Walter Pincus had an article today in the Washington Post titled "Contractors in Iraq Have Become U.S. Crutch" in which he points out:
While U.S. contractors have provided personal security to officials in other conflict zones, those in Iraq are now being used in all aspects of the struggle because, as the CRS report says, doing otherwise would require policymakers "to contemplate an increase in the number of U.S. troops, perhaps increasing incentives to attract volunteers or re-instituting the draft."
emphasis mine
With a roughly 1 to 1 ratio in Iraq, this is no exaggeration.
This is the fore front of what has been one of my standing issues with the way contractors in Iraq have been used. The use of contractors can allow for a disconnect to develop between this country's population and the military endeavors our government takes on. To a large degree a volunteer military does this, we do not see the protests today specifically because there is no draft.
But even with a draft, there has to be political consideration for where and how troops are used and how many of them to send off. With an ineffective public message, it is difficult to mobilize even a small amount of troops much less sustain them. But even with an effective, though tiring, public message, the number of troops sent to combat has a direct impact on the number of people in the voting population who are directly effected.
Though not a complete remedy, the use of contractors can not be underestimated as a tool for softening the public impact a war or some military action may very possibly create. This is a real danger if the action is inappropriate, unsupported, or not a benefit to the populations on the receiving end of this action. The very essential public check on our policies is weakened by the use of contractors.
This, of course, has a flip-side. That threat of a negative public reaction is, in part, why we do not intervene, or more correctly, in part why politicians are hesitant to act abroad in regions that could use our direct aid. What we are often left with is pursuing our interest in any way we can, and proper peacekeeping is left to less equipped, trained and organized forces. I want to stress this is not the only reason we are not more active in regions that could use us, just that it does play a role.
Ensuring the Executive Branch does not abuse the flexibility contractors can bring to an operation is the role of proper Congressional inquiry and oversight. Warfare and its related necessities are the most volatile and guarded skills, and knowledge of and capacity for these skills requires stable institutions tasked with delegating these responsibilities along with the facilities of the government to handle the vital peripherals that accompany the sending of men and women into war zones:
New statistics from the United States Department of Labour offer greater insight into the number of defence contractors killed in Afghanistan and Iraq, but questions remain about compensation for injured or dead contract workers and their families.
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In Iraq, the Department of Labour reports that 1,001 contractors died between Mar. 1, 2003 and Jun. 30, 2007.
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AIG and many of the other insurance providers have been most unwilling to expand benefits to most of the contractors. Twenty-five to 30 percent of the time they'll pay. The rest of the time they contest. Especially with PTSD (post-traumatic stress disorder)," said Davis.
"When the insurance companies do have to pay, and don't contest it, they usually wait until told to do so by administrative law judges. Hearings usually require nine to 18 months to schedule," he added.
"When a claim is filed we have 14 days to accept the claim or deny it. If it goes over 14 days to collect documentation you have to reject the claim. Then you can accept the claim after you've received the documentation," AIG spokesman Chris Winan told IPS.
for more see Susie Dow's work
The loyalties, motivations and even legal standings of non-State forces operating in a war zone, and those contracting them to do so, fall outside the stable institutions of the military and reside, though attached to the State and its policies, in a market of conflict and in an on-the-ground-world that has yet, to this day, been legally enforced.
In addition, the use of contractors inhibits the internal capacity of our military institutions:
But the expanded contractor use has evoked new attention to a 1995 criticism of the practice. According to the study, a Defense Department Commission on Roles and Missions found then that depending on contractors was detrimental and that it kept the Pentagon "from building and maintaining capacity needed for strategic or other important missions."
A couple days ago Pincus reported on the Defense Intelligence Agency's increase of the use of contractors for intelligence related work:
The Defense Intelligence Agency is preparing to pay private contractors up to $1 billion to conduct core intelligence tasks of analysis and collection over the next five years, an amount that would set a record in the outsourcing of such functions by the Pentagon's top spying agency.
The proposed contracts, outlined in a recent early notice of the DIA's plans, reflect a continuing expansion of the Defense Department's intelligence-related work and fit a well-established pattern of Bush administration transfers of government work to private contractors.
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The DIA did not specify exactly what it wants the contractors to do but said it is seeking teams to fulfill "operational and mission requirements" that include intelligence "Gathering and Collection, Analysis, Utilization, and Strategy and Support." It holds out the possibility that five or more contractors may be hired and promised more details on Aug. 27.
Again, the same problems arise. Most substantially with the Department's in house capacity to gather and analyze data, but of no lesser sensitivity with interrogative measures employed by the private sector, who are not bound by the Geneva Conventions. Both raise fundamental questions on the structure of DOD's intelligence activities.
The DOD is not alone. Though old news, it bares repeating in light of the DIA's recent increase the talk earlier this year of the CIA possibly outsourcing up to 70% of their budget, CIA Director Hayden has tried to bring some functions back under Langley's roof:
A procurement executive from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence gave a PowerPoint presentation at a conference in Colorado and let slip a staggering statistic - private contracts now account for 70 percent of the intelligence budget.
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It's not just the money that flows out the door, either: It's also the people, as the companies offer hefty raises to government employees who join their ranks. A recent report from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence found that "contractors recruit our own employees, already cleared and trained at government expense, and then 'lease' them back to us at considerably greater expense."
This process - called "bidding back" - has created a brain drain. Two-thirds of the Department of Homeland Security's senior officials and experts have departed for private industry. Michael Hayden, the CIA director, worries that his agency has become "a farm team for these contractors."
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The Senate Intelligence Committee explicitly chided the spy agencies earlier this month for "increasing reliance on contractors." In response, the CIA announced that it would pare the number of contractors by 10 percent.
Keep in mind that increasing the intelligence capacity of the Defense Department was one of Rumsfeld's main goals in reshaping the Pentagon and there is no reason yet to think Gates has a different approach. Rather than build these institutions in-house, especially if this "War on Terror" is going to be for decades, wouldn't it be counter-productive to sustain such a reliance on the private sector? Outsourcing can enhance government operations but it can also sap the self-reliant capacity of the institutions entrusted with the nation's security.
Some of these issues are being addressed in upcoming legislation. David Price (D-NC) has two bills up that focus on contractor accountability and transparency. One is HR 2740 which:
would bring all contractors operating in a war zone under the jurisdiction of U.S. criminal code, and stand up FBI field units in conflict areas to investigate allegations of criminal misconduct.
Also known as the MEJA Expansion and Enforcement Act of 2007, this would require, in part, for the Justice Department to respond with a report that would include:
(A) a description of the status of Department of Justice investigations of abuses alleged to have been committed by contract personnel, which shall include--
(i) the number of complaints received by the Department of Justice;
(ii) the number of investigations into complaints opened by the Department of Justice;
(iii) the number of criminal cases opened by the Department of Justice; and
(iv) the number and result of criminal cases closed by the Department of Justice; and
(B) findings and recommendations about the capacity and effectiveness of the Department of Justice in prosecuting misconduct by contract personnel.
The second is HR 369, the Transparency and Accountability in Security Contracting Act of 2007, which is a much more in depth bill that seeks to provide transparency, better communication and effective oversight for the use of contractors.
The Senate's version HR 369 is S 674, the Transparency and Accountability in Military and Security Contracting Act of 2007 which is sponsored by Senator Obama and cosponsored by Senators Durbin and Whitehouse.
These bills aren't cure-alls, but they are part of the legislative process of gaining a foothold on the issues that need to be addressed. The Bush Administration has been absolutely negligent in effecting proper oversight for contracts and contractors. In a related Justice Department annual funding bill, a similar MEJA related provision was approved in which the House Appropriations Committee noted that
“the Department has not prosecuted any cases of civilian misconduct under MEJA, despite numerous allegations of criminal misconduct by civilian contractors.” The legislation directs the Department to report to Congress on the number of incidents of alleged misconduct reported to the Department, the number of investigations undertaken, and the number of criminal cases opened and closed. The legislation further calls for an assessment of the Justice Department’s capacity to prosecute contractor abuses under MEJA and whether additional resources or legal authority is needed in this regard.
This legislation does some good in some of the immediate areas that need to be addressed, but there should at some point develop a detailed understanding of when to use contractors and when not to. There should be clear standards of what are inherent government functions and what can be enhanced by outsourcing.
There should also be a consensus on what contractors are being used for. If our policies are bad, the use of contractors can only enforce those policies and add to the lack of public knowledge and understanding of our foreign policy. If the policies are good, contractors can play a beneficial role.