nuclear devices are really only useful for deterrence. They would be unlikely to have the capacity to deliver them on planes or missiles, and would be more likely to smuggle them into a hostile country and hide them in cities, and then threaten to detonate them if attacked--or unless their aims and conditions are met. The object should be not to blow up a city but to deter attacks on their country, region or organization." One is struck, once again, by the counterintuitive nature of the strategic issues related to these weapons--one has, to a large extent, a powerful strategic interest in the sophistication of one's enemies.
It's better to have nuclear weapons in the hands of an hostile regime than in rogue groups with no clearly identifiable strategic goals. It's better than the West (and Israel) be vulnerable to a rational State than to whichever terrorist group will manage to get its hands on a dirty weapon (and Iran having nuclear weapons to balance Israel's will massively reduce the motivation for smaller groups to have such a weapon).
Being vulnerable can be a strategic tool. There is no such thing as no risk, and no dependency on others. Interdependency - and mutual vulnerability - is the safest road to peace.