...Hilton with a date in a desparate bid for attention.
So thank you for taking a moment out of your lives to read even this far. Like you, gentle reader, I have been climbing the walls out of frustration these past many years. Unlike you, I did not figure out how to use dKos until last week or so. What a great thing to find! I beg your indulgence while I vent at last.
There are so many well-spoken, skilled diarists here. It is a bit intimidating. The way some folks cross-reference and research is astounding. I don't expect people to just take me at my word, but one thing has been bugging me ever since Seymour Hersh's article appeared.
The Iran war planning controversy, and the SecDef Rumsfeld criticisms are always discussed as two separate stories. Consider for a moment, or for a week, that they are not. To understand what all this is about, let's take "Deep Throat's" advice and follow The Button.
HYPOTHESIS
America's top military leadership is maneuvering so as to obtain legal basis for de facto veto power over President Bush's ability to launch a nuclear attack on Iran.
MAKING THE CASE - INTRODUCTION
The above hypothesis is bound to strike many readers as overly alarmist and, possibly, childishly naive. I suspect this to be true, because usually I am sitting with the skeptics when it comes to yet another 'amateur conspiracy theorist'. I my defense I can only adopt an 'aw-shucks' attitude, and say that I don't think anyone could have foreseen a Bush Administration.
So, aw-shucks, let's play Follow The Button for a few paragraphs, and see what we find. We have two places to look so far.
1. Sy Hersh reported on threatened resignations over nuclear planning. What do plans have to do with Who Has The Button?
2. Six retired Generals and more call for SecDef Rumsfeld to resign over his dismal performance. What does the past in Iraq have to do with future Button-pressing aimed at Iran?
MAKING THE CASE - NUCLEAR PLANNING
Americans all know their President is also the Commander-in-Chief (CinC) of the military. Most every American understands, correctly, that only the President can authorize the actual use of nuclear weapons. But most Americans assume, incorrectly, this boils down to absolute control over every aspect of use. In truth, various legal limitations appply to every US official involved in use of nuclear weapons. This includes the President. The President cannot use nuclear weapons as the CinC pleases, according to nothing more than CinC whim.
American nuclear doctrine calls for nuclear weapons to be used according to pre-designed, pre-approved plans. It is this term plan which is causing so much confusion. The same term is used with different meanings in different parts of the same government publication. To avoid confusion, I will coin a new term, "nuclear attack profile" or NAP.
A lot of time and effort goes into all the planning needed to design the optimum nuclear attack profile. American warfighting doctrine demands that any use of nuclear weapons take place in accordance to such a nuclear attack profile. This ensures the nuclear weapons will be targeted according to well-thought strategies.
What does this mean? It means we can make much more sense of the Seymour Hersh article. Mr. Hersh reports of possible resignations over the nuclear planning over Iran. With our new term we can better understand what is being said, and why it is so significant.
The threatened resignations are not over routine, theoretical planning. The resignation threats are over the President Bush's insistance the Pentagon include a NAP in the Iran warplan.
Without a NAP in the official warplan, The Button essentially passes over to Pentagon officers. In this situation, nuclear weapon use must be requested by the Theatre Commander. IOW the military has The Button.
The NAP is a legal hinge decisive enough for even the hint of mass resignations. Such a move would be unprecidented in American military history. What could be the motivation? Legal control over The Button during a crisis provides ample reason.
MAKING THE CASE - RUMSFELD & THE RETIRED GENERALS
It is unprecidented in American military history for Generals and Admirals to resign in direct opposition to their political superiors. But political criticism from retired Generals and Admirals is not so unprecidented. Retired Generals often act as proxy spokespeople for their pals still on activy duty. Criticism via proxy is mildly unusual, but not unprecidented.
What is noteworthy is the large number of officers, all of General officer rank, who all personally held command or staff assignments in the controversial operations, to all appear at virtually the same time, all with virtually the same talking points. Put another way, the Pentagon is "Swift-Boating" Rumsfeld through its willing proxies.
What does this have to do with the extremly not routine idea of nuking Iran? The answer, of course, is found by following The Button.
In American policy, the President is the only person who can authorize the use of nuclear weapons. This authorization passes from CinC down the Chain of Command (CoC) and eventually reaches the appropriate military officers. The first stop in the Chain of Command is the Secratary of Defense.
According to the "Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations", the defined CoC is treated as an important legal mechanism in the actual use of nuclear weapons. There is nothing in that public document, at least, to suggest the SecDef is forced to agree with the CinC decision to use nuclear weapons.
In other words, once the CinC presses The Button, it passes into the hands of the Secratary of Defense. The SecDef is now authorized to order the use of nuclear weapons ... but nowhere is is said the SecDef is compelled to do so.
The Chain of Command is a legal reality in American use of nuclear weapons. President George W. Bush can count on Donald Rumsfeld's commitment to extreme action. Would any other SecDef be willing to Press The Button if Rumsfeld were to resign?
Any new SecDef that could pass Congressional approval, that is. No "Brownie" will be confirmed in the face of a 35% Presidential approval rating. Congress is full of GOP incumbants suddenly looking for ways to distance themselves from President Bush. The loss of SecDef Rumsfeld would not be a symbolic blow to the Bush administration ... it could very well be a fatal blow.
The criticism over SecDef Rumsfeld is spoken in terms of Iraqi failures. It is phrased that way, because Sec Rumsfeld is vunerable to such talk. But the intent, the intent is to break the Chain of Command. Who has this intent? The American active-duty military community for whom the retired officers serve as public proxies.
MAKING THE CASE - WRAP UP
These two separate stories can be seen instead as two different parts of a single strategy. The hypothesis assumes a President Bush willing to risk a nuclear strike on Iran. And it assumes a professional military horrified by its informed opinion on the aftermath of such folly. In these circumstances it makes sense that the Pentagon would seek to firm up its legal standing to head off such a disasterous course of action.
This is not a question of a Pentagon mutiny. This is a matter of legal maneuverings. American nuclear warfighting doctrine puts human decision-making "in the loop" for the most serious of reasons. The Pentagon is not without legal tools to resist a President out of touch with reality. Is it not important to bring these tools to light in the public debate?
The diarist hopes the national debate will consider these stories as more significant than mere symbolism. Please consider them instead as stories of control in the very real sense - control of The Button.
For the next day, or a week, please consider develpments with this possibility in mind. And thank you for reading this far. Nice to meet you, dKos community
The Quicklund diary page features more on this, and closely related topics.
DISCLAIMERS AND OTHER ACTS OF CYA
The diarist is a layman and claims no more authority for his opinions than any other citizen. The hope is this viewpoint might gain some interest and further public discussion, especially by those with professional subject knowlege.
Commentary is partially based on readings in the Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations JP 3-12 dated 15 March 2005. A copy may be found here.
http://www.globalsecurity.org/...