The Center for American Progress's John Podesta, Lawrence Korb, and Brian Katulis have an important analysis of the ISG and Salazar's legislation (S. 1545) that should be circulated to all of those Republican Senators, and the handful of cosponsoring Dems, supporting the bill.
They argue that some of the recommendations of the ISG are "ambiguous and others have been overtaken by events." The three main recommendations of the ISG report:
- Political benchmarks for the Iraqi government
- Accelerated and increased training for Iraqi security forces
- A region-wide diplomatic offensive
have all been substantially altered by the surge and the response of Iraqis to the surge. The third recommendation, at least with this administration, was always a pipe-dream.
The authors note five practical obstacles to the ISG's goals.
1. Conditioning U.S. troop withdrawal from Iraq on the outdated "We'll stand down when the Iraqis stand up" formula.....The fundamental challenge with Iraq’s security forces is not skills building and training. It is instead a problem of motivation and allegiance. The last six months in Iraq have reinforced the point that Iraqis will not take responsibility as long as U.S. forces remain in the country in such large numbers. Despite the latest escalation, the Iraqi government has not made any progress toward reconciliation.
2. Placing too much focus on Iraq’s central government, a dysfunctional and divided government that lacks the unified support of its own leaders.... Meeting these political benchmarks will likely have no effect on the major conflicts in Iraq and may well exacerbate the Kurd-Arab and intra-Shi’a conflicts emerging in Iraq’s northern and southern regions. As such, these benchmarks provide false hope for resolving a series of conflicts that require a much deeper solution than the United States can provide unilaterally.
3. Paying insufficient attention to the 2005 Iraq Constitution and the will of the Iraqi people.... According to a poll of the Iraqi public conducted in 2006, 71 percent of Iraqis wanted the Iraqi government to ask for U.S.-led forces to be withdrawn from Iraq within a year or less. Another 61 percent support attacks on U.S.-led forces. In short, many Iraqis are opposed to the ISG recommendations, and as a result the United States would face severe problems attempting to implement them.
4. Supporting the unconditional training of Iraq’s security forces, which is deeply problematic.... The core of the ISG report is the recommendation that the United States accelerate and increase the training of Iraqi security forces. It proposes an American advisory effort of between 10,000 and 20,000, comparable to the U.S. advisory strength in Vietnam at its height. Increasing the capacity of the Iraqi security forces, however, won’t rectify their three main problems: [unreliable Iraqi security forces, the use of Iraqi security forces by the Iraqi government to promote sectarian interests, and force protection concerns for the U.S.]
5. Offering undeveloped ideas on a regional diplomatic offensive.... Rather than dealing with Iraq’s multiple internal conflicts as discrete problems that require separate attention, the ISG approach could result in a "one-size-fits-all" diplomatic package. Progressives should recognize that each of Iraq’s neighbors have differing interests in each of Iraq’s conflicts, and then advocate that the United States tailor its diplomacy to each conflict in an attempt to deal individually with the myriad problems confronting Iraq.
Beyond the fact that the ISG recommendations are largely now rendered meaningless by both the passage of time and the detrimental results of the surge, codifying these recommendatons in a toothless sense of the Senate resolution--which Salazar's effort is--achieves nothing to change the course of the occupation. It does nothing to take us closer to a redeployment of forces out of Iraq--indeed, it could result in a never-ending commitment.
Today's vote on the Webb amendment was a clue for us on where our Senators stand. The Democrats who are co-sponsoring the Salazar amendment have already committed to a concrete effort to change the direction of this mess, and should be commended for that. But they should also be urged to do more. Support for the Salazar amendment falls far short--they need to do more.
Call them and tell them to vote for both of the upcoming Levin/Reed and the Feingold/Reid amendments. Tell them that they should support the one element of the ISG that should hold--a redeployment of troops by April 1, 2008.
The same goes for those "defecting" Republicans. We got seven of them on the Webb amendment--none of those seven should now vote for anything less than Levin/Reed. Let them know that a vote for the Salazar amendment and no real, concrete effort at policy change just won't cut it.
A list of and contact info for the target Senators is below the fold.
Democrats:
Robert Casey (D-PA): (202) 224-6324
Blanche Lincoln (D-AR): (202) 224-4843
Mark Pryor (D-AR): (202) 224-2353
Bill Nelson (D-FL): (202) 224-5274
Republicans:
Lamar Alexander (R-TN): (202) 224-4944
Bob Bennett (R-UT): (202) 224-5444
Susan Collins (R-ME): (202) 224-2523
Pete Domenici (R-NM): (202) 224-6621
Judd Gregg (R-NH): (202) 224-3324
Richard Lugar (R-IN): (202) 224-4814
John Sununu (R-NH): (202) 224-2841
George Voinovich (R-OH): (202) 224-3353
John Warner (R-VA): (202) 224-2023