One of the problems in the election integrity movement is that there are many voices, many ideas and various levels of understanding of the problems inherent to the technology of computerized voting. Suggestions for reform come from many sources and the debate has become disorganized and sometimes contradictory. Additionally, efforts to improve the system are sabotaged by shills for the voting machine industry, who secretly work against election integrity. Opponents of election integrity weaken reform efforts through legislative loopholes, by which accountability can be avoided.
HR811, also known as the Holt Bill was designed to bring accountability to voting machines. It has passed through committee in amended form and awaits final passage. Unfortunately HR811 still contains a huge loophole through which election fraud may continue: Touchscreen DRE's (Direct Recording Electronic Voting Machines), in which the official vote is electronic, and not paper, remain legal. HR811 will give the appearance of voting machine reform, without real change to the status quo. Under the terms of HR811, "Black box" DRE's can be used if they simply provide an ATM-style receipt for the voter. This is not a step forward.
Most precincts around the country are using touchscreen DRE's, which provide no parallel means for auditing the accuracy of results. Most counties, like mine in Pennsylvania, have spent millions of dollars on the new machines, and are loathe to get rid of them. HR811 requires only that the voter receive a paper "receipt" which documents their selections. Under the terms of HR811, counties will stick with these election-stealing DRE's for years to come, adding a "voting receipt printer" for good measure. Why is an ATM-style receipt from a DRE not a meaningful voter-verified paper ballot (VVPB)?
Here are some problems with such a system:
- In HR811, the electronic ballot is still the ballot of record. It is a simple task for any computer to print the paper receipt one way, the way the voter selected, but count the vote another way, different from the voter's selection, and store the incorrect vote in an invisible electronic cache.
- Printer failure. What if the DRE's printer doesn't work? Does the lack of a paper receipt invalidate the vote? Does the voter simply shrug his shoulders and say "Oh, well" and the vote becomes memorialized only in electronic form? This is not a voter verified paper ballot. It is a voter verified paper receipt.
- Many people will toss the receipt in the trash without even looking at it. The paper trail is thereby lost to any possibility of auditing.
- In the event of a challenge to the official results, how are the paper receipts to be collected and verified? Even if collected, does anyone believe that the paper record would carry any weight in such a challenge? As things stand today, when numerical discrepancies are identified, even scanned paper ballots are rarely hand-counted, even when the paper ballots are in the possession of the county elections departments. Will the tooth fairy be available to collect the receipts and do the recount for us? It is absurd to expect that this type of VVPB will do anything to improve accountability or auditing capability.
Paul Lehto, an election integrity attorney, was interviewed by Scoop. He is working on several fronts to battle the misinformation put forward by DRE proponents. Paul and others are publicizing problems with HR811, but their concerns are not being acknowledged by those who support this flawed bill.
Some advocates of voting integrity, such as People for the American Way, are pushing for passage of the bill in its current form. Their support gives cover for those who wish to keep the loopholes in place. The New York Times is similarly providing cover for election fraud.
In an editorial yesterday, The New York Times advocates passage of HR811 as it stands, loopholes and all.
May 16, 2007
Editorial
The Unkept Promise on Voting
Congress has done a terrible job of regulating electronic voting: It allowed A.T.M.-style voting machines to proliferate without requiring them to produce a paper trail that can be audited to ensure that the results are accurate. That has meant wasted time and money for the states, confusion for voters, and questionable election results. Fortunately, the nation’s delinquent lawmakers have a chance to set things right — through a bill introduced by Representative Rush Holt, Democrat of New Jersey, that would finally impose a paper trail requirement. There are some details that need fine-tuning, but Congress should move quickly to pass it.
Is the NYT's position simply based on its haste for election reform? Is the NYT suggesting that bad voting machine legislation is better than no legislation at all? Perhaps corruptible media outlets like the New York Times (see Judith Miller /Iraq War) are protecting corporate affiliates who stand to lose money if DRE's are outlawed.
Scientifically, the use of DRE's with ATM-style receipts cannot be defended as meaningful VVPB's. The ballots of record must be votes recorded on paper. Digital technology can assist us in counting the ballots, but it cannot be trusted to provide accurate results without credible auditing capability.
No federal legislation that says otherwise should be passed. Florida has done it the right way- they have banned DRE's altogether. The rest of this country should do the same.