The title brings back memories doesn't it?
It just gets curious’er and curious’er...
We here in the progressive blogosphere already knew that despite all the fractious denials and rancorous public statements to the contrary, the Bush administration has indeed been talking clandestinely with Iran all along. Now, to what end or to whose benefit necessitated this furtive behavior, quite frankly, seems counterproductive to the administration's desired end goal regarding Iran -- whether it be war or cooperation.
Why not tell us the truth about it? Why would the administration hide diplomatic efforts with Iran when the Congress, the American people, the Iraq Study Group, and the majority of world leaders have all been pushing them to pursue this course since the beginning?
This from Friday's L.A. Times.com:
UNITED NATIONS — The White House insists that the United States won't talk directly with Iran until Tehran suspends its nuclear program. But U.S. officials have been discreetly meeting their Iranian counterparts one-on-one for more than a decade, often under the auspices of the United Nations.
The little-known history of these contacts between the two nations, which have not had formal diplomatic relations since the Iranian hostage crisis ended in 1980, is one of misunderstandings and missed opportunities. Budding cooperation on Afghanistan, Iraq and Al Qaeda has led to increased distrust and frustration instead of warmer ties — a record that adds to tensions as representatives of both countries prepare to attend a regional summit this weekend in Baghdad.
Mr. Smug & Smarmy himself, top State Department Iraq advisor, David Satterfield, said Thursday that he would confront Iran about its alleged provision of material and training for attacks on U.S. troops in Iraq. (as if, he hadn’t already done so) Satterfield added that he would not seek out Iranian diplomats and: "If we’re approached over orange juice... we are not going to turn and walk away."
Now, isn’t that special. More from the article:
Despite decades of tension, the continuing conversations reveal a slender swath of common ground upon which Washington and Tehran have built a delicate bridge: an interest in the region's security and resources.
"The point is that we think the Iranians can do a lot that will be conducive to peace in the region and good for them and good for their people," White House Press Secretary Tony Snow said last week. "We're going to continue doing whatever we can to encourage them to do it. And if they want to have bilateral relations, it is up to them."
This sort of clandestine behavior by this administration – any administration -- especially in the field of foreign policy, has always had a way of going askew and having a negative effect on world perception in general. So why do it? Is this a case of a condescending parent standing in front of his or her child with folded arms, tapping their foot on the linoleum, and giving them the silent treatment? Or, is this just another misguided implementation of cowboy diplomacy? Good cop... bad cop? Is life just one great big, Orwellian movie looping over and over again on an endless reel with these guys? Do I ask too many questions? Sorry, I have logic "issues."
But, I digress...
Anyway, the history books are plum full of U.S. clandestine foreign policy gone bad – secretive, back room deals – especially where Iran is concerned. In the 1980s, we had the Iran/Contra scandal; a prime example of misguided U.S. foreign affairs folly.
And, unfortunately, it’s wasn’t always the Republican’s dirty deeds that were bad for the relationship between America and Iran.
In 1994, at a time when the U.S. had pledged to uphold a U.N. weapons embargo, President Clinton secretly condoned shipments of arms to Bosnian Muslims from... you guessed it, Iran. After the folly was exposed in 1996, it met worldwide admonition. Moreover, behind the scenes, it contributed greatly to keeping both Iran and the U.S. from broadening much-needed ties; workable, diplomatic ties that just may have cutoff at the knees the Bush administration’s ongoing escalation of alienation attempts. And no, I’m not blaming Clinton for Bush’s foreign policy blunders. The big dog just inadvertently contributed to making it easier for Bush to pursue this wrongheaded course of action. But then, I doubt if Nostradamus could’ve anticipated the rise of George W. Bush.
To his credit, Clinton did eventually offer an "authoritative and unconditional" dialogue to which the Iranians immediately rejected, insisting that the U.S. first lift sanctions. Incidentally, it was through a U.N. initiative to provide a "safe house" in which the two adversaries could begin talks that precipitated at least a partial thawing.
Once again, I digress. Back to the article:
In late 2001, Iran made it clear it was interested in a broader strategic dialogue with the United States. But the U.S., thinking it had the upper hand, brushed off the overtures, and then-Secretary of State Colin L. Powell wrote to thank every foreign minister who had attended the conference — except Iran.
Six weeks later, in President Bush's 2002 State of the Union address, he named Iran part of an "axis of evil." Iranians had been expecting some sort of diplomatic reward in exchange for their help in Afghanistan, and took it as a slap in the face.
In May of 2003, Iran, feeling empowered by the elimination of two of its main existential threats, (Saddam and the Taliban) sought help through the Swiss Ambassador in Tehran, and sent a two-page fax to the U.S. State Department outlining a "road map" to normalized relations purportedly endorsed by Iran’s senior and religious leaders. Reportedly, it addressed all the differences between the two-countries – including U.S. concerns about the Iranian’s alleged nuclear program.
Of course, as expected, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, then director of the National Security Council, still says she never saw the "memo," and the president has yet to acknowledge it. To muddy the waters even more, the administration then excoriated the Swiss ambassador for overstepping his bounds.
So, allow me to set the scene. It’s late 2003, and the U.S. is at its height of power in the region with major military force in the theatre. The Taliban, Saddam and his sons are all gone – making both the administration and the Iranians very happy. The insurgency had barely gotten started and Iran had yet to begin enriching uranium. The Shia reformer, Ayatollah Khatami was still leader in Tehran. I guess it would have taken at least one ounce each of common sense and political insight to realize this as a good opportunity talk to Iran, and for the sake of world-peace put forth an earnest attempt to change the path of proliferation they were considering embarking upon. After all, we had Iran flanked, and Khatami and the other Iranian leaders had already altruistically helped us form a government in Afghanistan. In what better position could the administration be?
It’s ironic how moments of opportunity slip by so quickly, and all that you are left with is the irony and a fleeting notion of how things could have been. But, I guess that’s what happens when you’re blinded by greed, power and misappropriated oil profits.
As always happens, the fortunes of both countries shifted. The Iranians elected a populist firebrand, and we, egads, re-elected a corporate dunce. Iran began its uranium enrichment, and we forged ahead in our quest for a mega-billion dollar oil deal that would leave the Iraqi people stuck with a 30% share of oil profits for the next 30-years. No wonder the Sunnis resisted. In the deal, the Sunnis are only entitled to a jackal’s share of scraps from a lion’s kill.
To top it all off, back in January 2006, the U.S. asked for talks to begin on Iraq in which Iran would participate. Khalilzad had Cheney’s authority to arrange meetings with Iranian counterparts but wouldn’t ya know it, the Whitehouse inexplicably had a change of heart.
Former CIA analyst and Middle East expert at the State Department -- now at the New American Foundation, Flynt Leverett, reflected on the administration’s blunder.
"At the same time we're beating them up in the Security Council trying to get them under sanctions, we're trying to get them to help us in Iraq. Why should they be helpful?"
Why indeed...