Frontline's must-see latest documentary, ENDGAME (what when wrong, and why, in America's tragically failed effort to find a strategy for success in Iraq), shows how we got into the mess we're in, the shocking (even for the Bush Administration) level of incompetence and the lack of options we face now:
On Dec. 19, 2006, President George W. Bush said for the first time that the United States is not winning the war in Iraq. It was a dramatic admission from a president who had insisted since the start of the war that things were under control.
Now, as the U.S. begins what the administration hopes is the final effort to secure victory through a "surge" of troops, [snip] military and government officials talk to FRONTLINE about both the military and political events that have led up to the current "surge" strategy.
http://www.pbs.org/...
The fifth in a series on the Iraq war, this documentary casts a clear light on the mistakes made at the highest levels, both from a civilian and military point of view.
More below the fold...
In a particularly telling segment, Thomas Ricks from the Washington Post referred to the army's early strategy as: "War Tourism."
"You have war tourism. Units based on big forward operating bases - FOBS, going out and doing patrols from Humvees, usually not foot patrols, but mounted patrols, and then coming back to their base. If that's the way you're operating, you're not in the war. You're simply a war tourist."
General Jack Keane (Ret.), former Army Vice Chief of Staff, added:
"When you look back on that, and analyze that, it's a short war strategy. Nowhere in there, is a plan to defeat the insurgency."
The documentary points out that, originally, the strategy was to leave Iraq by Sept. '03, that the top generals in charge were brought back shortly after the invasion and command was assigned the "lowest ranked three start general in the Pentagon" (Sanchez) for what what was, essentially, supposed to be a mopping up and withdrawal operation.
The narrator says the planning did not account for an insurgency.
Here's my problem with that. I remember Saddam Hussein saying something to the effect of (paraphrasing here) -- prior to the start of the war -- if you attack we'll turn it into another Vietnam with guerrilla forces.
Didn't anyone think he might have meant it?
In fairness to Gen. Casey (the four star general brought in to replace Sanchez after Abu Ghraib), he was one of the first to point out that the solution needed to be political, not military, especially after he realized his requests for more troops would not be met.
He brought in a large group of military strategists (Casey's Ph.D's) who tried to figure out the best way fight the insurgency without alienating moderate Sunnis. At one point, they suggested the military hold off on attacking the insurgents at Fallujah until they could figure out a way to reach out to the moderate Sunnis.
That strategy lasted until Nov. 8, 2004 (just after the election -- get it?). Then the army was sent in to take Fallujah, resulting in God knows how many deaths on both sides and (what would turn out to be a Pyrrhic) victory for the United States.
"Ultimately," according to Major Thomas Mowle, one of the advisers that Casey had assembled, "if you draw out all the events that followed Fallujah, that certainly decreased the Sunni Arab support and, in that sense, it did help the insurgency."
The Iraqi elections produced warnings from Casey's Ph.D's that the Sunni boycott had split the Iraqi government into something that would increase the insurgency and prevent a political solution at the same time that Bush's rhetoric was painting the result at Fallujah as a success.
It's not that the military on the ground was failing there, btw. One must-see segment of the documentary shows the successful strategy created by a Col. H.R. McMaster (Clear, Hold and Build), where his troops went into a city, lived among the population in small units, built trust and protected the population while they fought the insurgents.
Requests to implement his strategy went up the ranks (I'm thinking like wildfire), but was stopped at the highest levels. The reasons given, some that might have had validity: it would take more troops and put them in more danger, others not so much: because, as noted above, you can't fight a war as a tourist.... It was not implemented by the Pentagon.
The State Department representative in Iraq found out about it and flew back to tell Condi Rice. She went before Congress and, in what turned out to be a direct challenge to Rumsfeld, formally recommended the Clear, Hold and Build strategy during a hearing that was broadcast live.
To say that Rummy (Cheney, too, I would think) was pissed, might just be the understatement of the century.
Rumsfeld quickly held a press conference where he said (paraphrasing): we didn't have the troops to implement it and it wasn't our responsibility to protect the Iraqis...
The insurgency exploded.
The State Dept and several generals did not give up on the idea of Clear, Hold and Build, however. They acknowledged it would put more troops at risk, but pointed to Col. McMasters' success as the only feasible strategy, and also noted, in what was described as an act of sheer will on McMasters' part, that he did manage to do it with the limited number of troops he'd been given.
Limited took on a new meaning, however, the summer of '06 when Clear, Hold and build was tried on a "limited" basis -- enough resources to clear but not to hold, with Iraqi troops for the hold part.
Which Gen. Keane says was doomed to failure.
Which it did (just before the '06 elections).
Rumsfield's departure soon followed. After that, the drive for the strategy of Clear, Hold and Build began to gain momentum until it developed into the "Surge" strategy, which Keane was told put together for a presidential briefing. He says he was clear with Bush about the resources needed, the risks, the need for a political solution, etc.
Keane came away from the meeting thinking he had a consensus.
But Thomas Ricks, referring to Dick Cheney as the "Moby Dick" of the administration, said (paraphrasing) that Cheney, as a rule, goes in after meetings and works on Bush until he changes the outcome of decisions.
As a result, the Clear, Hold and Build, which had worked with McMasters, began with exponentially less troops than were needed to provide success.
That's where things get interesting. Gates and Petraeus came on board. General Petraeus, who Ricks describes as a realist, turned out to be a strong advocate of Clear, Hold and Build, and brought both Keane and McMasters into his inner circle once he took command.
The troop build-up of the surge (which the documentary describes as "one last try") will be fully implemented early next month (4th of July, of all dates).
Some conclusions:
Going beyond the obvious point that we should never have gone into Iraq in the first place, here's my takeaway from this documentary:
- The planning from the start was to go in and get out within a few months. Anything that didn't fit in with that strategy was disregarded.
- The bases and embassy planned were part of a combination army and contractor force that would stay to protect oil resources and as a forward operating base on both Syria and Iran's borders, while the combat invasion forces would be withdrawn.
- The experienced commanding generals were called back within a few months of the invasion and the command was left to an inexperienced tank commander (Sanchez), which was a completely different type of war.
- The one successful strategy developed by Col. McMasters, Clear, Hold and Build, was not given enough consideration by Rumsfeld, Casey, Bush and Cheney.
- Surprisingly, Condolezza Rice did see the value in Clear, Hold and Build and did challenge both Cheney and Rumsfeld by going before Congress to advocate for it.
- The Clear, Hold and Build strategy was refused (by Rumsfeld) at a time when the circumstances on the ground might have allowed that strategy to provide a climate for the political solution, which is the only way this will be resolved.
- After Rumsfeld was ousted, Clear, Hold and Build was put into planning stages, resulting in what is described now as "The Surge."
- There is a strong question as to whether there are enough troops to produce an effective outcome (the same one described above - create an environment where the politics can resolve the situation).
- Gen. Petraeus is considered to be a realist by many critical of the military and of the administration. Therefore, it is possible his September assessment will be a sobering one.
- No matter what the outcome, we have no clean exit from Iraq.
The documentary goes into all kinds of detail, what led to insurgency, how it turned into a civil war, interviews from those intimately involved with the decision-making process which, for me, at least, showed how difficult a position our military has been placed in.
At every turn, whether it was due to lack of planning, faulty assumptions or arrogance, the people who have carried the brunt are both the Iraqi people and our military, from the lowest to the mid-highest levels.
This is truly Bush's, Cheney's and (now, as a legacy) Rumsfeld's war. It's not that the generals didn't make mistakes. They did. But I'm not sure how many of them could have done differently given the obstructive incompetence of their leaders.
When I watched this report, this disturbing, heartbreaking, infuriating and, ultimately, terrifying report, I found only one conclusion possible:
Iraq was to the Middle East what Katrina was to America in this one specific sense: It was a disaster climactic proportions that was the administration's own making as determined by their incompetence, arrogance, indifference and [add your description here].
Our military has always been our strength, our protection, our honor. They're being asked to go into the heart of a darkness of our creation and implement Clear, Hold and Build (let's stop calling a surge - that's a frame, not a strategy), so that the people of Iraq stuck in the fight zone can be protected while our troops fight the insurgents.
I'm not going to call that bad strategy. I'm going to call it bad timing. It's tragic to think that this is something that may have worked when McMasters first came up with it. Now, with the level of violence, with the fact of a civil war, it's hard to believe that it could work without many, many, many more troops or that it will or will not work without many, many, many more casualties.
That being said, I'd like to state that I am proud of our soldiers. That's a hell of thing to ask them to do. I'd rather have had them do it a few years ago, like before Fallujah..., if at all. But I'm not going to fault them for following orders on this.
They are, imo, both heroes and victims in this.
The same for the Iraqi people. I cannot IMAGINE what it's like to live in this hell of our making. And, while I have no sympathy for the people doing the blowing up -- I have a great and heartfelt sympathy for those getting blown up, kidnapped, executed, forced to become refugees, the list goes on.
As for the Bush Mal-Administration, I think this needs some serious investigation. The level of misuse of our military is unconscionable, as are the opportunities missed, the problems not planned for; oh, heck, just the unblankingbelievable incompetence has left us with a war that, no matter what endgame we choose, has no good outcome.
LINKS:
FRONTLINE: ENDGAME on PBS.
And the five part FRONTLINE ENDGAME SERIES ON THE IRAQ WAR (Video)
© 2007 jhritz