In the March/April 2007 edition of Foreign Affairs, James Fearon matter-of-factly explains why even a successful troop surge will inevitably be counterproductive. Titled “U.S. Can’t Win Iraq’s Civil War,” Fearon’s essay is must reading.
By definition, an occupying power cannot “win” a civil war: Victory is possible only for one of the indigenous forces. All the occupying power can hope to do is to manage events long enough for a politically acceptable resolution (to it) to occur. Meanwhile, the occupying power finds itself taking sides regardless of its intent. In Iraq, this means that the United States has allied itself with a weak Shiite-dominated government whose control of Shiite interests -- much less Iraq’s national destiny -- is questionable.
The Bush Administration resists admitting that the conflict in Iraq has become a civil war, all appearances to the contrary. To do otherwise virtually admits failure. But, as Fearon argues persuasively:
“...there is a civil war in progress in Iraq, one comparable in important respects to other civil wars that have occurred in postcolonial states with weak political institutions. These cases suggest that the Bush Administration’s political objective in Iraq -- creating a stable, peaceful, somewhat democratic regime that can survive the departure of U.S. troops -- is unrealistic.”
He then reviews the lamentable history of postcolonial civil wars, making a compelling case that situation in Iraq amounts to a civil war whether we like it or not. And, he observes, “civil wars are rarely ended by stable power-sharing agreements.” The only example he cites of a civil conflict ending this way is South Africa’s, and that required the stature and ability of Nelson Mandela together with a unique set of circumstances (stability among the co-combatants after after a period of violence had established the military capabilities of each side). Neither exists in Iraq. Indeed, factionalism among the Shiites and Sunnis is so rife that is incorrect to think of them as cohesive opposing sides, each with definable leadership, goals, loyal soldiers, and coordinated tactics and communications.
Americans find it easy to think of the phrase “civil war” in terms of lines of gallant rebels and valiant bluecoats fighting out set piece battles, of Lee and Grant matching wits, with all of it ultimately guided by Providence and the wisdom and leadership of Abraham Lincoln. Suffice to say that none of that describes the reality of Baghdad, a tragic city rent by ghastly bombings with no evidence of the hand of divine Providence. It has become a tale told by an idiot, the meaning of which became lost long ago in the sound and fury of sectarianism and gangsterism. By aligning itself with the Maliki government, the United States has thrown its lot in with a dysfunctional Shiite regime whose ministers “...see their best option as cultivating militias...for current and coming fights, extortion rackets, and smuggling operations.” Oh, and propping up the Maliki government advances Iran’s strategic goals as well.
This, then, is the young democracy that George Bush takes credit for fostering. This is what American lives and dollars are being invested in: Support of a morally dubious regime that doesn’t even advance American self interest. The most likely outcome of the surge is making “...the United States passively complicit in a massive campaign of ethnic cleansing.” I don’t know about you, but this doesn’t sound like “victory” to me.
Without or without the presence of American troops, Fearon predicts an extended civil conflict. While the most likely outcome is a decisive military victory for one of the factions, the possibility of a power-sharing arrangement based on the common interest of oil revenues remains. Given the realities of civil wars, it is not within American power to impose such a settlement. We could play a facilitating role, albeit one that would require a nuanced, multi-pronged approach that is downright anathema to the Bush Administration. Frankly, even if the administration had the aptitude or the skills for balanced approach, they completely lack the necessary credibility.
Meanwhile, Phillip Carter points out that Rome burns while the administration fiddles with its surge. And if your wounds require treatment at Walter Reed Hospital, don’t worry. The man who promised this:
Throughout the area hit by the hurricane, we will do what it takes, we will stay as long as it takes, to help citizens rebuild their communities and their lives.
assures us that:
The problems at Walter Reed were caused by bureaucratic and administrative failures. The system failed you, and it failed our troops. And we're going to fix it.
In other words, everything he’s done for the residents of the Gulf Coast, he’s going to do for the veterans of the Gulf War. Sounds about par for the course.