The announcement by Edwards that he will accept limits in order to get public financing wil shake up the race. First of all, it can be done -- Russ Feingold accepted the same kind of limits that he wanted others to follow and won elections that way. As Kos writes, it is a gamble. However, it might be a good gamble on his part; he might be at the point where he figures he will lose anyway if he does not gamble.
First of all, in order to win the primaries, Edwards must be able to differentiate himself from the rest of the field. He has been doing that in the last two days. For instance, he explained that the difference between his plan and Hillary's on Iraq was that he would withdraw all combat troops while Hillary would not. Hillary would bring the pharm companies, the drug companies, and the insurance people to the table to devise a healthcare plan; Edwards would not.
So, for him to be able to differentiate himself from the rest of the field, Edwards is accepting matching funds. That way, he is attempting to make the big money that Clinton and Obama have raised an issue against them. After all, if Clinton and Obama are the ones racking in the millions, that means that they are more likely to keep as much of the status quo as possible and not make the changes that we need.
Edwards has done this before -- he was heavily underfunded in his first Senate race and still defeated Lauren Faircloth, the Republican incumbent. He did it the same way -- by portraying himself as the champion of the people against the powerful. And as I mentioned at the top, it has been done before -- Feingold did it twice, in 1992 and 1998, despite being heavily outspent. However, the question is whether it can be done at the national level. The person who came the closest to winning by following this approach was Jerry Brown in 1992, who ran a surprisingly competitive race against Bill Clinton despite being badly outfunded and being almost totally ignored by the media. Brown was able to outlast Paul Tsongas, who was racking in the second place finishes, but who had to drop out due to lack of funds.
One of the reasons we are in the game is to change a system which we feel has been totally corrupted by corporate donors and big money. However, once someone actually takes a stand and directly challenges that, then isn't it a strange argument to turn around and argue against Edwards' approach, when he is directly challenging the system? That is the sort of thing that Russ Feingold does all the time, and he is well-respected here for the most part; if Edwards is doing the same sort of thing that Feingold is doing, then he should be worthy of similar approbation. But if big money is simply part of the game, and the ideals of campaign finance reform are dead in the water and are a thing of the past, then so is Edwards.
There is something else that we must consider as well -- the Internet is an equalizer when it comes to big money. As our success in 2006 shows, the netroots have shown that they can neutralize a funding disadvantage because it allows candidates to get their message out even if they do not raise the kind of money that other candidates can. And even when they do not win, they have shown that they can force the other guy to spend tons of money where they would not have otherwise. In other words, it ties down resources that would have otherwise been spent elsewhere. So, Edwards would have a much more equal playing field than Feingold or Brown did because he can get his message out much more effectively than they could back in the 1990's.
The danger, as Markos mentions, is that we will end up with a broke or underfunded Edwards as the nominee, and the DNC forced to pick up the slack. But the fact of the matter is that under Dean's tenure, he has cut into the RNC advantage in fundraising. If the Republicans continue to run on their record of perpetual warfare, then they will continue to bleed fundraising support, and the Democrats will continue to make up ground.
Of course, if you are an Obama or Clinton supporter, this smacks of opportunism or desperation. They may point out that Edwards had the chance to forego public financing earlier in the year, but chose not to. If he was interested in standing up for principle, then he should have, according to them, done so back in the early part of the year rather than wait until late September to do so.
Others may argue that money is free speech, per SCOTUS rulings over the last 20 years, and that it is simply part of the game. The SCOTUS gutted the movement to reform campaign finances after Watergate when they ruled that political contributions were a form of free speech. Thus, subsequent supporters of campaign finance reform like McCain and Feingold had to settle for half-measures which in some ways, made things worse. Now, there are 527's, which McCain and Feingold never dreamed of when they first thought of their bill.
Others may argue that Edwards is doing the wrong thing by passing the buck onto the DNC, per Markos' comment:
Except that we end up with a broke or seriously underfunded nominee with six months before the convention. The Edwards campaign argues that the DNC can pick up the slack. And sure, Edwards could funnel money he can't raise to the DNC to act as a proxy. But as we've seen since forever, the RNC always grossly outraises and outspends the DNC. That could change next year, of course. But again, it's a gamble.
People may argue at this point that Edwards is simply passing the buck and that he should be responsible for his own message rather than pass it off to someone else. Others may point to the practical reality that what the DNC or MoveOn might say about you might be totally different than what you intended to say about yourself.
So, the question is this -- are you more likely or less likely to vote for Edwards as a result of what he did?