Michael Smith, he of
Downing Street Memo fame, today puts out at RawStory
an analysis of Blair's stovepiping of British Un-Intel in the runup to the Iraq war in the fall of 2002. British intelligence, Smith points out, were much less certain of Saddam's nuclear, biological and chemical capabilities than were the stove-piped US estimates. For the British public, Smith argues,
Saddam's delivery systems were as important as what payload they might carry, as Cyprus, for example, might be within striking distance.
Blair capitalized on this aspect of Saddam's supposed capabilities, "fixing the facts to match the policy" in a way that was never used in the US/Bush efforts.
"The transformation of the JIC [British joint intelligence committee] drafts into the very much firmer September dossier, was explored in detail by the Hutton Inquiry, with particular reference to the 45-minute [time-to-launch] claim. ...
WHAT DOES 45 MINUTES IMPLY? BELOW THE JUMP
That Iran MIGHT have had missiles which MIGHT have had a 45 minute to launch capability was morphed into the idea that they possessed long-range Soviet-made missiles:
There was of course nothing sub-conscious about the way in which the 45-minute claim was hardened up. The source did not specify the precise context for this timing and no-one in either British spy agency MI6 or the JIC Current Intelligence Group on Iraq seemed to know.
But among military intelligence experts on artillery and missile systems, the figures rang some very loud bells. They appeared to be straight out of the old Soviet artillery and rocket troops manual. The most likely systems the Iraqis would use to deliver chemical or biological weapons were all Soviet-made mortar, artillery and missile systems. These included the al-Hussein surface-to-surface missile. This was an Iraqi version of the Scud missile, which was the Soviet army-level surface-to-surface missile system.
There then came the realization of the propaganda potential of the shakey 45-minute number:
Put at its simplest, Alastair Campbell, Blair's Director of Communications, knew the tabloid headline writers would, British bases in Cyprus were '45 minutes from doom.'
Campbell told the Hutton Inquiry that it was the Prime Minister who insisted that the claim had a prominent place in the dossier. James Dingemans, counsel to the inquiry, said Campbell had 'plainly had selected 45 minutes as a message worth including in the Prime Minister's foreword.' Campbell asserted that the Prime Minister had.
Smith then traces the expansion of the 45 minute claim through draft documents, and the progression of the strength of the claim:
'The language you queried on the old page 17 has been tightened.' Put simply 'may be' had become 'definitely.'
Blair's mechinations were of great importance in obtaining at least a semblance of public support invasion, and thus greatly strengthening Bush's hand. Michael Smith has done a fine job of fleshing out how Blair twisted and exaggerated selected intel, in a manner analogous and simultaneous with similar efforts in the US. For the Brits, delivery systems propaganda took on a role which had no applicability in the US.